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Critique of Positive Existentialism

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One evening,
level crossing of Ognina Cannizzaro,
in Catania.

"If we admit that the category of the non, a category that actually exists in the spirit, a positive and concrete procedure for ordering and systematizing our knowledge, is immediately put into action by the presence in us of certain affirmative judgments, and which comes to mark specific character of certain thoughts that result from these judgments, the negation of any negative function will be completely stripped of these considerations. Because denial is a denial of existence. With it a being (or a way of being) is placed and then rejected into nothingness. If negation is a category, if it is nothing but a seal indifferently placed on certain judgments, how could it annul a being, make it suddenly arise and give it a name and then plunge it back into non-being? If the previous judgments are observations of fact, such as those we have taken for example, the negation must be like a free invention, which detaches us from this wall of positivity that encloses us: it is an abrupt solution of continuity that cannot in no case result from previous affirmations, an original and irreducible event. But here we are in the sphere of consciousness. And consciousness cannot produce negation except in the form of negation consciousness. No category can "inhabit" consciousness and remain there as a thing. The non, as an abrupt intuitive discovery, appears as consciousness (of being) consciousness of not. In a word, if there is being everywhere, not only the Nothingness, as Bergson

says, is inconceivable, but negation cannot in any case derive from being. The necessary condition for it to be possible to say "not" is that non-being is a continuous presence, in us and outside of us, is that nothingness continually penetrates being. But where does nothing come from? And if it is the first condition of the questioning attitude and, more generally, of any philosophical or scientific research, what is the first relationship of the human being with nothing, what is the first canceling conduct? [...]. We are immediately tempted to consider being and non-being as two complementary components of reality, in the manner of shadow and light; In short, it would be a question of two rigorously contemporary notions which thus come together in the production of existing ones, that it would be useless to consider them in isolation. Pure being and pure non-being would be two abstractions, and only their union would be the basis of concrete realities. Such is certainly Hegel's point of view. In *Logic*, in fact, he studies the relationships of being and non-being and defines this Logic as "the system of pure determinations of thought". [...] The true concrete for Hegel is the existing, with its essence, it is the totality produced by the synthetic integration of all the abstract moments that are overcome in it in demanding their fulfillment. In this sense, being is the most abstract and poorest abstraction, if we consider it in itself, that is, without its passing into essence. Indeed: "Being relates to the essence as the immediate to the mediated. Things, in general, 'are' but their being consists in manifesting their essence". Being passes into essence; this can be expressed by saying: "Being presupposes essence". Although the essence appears, in relation to being, as mediated, nevertheless the essence is the true origin. Being returns to its foundation: "being is surpassed in essence". Thus the being separated from the essence, which is its foundation, becomes "the simple empty immediacy". And this is precisely how the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* defines it, which presents being pure "from the point of view of truth" as the immediate. If the principle of logic is to be the immediate, this principle will be found in being, which is "the indetermination that precedes all determination, the indeterminate as an absolute starting point". But immediately being so indeterminate "passes into its opposite". "This being pure" writes Hegel in the *Little Logic* "It is pure abstraction, and, consequently, absolute negation which, also taken in its immediate moment, is non-being". In fact, isn't the nothingness, simple identity with itself, complete emptiness, absence of determinations and content? Pure being and pure nothingness are therefore the same thing. Or rather it is true to say that they differ. But always according to Hegel, "since here the difference is not yet determined, because being and non-being constitute the immediate moment, this difference cannot be defined for now, it is a pure opinion". This concretely means that "there is nothing in heaven and on earth that does not contain being and nothingness". [Being] is reduced with Hegel to a manifestation of the existing. Being is connected to essence, which is its foundation and origin. The whole of Hegel's theory is based on the idea that a philosophical procedure is necessary to find at the origin of logic the immediate starting from the mediated, the abstract starting from the concrete that founds it. But we have already noted that being is not related to the phenomenon as the abstract is to the concrete. Being is not a

"structure among others", a moment of the object, it is the very condition of all structures and of all moments, it is the foundation on which the characteristics of the phenomenon are manifested. Likewise, it is not admissible that the being of things "consists in manifesting their essence". Because then a being of this being would be needed. On the other hand, if the being of things "consisted" in manifesting, it would not be understood how Hegel can fix a pure moment of being, where we would find no trace of this first structure. It is true that pure being is fixed by the intellect, isolated and identified in its determinations. But if the passage towards the essence constitutes the first character of being and if the intellect limits itself to "determining and persevering in the determinations", it is not clear how it does not determine being precisely as "consisting in manifesting". It will be said that, for Hegel, all determination is negation. But in this way the intellect would limit itself to denying of its object that it is other than what it is. This is undoubtedly enough to embarrass any dialectical process, but it should not be enough to make even the germs of overcoming disappear. Inasmuch as being surpasses itself in other things it escapes the determinations of the intellect, but in as much as it surpasses itself, that is, the origin of its passing is in the most intimate of its being, it must instead appear as it is to the intellect that configures it in its essential determinations. To affirm that being is only what it is should at least mean leaving being intact as it is one's own overcoming. Here is the ambiguity of the Hegelian notion of "overcoming" which now appears to be a development from the depths of being considered, now an external movement by which this being is dragged. It is not enough to affirm that the intellect finds in being only what it is, it is still necessary to explain how being, which is what it is, can only be this: such an explanation would derive its legitimacy from the consideration of the phenomenon of to be as such and not by the negating procedures of the intellect. Heidegger, in his most important work, demonstrated the legitimacy of the question about being; this no longer has the character of a scholastic universal which it retained in Hegel; there is a sense of being that needs to be clarified: a "preontological understanding" of being that is closely linked to all the conduct of "human reality", that is, to all its projects. Likewise, the aporias that arise when a philosopher arrives at the problem of nothingness all turn out to be without scope: their value lies only in limiting the use of the intellect, and simply showing that the problem is not within the competence of the intellect. Instead, there are numerous attitudes of "human reality" that imply an "understanding" of nothingness: hatred, prohibition, regret, etc. There is also for the "Dasein" a continuous possibility of being "faced" with nothingness and discovering it as a phenomenon: anguish. However, Heidegger, while establishing the possibilities of a concrete perception of nothing, does not fall into Hegel's error, he does not preserve a being, not even an abstract being in the non-being: the nothing is not, it cancels itself. It is sustained and conditioned by transcendence. [...] Every determination, for Heidegger, is overcoming, because it requires a withdrawal, a stance. This overcoming of the world, a condition of the very formation of the world as such, the "Dasein" accomplishes in the direction of itself. Indeed, the characteristic of selfhood (Selbstheit) is that man is always separated from

what he is from the whole volume of being that he is not. He announces himself to himself on the other side of the world and goes back to internalize himself, starting from the horizon: man is "a being of distant". It is precisely in the movement of interiorization, which passes through everything, that being is formed and organized as a world, even without the priority of the movement over the world, or of the world over movement. But this appearance of the self beyond the world, that is, of the totality of reality, is an emergence of "human reality" into nothingness. The overcoming of being can only be completed in nothingness. At the same time, precisely from the point of view of the beyond the world, being is organized in the world, and this means, on the one hand, that human reality is formed as an emergence of being in non-being, and on the other hand, that the world is "suspended" in nothingness. Anguish is the discovery of this double and perpetual annulment. And precisely starting from this overcoming of the world, Dasein realizes the contingency of the world, that is, it poses the problem: "On the basis of what is there something rather than nothing?". The contingency of the world therefore appears to human reality as it has placed itself in the void to perceive it. Here, then, is the nothingness that surrounds being on every side and, at the same time, is expelled from it: here is that the nothingness is given as that for which the world receives its contours of the world. Can this solution satisfy us? Certainly it cannot be denied that the apprehension of the world as a world is nullifying. The world, appearing as a world, presents itself as being none other than it. The necessary counterpart of this apprehension is therefore the emergence of "human reality" from nothing. But whence comes the power that human reality has to thus emerge from non-being? No doubt Heidegger is right to insist that denial is grounded in nothing. But, if the nothing is the foundation of the negation, it also encloses the non as its essential structure. In other words, it is not as an undifferentiated emptiness or as otherness that arises as otherness, that the nothing founds negation. The nothing is at the origin of the negative judgment, because it is itself negation. It founds negation as an act, because it is negation as being. The nothing can be nothing, if not expressly annulling itself as the nothing of the world: that is, by directing itself expressly, in its annulment, towards this world, to constitute itself as a rejection of the world. Nothingness carries being in the womb. But in what sense does the emergency explain this nullifying refusal? It is certainly not transcendence, which is "projection of oneself beyond ...", which can found the nothing, on the contrary it is the nothing that is in the very bosom of transcendence and conditions it. Now, the characteristic of Heideggerian philosophy is to use positive terms in the description of Dasein which hide implicit negations. The Dasein outside of himself, "in the world" is a "being of the distant", it is "restlessness", it is "its possibilities", and so on. All this means that Dasein "is not" in itself, "is not" with respect to itself in immediate proximity and "surpasses" the world in that it poses itself as non-being in itself and as non-being the world. In this sense Hegel is right against Heidegger when he says that the spirit is the negative. Only the same question can be posed to both of them in scarcely different forms; we must say to Hegel: "Is it not enough to place the spirit as the mediation and the negative, must negativity be shown as the structure of the being of the

spirit in order to be able to constitute itself as negative?". One can ask Heidegger: "If negation is the first structure of transcendence, what must be the first structure of 'human reality' in order for it to 'transcend the world'?". In both cases we show a negating activity and don't worry about basing this activity on a negative being. Heidegger, moreover, makes nothingness a kind of intentional correlative of transcendence itself, like an original structure. But, furthermore, what is the use of affirming that nothing is the basis of negation, if we then come to formulate a theory of non-being which hypothetically deprives the nothing of any concrete negation, if I emerge from nothing beyond the world, as this extra-mundane nothing can found the small parentheses of non-being that we meet at every moment in the bosom of being. I say that "Peter is not there", that "I have no more money", etc. Is it really necessary to overcome the world towards nothingness and then return to the bosom of being to found these daily judgments? And how can this be done? It is not a question (in this case) of making the world slip into nothingness, but simply, keeping within the limits of being, of refusing an attribute to a subject. It will then be said that every rejected attribute, every denied being is grasped by one and the same extra-worldly nothing, that non-being is like the fullness of what is not, that the World is suspended in non-being, like the real in the bosom of the possible? In this case it would be necessary for every negation to have a particular overcoming: the overcoming of being towards the other. But isn't this overcoming really Hegelian mediation? and have we not already in vain asked Hegel for the annulment basis of mediation? [Not] one can conceive the nothingness outside of being, as a complementary and abstract notion or as an infinite means where being would be suspended. The nothingness must be given in the depths of being, in order to perceive that particular type of reality that we have called negativity. But being-in-itself cannot produce this intra-worldly nothingness: the notion of being as the first positivity does not contain nothingness as one of its structures. And on the other hand, it cannot be said that it excludes it: it is unrelated to it. Hence the problem that arises, now with a particular instance: if nothingness can be conceived neither outside nor starting from being, and if, on the other hand, being non-being, it cannot draw from itself the force necessary to "cancel itself", where does nothingness come from? It is therefore important that the interrogator always has the possibility of detaching himself from the causal series that constitute being and can only produce being. Indeed, if we admit that the question is determined in the interrogator by universal determinism, it would cease to be not only intelligible, but also conceivable. A real cause, in fact, produces a real effect and the being caused is completely immersed in the cause in positivity: to the extent that it depends, in its being, on the cause, there could not be the slightest germ of anything in it; insofar as the interrogator must be able to carry out a kind of annulment withdrawal in relation to the interrogated person, he escapes the causal order of the world, frees himself from being. This means that, with a double movement of annulment, it cancels the questioned in relation to himself, placing him in a neutral stage, between being and non-being - and cancels himself in relation to the questioned by detaching himself from being. , in order to be able to give birth to the possibility of a non-being. Thus, with the question, a certain

amount of negativity is introduced into the world: we see nothingness looming over the world, coloring things. And at the same time the question comes from an applicant who justifies himself in his being as an interrogator by detaching himself from being. It is therefore, by definition, a human process. Man presents himself, at least in this case, as a being who makes nothing appear in the world, as he invests himself in non-being for this purpose. These observations can serve as a guideline for us to examine the negativities we talked about earlier. There is no doubt that these are transcendent realities: distance, for example, imposes itself on us as something that must be taken into account, which must be overcome with effort. Therefore these realities are of a particular nature: they immediately indicate an essential relationship of human reality with the world. They derive their origin from an act of the human being or from an expectation or from a project, they all indicate an aspect of being as it appears to the human being who is committed to the world. And the relations of man with the world indicated by negativities have nothing in common with the a posteriori relations that develop from our empirical activity. It is not even a question of those relations of use by which the objects of the world are discovered, according to Heidegger, to "human reality". Rather, every negativity appears as one of the essential conditions of the relationship of use. For the totality of being to be ordered around us in forms of use, to be subdivided into differentiated complexes that refer to one another and that can serve, the negation must arise, not as one thing among others, but as a categorical rubric, to preside over the arrangement and distribution of the great masses of being into things. The appearance of man in the midst of the being who "invests" him makes it possible to discover a world. But the "essential and primordial" moment of this apparition is the negation. Thus we have reached the first objective of our study: man is the being for whom nothing comes into the world. But this question immediately provokes another: What must man be in his being, so that nothingness comes into being through him? Being can only generate being and, if man is involved in this process of generation, only being will be born from it. If he is to be able to formulate an inquiry into this process, that is, to question it, he must be able to keep it under the gaze as a whole, that is, to put himself outside of being and at the same time undermine the structure of 'being, of being. However, it is not given to "human reality" to annul, even temporarily, the mass of being that is placed in front of it. Instead, he can modify his relationship with this being. For it, putting an existing particular out of scope means placing itself out of scope in relation to this existing. In this case it escapes him, it has put itself out of reach, it has withdrawn beyond nothing. Descartes, after the Stoics, gave this possibility of human reality to produce a nothing that isolates it: freedom. But freedom is but a word. If we want to delve deeper into the question, we must not be satisfied with this answer, and we must immediately ask ourselves: What is human freedom if through it nothing comes into the world? ».

(J.-P.- Sartre, *Being and nothingness* , tr. It., Milan 1968, pp. 46-62).

Introduction

Appearing by chance on the corrugated horizon of my fifteen years, Abbagnano's *History of Philosophy* was a guide book for furious six months of total immersion. For me that book, with all the deficiencies that later seemed clear to me, it was as if the messenger from an unknown world had presented himself at the door telling me that elsewhere, in completely unknown territories, there were young people who were talking around a teacher of things that I did not know and that fascinated me as they fascinate all the mysteries beyond our reach.

So those pages took on the task of ferrying me into a world that I suddenly realized corresponded to my innermost desires, the world of philosophy, where I installed myself in a short time, immediately trying to understand where the mysterious heart that I felt beating resides. Ignorance and knowledge acted in concert on me, one soliciting the other, and vice versa, operating in different registers and making me face efforts that otherwise, that is, not solicited in this mysterious and alchemical way, would have been impossible for me. The livid horizon of many philosophical theories, often difficult almost by sideline, excited me to the struggle, to a cosmic conflict where I ended up preferring the illegible Aristotle to the readable Plato. What did it matter to me, that I had by now bitten into the fruit of knowledge, of the fact that I almost did not understand much of it? Nothing, I went on all the same, and so the great hunger for knowledge suggested to me, imperceptibly, a method that many years later I came to know had to do with hermeneutics. That book was by Abbagnano - as I discovered later - so to speak, being essentially a product of the workshop, revised and arranged by the master craftsman, but what importance could it have for me? My physiological condition was more or less that of a sponge, there was no reading at the time that I did not confiscate quickly, composing and reassembling the various parts into a continuously boiling whole. Lightning splinters, shorthand notes, diagrams and summaries, logical formulas and technical memorization, an incredible heap that crushed and reassembled Abbagnano's work, together with the immediately following readings by Windelband and De Ruggiero. I accounted for this adventure in the *Introduction* to the two volumes of *Lessons (out of place) in the History of Philosophy*, it is not worth talking about here.

Abbagnano, seen through (his) *History of Philosophy*, was not at the time what could be defined as a novelty. The method and the choices were dated and followed a stale pragmatism, but for me who could not know it was fine. I was opening up a prospect and this went very well. Perhaps a teacher in flesh and blood would have opened my eyes to many false obstacles, which I considered insuperable, but since the old priest, a friend of my father, who had taught me Latin and Greek lessons since I was eight, yes he was tired of dealing with my engulfing gluttony, I couldn't even ask him. Thus I became, taking possession of the boundless matter that lay supine in that book, intolerant of any advice and ready to make judgments that mostly sounded at least strange. I had become an annoying and know-it-all young scholar, but I wasn't going to stop. Constitutionally lacking that presumed infallible shrewdness that characterizes the know-it-all, I was a well-known but passing through, I never stayed long in a cultural possession, I immediately put it back into play and therefore I damned it to get lost in an ever new adventure.

So I was quick to notice what was not in the book and to go and look for it. There was no culture external to philosophy, poetry, literature, music, science, mathematics, in short, the world was missing, while everything seemed to revolve around the cloaks of licensed philosophers. There could not have been a better invitation for me. Go elsewhere, go back to my thirteen volumes of Vallardi (*Literary History of Italy*), be amazed by sociology, return to music, be amazed by mathematics, and more. In short,

Abbagnano had opened an extraordinary universe to me and I, in a short time, had come to the conclusion that instead of being crowded it was too monotonous, it had to be enlarged. So I was amazed that he himself did not accuse himself of partiality, of laziness, of approximativity. In this bizarre condition I persisted for all the years necessary to check these gaps in person, directly at the source.

Mine was not audacity, it was a self-confident project, immediately provided with cruel and ferocious comparisons with other authors much more rooted in the international culture of poor Abbagnano. Sure I was putting my feet on the plate, but it was a habit for me. I took possession of a knowledge, it seemed to me immediately asphyxiated and I tried to breathe elsewhere, in the harmonic correspondences that I thought harbored in another place. It wasn't quite like that, but what did I care? Palpable was only the knowledge I was acquiring by not standing on it like a dead body. Other, I was looking for something else, what I was looking for I didn't know, and I don't even know now. It was certainly not existentialism I was looking for, I was still moving in the Crucian sphere, with some peripheral reading of Gentile.

The constant bubbling of the readings was tearing Abbagnano's framework to pieces, replacing it with schemes that carried in the front door the indication that visitors were not welcome. I dramatized my solitary adventure and enriched it with heroic as well as insipid examples. In the end, Abbagnano, under the book species, or rather the only book of his that I had read, was dulling to me, while my exasperated demands were rampant in a certain exaggeration, in a refined screech between what I knew and what I wanted to know, unusual disproportions, more and more elephantine. There was hardly anything left of the book, but I was investing a lot in the person, obviously hypothetical, not being able to write letters or declarations of love to great men, presumed to be such. I had, after all, too much self-love to do such a thing.

I had to put aside judgments and choices, and this was much more difficult. Comparisons and weighings were needed out of my reach. So I slowly began to carve out tiny frank territories, gradually resolving the contrasts with direct readings of small passages or whole works of modest size. An example, *The discourse on the method*. Annotations in the margins of the texts helped me to constantly put new questions on the table. But who could give me the answers? They were also vague questions, sometimes overflowing or lacking a noteworthy topic. Peregrine and strange, some resolvable in hypothetical contrasts, often brief, sometimes more consistent, ephemeral but not stupid, according to what later became my more acclimatized judgment. I did not support a thesis but many at once, I did not describe moods but impulses and primordial forces made the same appointment in those annotated margins. The ultimate goal was non-existent, I was moving blindly.

I was addressing two existential conditions, the positive one of accumulation - knowledge, qualifications, social recognition - and the negative one of marginalization, aimed at preferring the particular to the general. I was beginning to annoy the large systems, architecturally protected, which I did not yet know well but which I sensed only available to convey better than the others into the massacre, for example Schelling, strangely even more than Hegel. The units held together by the connecting force of great intellectual endeavors made me suspicious and angry, perhaps because my parallel, modestly compiling fantasies had more or less failed or never really started. The marginal note thus grew in importance until it moved to the new draft in an independent editorial office, charged with a different meaning that tended to be unrelated to the heavy debt position of departure.

Like many others, I recorded the influence in me of the post-war period, periods of new and powerful decadence, when the old values shattered by the world conflict had not yet re-assembled into new mythologies, as will regularly happen in the Sixties. And I reflected this generalized condition in my reading of philosophy, through Abbagnano's reductive prism.

I thought possible a different path, practically vagabond, going in search of philosophical plots - even the historicism of which I was still affected could lend itself to use - scattered elsewhere, an infinite gathering pilgrimage, with the aim of silencing my adventurous desire for knowledge and to accumulate an alternative possession, not codified in Abbagnano's argumentative prudence. I dreamed of finding wild places - Baudelaire at that time was one of them - where it was not easy to understand the exact starting point of a path in the forest and where it was going to get bogged down, in a rhythmic and content ambiguity. I imagined separating every theory, starting with Aristotle and logic, to go down into the single mechanisms, discovering appearances and exposing the tricks that had to be there but of which the impassive Abbagnano was silent. I was reflecting on the road to take to dissolve that sense of suffocation that caused me the theories capable of giving answers to everything, of organizing and commanding instead of making available, of giving.

Certainly I did not distinguish well what new and important could be in each theory, a central nucleus to be safeguarded at all costs, and this was the reason why more and more often I fell back on the method having little to say about its merit. Aristotle and not Plato. I could not get out of this reductive subjection - above all precision - by remaining clinging to Abbagnano's book, I had to get rid of it. I couldn't do it on the spot and so I decided to go to Turin and confront him directly. But it was not easy, the work in a bank and the lack of an adequate qualification prevented me. Solving these two problems took a few years but, in the end, I succeeded. It would be foolish to retrace the painful itinerary of these instrumental efforts here, so I will put it aside.

At the same time, my traces remained in the unknown, my improvised miniatures that were now becoming more and more full-bodied, my transversal cuts in search of another meaning, I do not say better but different. I was thus discovering that in my irregular condition there were many and that these had become a great number in periods of decline such as the one in which I lived. Thus I acquired a new sensitivity to identify them. I began to orient myself in reading the poetic and philosophical documents that will later be the basis of my *Essays on existentialism* (Trieste, 2013). From Abbagnano historian of philosophy to Abbagnano philosopher, the step was not short. In the middle were other figures of thinkers, more or less interesting, including Enzo Paci. The latter deserves a long separate discussion that I cannot do here or elsewhere, I don't have time. This group had allowed itself to be imprisoned, with greater or lesser consent, in the positive sphere of existentialism, some pawing - Preti, Vedaldi - others bowed their heads - Chiodi and others. They didn't tell me much, whether they were satisfied with their location or not, whether they went to the phenomenological, Marxist shores or not.

I needed a beginning, I was an incomplete beginning myself, I needed an icon somewhere, I couldn't be satisfied with a choir member, I couldn't accept only the pages written a hundred years ago. This nagging moved into the intensification of the readings but got stuck in the nerve center of choices. Where should I go? In the absence of authoritative indications, I always went back to my methodological choices that made me feel safer, even if they did not fully satisfy me.

Even the meeting with *Zarathustra* did not tell me much, perhaps because of the

translation or, better said, of my ignorance of the German. I felt that the time still spoke of those problems, the details of those problems, no longer the alleged safe distinctions of Croce, I felt that I would be happier among the pages of Gentile, but these were not familiar to me and the fascist connotation of its author it bothered me, even though there was no definite left-wing political coloring in me. I felt only myself, with the company of the great willpower that pushed me to master the knowledge, I tended to sever the different ideal bonds that I was building in the course of the readings, as these bonds became more solid and detailed and therefore they threatened to suffocate me.

After all, my meeting with Abbagnano was conflicting from the very first moment, due to this solitary choice of mine, a singularity that has never abandoned me for my whole life. I refused to be functional to a teacher, even if chosen by me, it seemed to me a degradation, and I pretended to be the one to give him the rhythm and not to receive it. I was therefore refractory to the role of learner and I was too prepared to be caught in the role - which would have been more congenial to me - of ignorant rebellious to any education. I had the recklessness of unconsciousness and perhaps also of the most absolute disinterest in any form of career. Every day a singular manifestation took place, I was tried, from many sides, to put in difficulty, and the failure of these attempts strengthened my idiosyncratic conviction of being elsewhere.

I proceeded alone, that's the reality, and even with specific German there were few cases in which I could be caught off guard. But this singularity eventually became a prison where I locked myself up every night after work, furiously trying to find that knowledge that would free me and that instead did nothing but turn the key in the lock of the cell. I ran the risk of being pleased with this loneliness and not finding a unity of orientation to understand where I was going. The examples that I had around me suggested the idea of a guide, at the most of becoming a guide myself, after appropriate assessments of acquiescence, no one told me to go on alone. For my part, I did not yet know, and I would have learned dearly, that going on like this requires perfect clarity and costs a lot in terms of life.

I didn't need goads and, for the same reason, I didn't accept cautionary advice. These, in truth, were not there, but some indirect hints managed to filter through the curtain of my reluctance. In the end I ran the risk of becoming gangrenous in the gloom of those who want to empty the sea with a bucket. What saved me was the same multiplicity and chaos of the readings. The coldness and detachment of the methodology, at that moment congenial to me for a matter of mere ignorance, were crumbling with the reading of French and Russian poets and writers, anything but cold or camouflaged in their own strangeness to the world. Turning around the problem, I could not help but be attracted by existentialism, even if Abbagnano's version seemed to me, albeit from a distance, a form of euphemism that diminished the significance of the French and German version.

I was not particularly attracted by the novelty, however not entirely new in the late fifties, nor by the decadent modernity of some researches that I myself was doing, I was fascinated by the problem of being in all its nuances and I felt within myself that none of the three current directions could have satisfied me, neither Sartre nor Heidegger nor Abbagnano. The nullism of the first seemed to continually apologize for its own extreme choices, the linguistic analysis of the second seemed to me aimed at demonstrating precisely the cancellation of being, the positivity of the third reminded me - wrongly - of Croce and this for a former Crociano, was not a good presentation. The first two were ingenious, the second even fascinating in its ability to dissect

language and make it speak, the third was premature, slow, smooth aging, a kind of retirement sinecure. I chose the third for the simple reason that I could not choose the other two. Going to Paris would have been materially impossible for me, and dating Heidegger was going against two obstacles, the ostracism he was subjected to because of his Nazi past and language.

Going to Turin was still madness, but at least it was a viable madness. And so I began to read the three canonical books Abbagnano: *Introduction to existentialism*, *Existentialism positive* and *Religion, philosophy, science*, which constitute the analytical subject of this book, at a distance made more than fifty years of notes and notes margin drawn up at the time. The impact was fiercely negative, I mean the one with the books, the next one with the person was better. Pleasant and captivating as he was, although lacking that intellectual acumen that characterizes men of genius. But let's go in order. I don't want to use the faded colors of my current palette to talk about man, I want to settle the accounts with the philosopher, that's all.

Mine was a rising sun, hot and shivering, his was a waning sun, aged badly, eager to leave a mark somewhere in philosophy. I was devoid of goals and scruples, he was full of both, as well as many other aspects, which I discovered little by little, certainly not nice. I hated refinements and nuances as much as he loved them and I lived uncomfortably in a school condition that always gave me weight and annoyance. I did not care much for the positive acquisitions made in installments, the promises of future salaries, the neuroses of the expectation of rewards to come, the confessions of passions that I knew as lukewarm as mine were ardent. I accumulated incorrectly - all right - but shunned academic fraudulence or ineffable inspired attitudes. I had no fixed ideas and did not consider myself an aspiring philosopher. I did not accept passwords or even more or less long-term anointings or investitures. I was extremist and extreme and always held the gauntlet in my hand.

Behind me there was the complete absence of a tradition to be protected, of stale acquisitions, in short, life was all in front of me, I could look at my destiny even without understanding it. That's why I was looking for and not selecting, I was also looking for what would damage me and make it difficult for me to go on, I was looking for the research itself, I was in love with my efforts, with the nights spent on books from an early age, with the sense of power that progressive acquisition gives of knowledge. I risked myself in the existentialist adventure as others saw it as an accommodation for life. My ruthlessness was spontaneous because it was dictated by the lack of ulterior motives, that of others was fictitious because it was imposed precisely by specific goals to be achieved, hindered and conditioned by them.

The lack of method is not a real absence, a void, it corresponds to the material that is investigated and into which one penetrates, my work therefore had more the air of a violent hand-to-hand than that of a real investigation and own. It is not possible to face a clash with such various and preponderant forces without consequences on the concrete way in which these forces are dealt with. I was involved in philosophy precisely because this was the way I lived the experience of what I was dealing with, my furious pursuit. Whatever the object, it was the way I approached it that made me philosophical, made it enter my philosophy, part of my being. This is why the search for being ended up becoming central and, accidentally, even taking the name of philosophy of existence or existentialism. In this context, in the blunt life or death struggle for learning, it was not just a question of what I got but mainly how I got it. So, in the end, by making this possession my own, it was difficult for me to distinguish what had become mine from what was not mine before. Each acquisition grew in me and was regenerated to the point of risking to appropriate knowledge that I could not

actually claim to possess to the full but only superficially.

I did not have the ability to regress in the acquired knowledge to give it a clear and functional order and direction for the realization of a purpose. I therefore lacked the possibility of repairing the leaks, of making the necessary repairs, of settling foundations that were sometimes shaky. What threatened to remain obscure remained so and only accidentally and suddenly could receive a luminous flux from an unexpected source of unsuspected origin.

Far be it from me the concept of positivity, elaborated at length and wisely by Abbagnano. I problematicized all my acquisitions, not being able to insert them in a functional way in an overall context capable of receiving them by completing them more and more. I ended up giving life to intervention devices, that is, occasions for acceptance that provided provisional means and conditions for understanding that were not real codified knowledge. Exactly the opposite happened to Abbagnano who collected contributions by pigeonholing them in a bank deposit where they all gave more or less a modest three per cent of income. I could never know which part of my already known was willing to accept the new cognitive arrival and where he wanted or could place it. In fact, this particular receptive form has never changed throughout my life and therefore cannot be considered as a childhood disease.

Each new element, even if chosen in a manner consistent with other previous elements, never succeeded in placing itself in a set of rules and constraints that made it productive not only of new connections and previously unthinkable reflections, but also of new rules and new constraints. It was not mine what is usually called a scientific discourse, I did not have the nature or the ability. Abbagnano, if he wanted to, could have made his corrective contribution in this direction. He didn't and maybe he couldn't do it. My personal monster grew out of all proportion, indeed it grew in itself and was not validated or rationalized by an external unitary force, much less internal, the latter absolutely opposed by myself. Without a paradigmatic yardstick, I lacked an orientation. Later, much later, having arrived at an orientation, which I spoke about in the *Treatise on Uselessness*, this does not *mean* that I have, albeit accidentally, arrived at stable paradigms capable of providing fixed articulations to my arguments.

I did not possess a theoretical structure that could be identified with certainty, everything was possible, everything was in the process of being formed, the accumulation of one day could be extraneous to that of the previous day and the connections inevitably provisional. I did not have the strength to address a theory from a solidified platform, I worked from the bottom, from the minimum level, addressing the past without shyness but also without any authority. Without a project, I was rich in means and techniques, among the latter those of memorization, and I mistakenly thought that these, together with purely intellectual means, could replace it. Basically I was an undisciplined omnivorous animal, sharing no common matrix with that hypothetical union of the experts in philosophy, if we want to keep ourselves in the field that occupied me most.

Not knowing the main models to which the aforementioned insiders continually referred implicitly in their theories, I was unconsciously free, as a butterfly is free to slam as it likes on a glass without passing through it. No uniformity of research, no judgments sustainable from the outside, no sacred traditions in some way introjected. The entire collection of arrivals was not relevant to a model, least of all to the existentialist one, it wandered gradually in an ever larger galaxy that could not define its own boundaries. Not only the absence of rules, but also the absence of a priori

correspondences, or pre-established projects. Each single theory certainly entered into an abstract partition, that of Abbagnano, including the blunders of the latter. The one on Meinecke is sensational. But these partitions were, for me, without foundation, empty ordering concepts, cases summarized together to make a category in themselves, repeatability of convenience, tacit compartments for initiates. To me, not initiated by definition, they were meaningless.

However, every arrival, every cognitive contribution, as a case in itself, even if I realized that, for example, many other philosophers derived from Plato, without thereby fixing exactly the family of idealists. I was therefore ready to clear a theory from one grouping to another without giving myself too much thought. These approximations horrified Abbagnano, yet they were the constant way in which cognitive possession entered me, my body, modeling me in a varied and concrete way, even if not directly catalogable from the outside. It was therefore not only a limitation due to my wild cultural state, or perhaps it was at the beginning, then it became a way of being, my way of being, which in turn governed and gave meaning to my life.

I was asked for a normalization of my potential for attack in order to be able to manage myself better, subjecting myself to that obvious school discipline that I practically did not know despite my two high school degrees, which authorized me access to university faculties. I had always been my own teacher, or almost, and now I had decided to choose one of my own free will, among the best - I thought - in circulation. Many mistakes, one on the other. I had to put myself aside and focus on learner behavior that would distort me.

But my refusal, culminating after almost a year of suffering in abandonment, could not have just this motivation. After all, I was a hellish machine and could have adapted to incorporate any cognitive project. There was more. The disappointment in the first place. Not with regard to myself, that is, not being able to bow my head and put to good use the many sacrifices made that in perspective could open the chain of oppressive work like few others, which I have never been disappointed with, but with regard to the myth that I had chosen. I was simply the wrong person or, as I later clarified, I was wrong in identifying the very possibility that a myth could materialize in a philosopher in flesh and blood. Perhaps in a theory - and over the years I have realized that not even this is possible - but never in a man.

But I didn't give in right away. In almost a year I had several times the opportunity to better envision my way of working. Incomprehensible reluctance on the other side. We could talk about everything, even to go and find traces of existentialism in unexpected places, but not of method, or rather, of a method that denied the rigidity of every method and not for theoretical bias but for physiological necessity, for a true and their own way of being alive, of breathing, of desiring. I was not declaring the discovery of something new, I was only explaining how I was made, I did not want to alter the canonical forms of research, I was only asking to verify with me a different path, perhaps wrong, but to declare it as such and convince myself to abandon it it was necessary that he put his feet on it. No way.

My explanation - which could not be spoken of as a method - was that the cognitive inflows had to remain free to associate and dissociate as they pleased, according to reciprocal suggestions, not according to pre-established scholastic categories. In this way they provided mutual support by floating freely. Except that to do this they needed a huge amount of incoming cognitive material, huge and heterogeneous. If the acquisition had become sclerotic within a single discipline, scholastically whole, let us say philosophy, the mechanism of mutual support would have jammed.

It seems to me necessary to underline here the concept of discontinuity that characterized, and in many respects even today casts its last reflections, my way of approaching knowledge. Not discoveries of truth but free conflict of mutually convertible theories and facts, not revisiting systematic arrangements to make room for new knowledge, but continuous upsetting of the reciprocal balances without worrying that they are plausible or acceptable in a pre-established perspective. Faced with this process characterized by the movement of arrivals rather than by the static of cataloging, I did not have the slightest knowledge of a government extraneous to the whole, a hypothesis of an external regiment, of something that in some way, unknown to me, kept the all by optimizing the results in the perspective of a theoretical goal to be achieved. From the point of view of discontinuity, I had only temporary and partial controls, immediately delivered to results to be decided whether to accept or not, in any case to be kept aside while awaiting future transformations. Eventually this continuous movement produced ungovernable chaotic upheavals and, in many respects, still produces them today.

My discontinuity unknowingly proposed a renunciation of the management power that any structured cognitive organization guarantees at the very moment it is put in place. This is something different and more complex than the philosophically understood system, it is not contained in the theory but extends to the cognitive whole of a single individual - whether small or large - until it constitutes his vision of life. There is in the continuous and finalized reorganization of the inflows an intrinsic form of power that ultimately determines the way of thinking and therefore channels the cognitive choices and finalizes them to the management of the goals to be achieved. Ultimately the decidability regarding the inflows is linked with the aims and is definitively captured by the latter.

Abbagnano's positivity was the product of a strong cognitive organization and a reduction in the number of people in school routines, of which his *History of Philosophy*, my convict book, was a striking example. It was based on the concept of definitive acquisition, codified in many ways and safeguarded from possible subversive interpretations. It assumed that something acquired could be definitively demonstrated and from choice to become truth, critically approved and subject to modification, but always valid at the right moment. Behind all this there was an investigative procedure with objective characteristics not a personal involvement, an amazing fact that threw me into despair since it was, after all, a problematic and restless philosophy of existence. Except that these last two aspects were enclosed, fearful, in the statements and not in the facts of life. Here the positivity prevailed and they preferred to invest the money earned under the distributive protection of a large publishing complex in a small publishing house. What could disgust me more?

The philosophical practice of positivity thus led to a profession like any other, professor, publisher, smoke seller, etc., in short, an insertion into the world of positivity protected by the aegis of a sort of small and modest system of thought, neither open nor completely Sealed. Digging into the main statements one thus discovered the hidden philistine, careful not to take risks or accept games that did not have the management of his own power by post, miserable and limited, but always attractive.

In the chaotic interweaving of my influxes, a certain cognitive correspondence suddenly acquired prominence, which perhaps for a certain time dominated the scene, but then ended up leaving room for other correspondences that were always new and often opposed to the previous ones. This temporary prominence, however, never came to impose a power of verification or control on the new inflows, it did not

bring about a superior modeling coherence. Everything could thus be reversed into its opposite without achieving any epistemological stability, despite my contemporary methodological interests. The same inflows of logical content ended up getting entangled in the same web and could only present themselves as a further cognitive contribution without extrinsic regulatory claims.

With all this I did not pretend to constitute an alternative methodological criterion to the dominant one, which would then always have been a regulative mode only with a different sign, I just wanted to affirm my right to breathe in my own way, because for me knowing was like breathing, not I could condition myself to live with an oxygen tank on my back. I knew, and I know, that no science can be founded on my way of breathing and, conversely, I breathed to live not to lay scientific foundations. I knew, and I know, that all my influxes would not have said much to others, but they were unique and only within me took the life that I granted them, where it was my existence that allowed theirs and not another totally different.

I was not even aware of a pure giving to me of the inflows, an autonomous movement that would thus have had the possibility of giving meaning to the acquisitions. It would have been a subtle form of episteme while in me there was only the continuous and disordered effort to seize the knowledge. The rest seemed to me an idle discussion that I only occasionally agreed to deepen with myself. From what I did every day, I could never have the intention of imposing rules or guiding postulates on myself in order to continue to know. In other words, I refused to unite in dominant figures the suggestions that the various influxes gave me and, on the contrary, I left the door open for them to interact with other acquaintances, creating new correspondences and new contradictions. The result was that I had never the certainty of what I knew, nor the control of the territory of its extension, yet a single reference solicited me an ever wider series of connections that, a priori, I would not have been able to determine in any way. In the end what I knew was implicit in the instant connection and it overflowed freely without my wanting to capture it in a particular system.

Abbagnano, as we will see in detail, speaks of finitude and commitment, important words that express positive concepts but which, not finding their explanation only in this perspective, can overturn being specular. It is the basic project that chooses their content and not vice versa. Man is limited, given that he does not automatically make him a fighter, other elements must intervene. Positivity casts an accommodating, sleepy, peaceful aura on finitude, so that the commitment that is placed next to it seems more or less a walk outside the door. The intelligibility of finitude, on the other hand, can receive from the problematic nature of existence quite another, negative light, and thereby arrive not at disengagement or apathy but at a different type of commitment that becomes trivial to define with this concept. A little taste. The problematic context - the finitude of human life and of life itself in general - throws an oblique light on a set of problems, including commitment, and makes them intelligible in a different way from time to time. There is no intrinsic statute to positivity except by the decision of the philosophical demiurge.

Positivity in Abbagnano acts as a metaphor for the world and obeys the law of the transfer of meaning, loading the contexts to which it applies, as happens when examples are given. It is an analogical form of sealing the various contexts that could get lost in the assumed chaos of the whole. Nothing of the kind could belong to me, at least as a form of behavior to which I must conform in an obligatory way, I could instead accept it as a simple object of knowledge. Once it was proposed to me as a single unit of measurement, a source for the logical construction of the world, I could

only refuse it. Had it been an external logical element, a comparison and a signifier for heterogeneous material to be reorganized, I could also understand and tolerate it, but it possessed something more than its own singularity, it was a sort of sacralizing formula. It was much more than a model, it was a vision of the world in action, not a term of comparison but a foundation. There was nothing in positivity that could be reproduced, it was a single whole that had to be accepted or rejected. Rejecting this sacralizing formula meant deactivating it, and this is exactly what I did every day, not suggesting a different analytical horizon but only pointing my feet at every possible opportunity. By bringing reality together in a new non-problematic context, intelligible and capable of self-reproduction, Abbagnano eliminated precisely the problematic nature he claimed to want to defend. I think he never realized this contradiction.

Without knowing it, I suggested a naively paradigmatic alternative, I proposed to approach the inflow to the previous accumulation or, at least, to the more similar part of this accumulation, in short, to bring the incoming part closer to the already arrived part, assuming - in the wake, this a consciously chosen time, by Aristotle - that the part that arrived earlier was better known to me than the influx. With this I do not mean that I was not able at the time to move deductions or inductions, the internal movement following the juxtaposition worked by continuously integrating the two methods in an almost involuntary way, but the acquisition was completely random and did not respond to no a priori project aimed at reaching a precise goal, even if it is antithetical to Abbagnano's positivity.

Certainly reflecting on the only passage from Aristotle that speaks of the example (*Analitica priora*, 69, a, 13-14) it must be said that for me the part closest to the influx and best known, because it arrived previously, was not an example, but the attraction operation was the same. Today I could better explain the mechanism by speaking of analogy but it would be an update of an effort that at the time I could only make with the forces I possessed, not with those I possess today.

My stubborn attempt was aimed at making sure that I remained myself, neither positive nor negative nor Abbagnano nor Sartre. Not that the latter and the hypothesis of nothing - as I preferred to call Sartian nothingness - I did not prefer them to the positive solution, and my research intensified in this direction while remaining close to Abbagnano, but above all I safeguarded my inner integrity, the my self-consideration, indispensable elements to support the outsize effort to which I underwent. This led me to reject both the concept of synthesis and the related concept of higher synthesis. I still did not fully understand the Hegelian mechanism but I did not even accept it as a provisional working hypothesis and, with the utmost impudence, I accused Abbagnano of wanting to clear something similar, certainly unjust accusation.

The most extensive image that I hypothesized at the time of my cognitive possession was that of the force field moved not only by the new influxes but also by the internal tensions that were continually composed and decomposed without my being warned by an immediately detectable result. New training within the field pressed not only at the level of acquisition availability but also at the level of acquisition intensity, thus orienting the cognitive processes that did not remain completely random, managing to link up on the basis of their correspondences that I could neither control nor predict.

Was mine a method? Certainly not. Several times later I had the doubt that I had obtained a method without knowing it as a consequence of my studies in logic and

methodology. Even now, if I reflect on this doubt, I must conclude that I had no conscious or unconscious method. It was a way of life, and the acquisition of knowledge corresponded to the most substantial part of this way of life of mine. What I was defending was therefore not a method but my life, failing to distinguish knowledge from living my truly inhuman condition of work and study on a daily basis. To be precise, the specific influx came into contact with the force field because this field was my life and here, together with my feelings, pains, fatigue and fears, it found the corresponding cognitive affinity, the corroborating example, with Aristotle or without him. As we can see it was not - and it is not - possible to formulate a rule from this operating condition.

In Abbagnano, the idea of positivity was not a paradigmatic example, it was a synthesis that made it possible to interpret the cognitive inflows by directing them towards a goal. The summary chooses, selects, accepts and sends back, all control procedures that guarantee the functioning of the system. A new influx is thus identified as connected with a previous influx not on the basis of their affinity but on the basis of their correspondence or not to the idea of positivity which constitutes the synthesis necessary for recognition. This method digs into knowledge and picks up exactly what it needs to complete the system, it does not let the single incoming elements flow freely and randomly. If it did so it would make synthesis impossible.

For my part, I was convinced that the collocation of a cognitive influx within the synthesis could be done only by suspending from their significance much of the sense of which the influx was bearer, that is, forcing it within a reductive scheme before insertion itself and giving it back a diminished intelligibility but suitable for giving it a different meaning. The suspension of spontaneous accumulation, as it presented itself to me in my continuous experiences, was proved by the interpretation perfected from time to time in view of the purpose, that is, of the normative stabilization of a positive character. This assignment was therefore not a stretch, on the contrary it appeared completely normal, and this due to the preventive reduction of the influx within the required and known limits. The correspondence thus became automatic and there was no need from time to time to show the certification of the reductive inclusion.

The strangeness of my condition was that I had no hypotheses to verify on the basis of new contents which therefore did not undergo any prior selection or contraction, at least so I thought. I did not realize that a process of reduction was still taking place not to defend a thesis but for the force of attraction exerted by the related content that attracted the new influx. It was not possible for me to suspend the dateness of a cognitive content in an absolute way and to assimilate the latter in its abstract condition, an illusory empirical movement that attracted me considering myself more or less like a coin-operated machine. A discovery that I had to make many years later but that does not question my criticism of the positivity of Abbagnano's existentialism.

While remaining in the illusion of completeness of cognitive access, this false vision was not the pivot of my controversy as much as the absence or cancellation of a dominant hypothesis a priori. That is, there was nothing hypothetical in my constant effort towards knowledge but a simple addition. I couldn't see the limitations of this reasoning but I could see that there was no dialectical mechanism behind it, no taking away and taking away in a higher synthesis. By exposing - more or less as such - the influx to accumulation I put it at risk of annihilation and deformation, and of this I was becoming convinced as the force field grew enormously, but I did not intend to subject it to a governing hypothesis a priori. My intelligibility was therefore, in whatever way we want to consider it, opposite to that of Abbagnano. Even the precomprehension of which Heidegger speaks, known by Abbagnano through the intermediary of Chiodi,

ended up distorted in the positive mechanism. For Heidegger it was a hermeneutic circle in which knowledge of the single phenomenon presupposed knowledge of the whole and vice versa. But the knowledge of the whole, in Abbagnano, intervened only through the dominant synthesis and not as an anticipatory structure of the influx capable of making the latter understandable and determinable within the possible of knowledge. In Heidegger there was something else, which Abbagnano did not detect, as precomprehension not only selects and determines but upsets the structure of the influx, adapting it not simply bringing it together. It was necessary to see how this pre-understanding was formed, whether starting from the force field or from a vicious circle that always presented the same part for entering and exiting. For Heidegger, as I later understood, the understanding of the influx is possible because the precomprehension affects the new material the indication of belonging to the existential structure of those who seek to understand.

And another thing I came to understand later, much later, that the accumulation, precisely because it is a force field, is not a simple summation nor is it massively opposed to the influx nor does it establish a hermeneutic circle with this, but it is the reciprocal connection. dynamics of single inflows, set in motion chaotically so as to form a whole capable of creating multiple and contemporary cognitive attractions, both in the face of a single inflow and in the face of multiple simultaneous pressing inflows. There is nothing that remains next to it for a certain time, the same juxtaposition is a way of saying what is not perceptible, the inflow being a continuous movement and the force field where an unclosed or sealed entity enters. These two units are not perfectly isolable except to provide an illusory method of identification, to know on which territory one is moving and to meet which monstrous intertwining the influx is directed. Considering these movements in the average trend of their knowability, there is not one of them that is fixed in the past and one that is fixed in the present. As the inflow is realized, the force field enters the subject being learned and recognizes it, that is, it identifies it and, as I said, understanding it late, conditions it allowing it to enter the field as part of a unstoppable constellation.

The time has come to close my accounts with Abbagnano.

Alfredo M. Bonanno

Ended up in Korydallos prison (Athens) on February 16, 2010

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Rater sa vie, c'est accéder à la poésie - sans le support du talent.

Emil Cioran

"The house has a sunny and a shaded facade. The distribution of the "environments" and, within them, the "arrangement" of the furniture according to use depends on this. Churches and tombs are arranged according to the rising and setting of the sun - regions of life and death - by which Being itself is determined in the world as to the possibilities of being more proper. Taking care of the very Being (to which, in its being, this being itself is always at stake) preliminarily discovers the proximity in which it finds its decisive satisfaction. The preliminary discovery of proximity is cooriginally determined by the totality of fulfillment to which the usable is returned in its encounter with the Being-There. Preliminary usability, inherent in individual proximity, possesses the character of intimacy without

surprises in an even more original sense of being usable. Such usability is ascertained only when the prescient environmental vision is taken by surprise by the usable which presents itself in the defective ways of caring. When something is not found in its place, environmental proximity becomes explicitly accessible as such. Space, which in being-in-the-world guided by a prescient environmental vision is discovered as the spatiality of all the means, is always proper to an entity of which it constitutes the place. Pure space is still hidden. It is shattered in places. However, this spatiality has its own unity through the totality of worldly fulfillment of the usable space. The "world-environment" does not settle in a previously given space; its specific worldliness articulates, in its significance, the satisfying complex of each concrete totality of places assigned by the prescient environmental vision. The individual worlds always discover the spatiality of space that belongs to each of them. The encounter with the usable in its environmental space is possible ontically only because the Being itself is "spatial" in its being-in-the-world. It is clear that the spatiality we attribute to Being-There, its "being in space", must be understood starting from the way of being of this entity. The spatiality of Being-there (which is absolutely different from simple-presence) cannot mean either its presence in a place of "cosmic space" or its being usable in some place. Both are spatial modes of the worldly entity. The Being is "in" the world in the modalities of commerce that takes care of the entity that meets in the world. The spatiality of Being-There will therefore be possible only on the basis of its in-being. This spatiality reveals the characteristics of distancing and directional orientation. With the expression dis-estrangement, as a way of being of the Being in its being-in-the-world, we do not mean either remoteness or distance. We use the expression distancing in an active and transitive sense. It means a constitution of the Being of Being with respect to which the pure and simple distancing of something, the placing away, represents only a particular modality. Dis-distancing [Ent-fernung] means making distance disappear [Ferve) that is the distance of something, it means approaching. Being-there is essentially displacing and, insofar as it is the entity that it is, it always allows the entity to be encountered in proximity. The distancing discovers the distance. Both remoteness and distance are categorical determinations of the entity not conforming to Being-There. Conversely, distancing must be understood as an existential. Only because the entity is in general discoverable by the Being in its being-disassociated, do the "distances" and the distances between one intramundane entity and another become accessible. Two points and, in general, two things cannot be found in a relationship of detachment because neither of these two entities can, as a consequence of its way of being, be such as to detach itself. Between them there is only a distance, which can be ascertained and measurable only on the basis of the distance. Dismissal, first and foremost, is an approach guided by a prescient environmental vision, a bringing in the neighborhood, as one has in the forms of procuring, installing, taking in hand. But also some ways of discovering the entity in a purely cognitive form have the character of approach. Being-There has an essential tendency towards closeness. All forms of speed acceleration to which we are more or less forced today tend to overcome distance. With the "radio", for example, Being-there is now carrying out a distancing of the

"world" that is not yet very clear in its existential meaning, but from which an expansion of the daily world-environment derives. The distancing does not necessarily imply the explicit evaluation of the remoteness of a usable from Being-There. Distance is not understood as distance. When the distance has to be evaluated, it is starting from the distances in which the Being-There is maintained on a daily basis. From the point of view of calculation, these assessments can be imprecise and changeable, however they have their own specificity and general comprehensibility. We say: "it's a walk away", "it's a pipe smoke away", "it's a stone's throw away". These measures show that there is no intention to "measure" and that the distance assessed is proper to an institution that is accessed under the guidance of the prescient environmental vision of caring. Even when we resort to more exact measurements and say: "From here to home there is half an hour", it is always an estimate. "A half hour" is not thirty minutes, but a duration that has no "length" in the sense of quantitative extension. This duration is always established in terms of "daily care". Even where the "official" distances are known, the distance is always evaluated first of all by the prescient environmental vision. Since the entity that these evaluations dissociate is always a usable one, it always retains its specific intramundane character. It also follows that the paths that lead us to the disassembled entity have a different length from time to time. The usable of the world-environment is never a simple-presence contemplated by an eternal measurer, freed from the structure of Being-There, but offers itself to the prescient environmental gaze of taking care of the Being-there daily. The Being-there that walks its paths is not a simply-present bodily thing that makes measurements; Being there "does not devour kilometers"; approaching and distancing always respond to a way of being characterized by taking care of what is approached and distanced. An "objectively" longer path may be shorter than another "objectively" shorter one, if this is, for example, "very difficult" and appears interminable. Only in this way of "appearing" the real world is actually usable. The objective distances between simply-present things are not identified with the distance and proximity of the usable intra-mundane. Even when they are known exactly, they always remain a blind knowledge and extraneous to the function of approaching the world-environment precisely of discovering that characterizes the prescient environmental vision. This knowledge is only useful to an institution that takes care of a world that it "cares about" and that, therefore, is not simply measuring distances. As a result of the anticipated privilege of "nature" and of "objectively" measured distances, we tend to consider these evaluations and this way of understanding distance as something "subjective". But in this case it is a "subjectivity" that discovers what is perhaps most real in the "reality" of the world and which therefore has nothing to do with "subjective" arbitrariness or subjective "opinions" about an entity that otherwise exists "in itself". The distancing, typical of the prescient environmental vision of the daily life of Being-there, discovers the being-in-itself of the "real world", of the entity in which the Being-There, as much as it exists, has always already existed. The interpretation that sees in the measured distance the primary and exclusive aspect of the distance hides the original spatiality of the in-being. What is "closest" to Being-There

is by no means that which has the least distance "from it". The "closest" is that which is removed from the average range of our perceptive, visual and prehensile apparatuses. Only because Being-There is essentially spatial in the way of distancing, its trade is constantly maintained in a "world-environment", separated from Being-There within variable boundaries; and that is why, first of all, we direct hearing and sight beyond what is "closest" according to the distance measured. Sight and hearing are senses of the "far away" not because of their range, but because the Being-There is maintained mainly in them as being displacing. For example, for those who wear glasses, which, in terms of the distance measured, are so close to them that they are "on their nose", this means of use is more environmentally distant than the picture hanging on the opposite wall. This medium is so close that it is often not even perceived. The means of seeing, or that of hearing (for example, the telephone receiver) has the character of non-surprise, which we saw to be proper to everything that is primarily usable. The same goes for the street, the means to walk. As we walk, it is trampled underfoot at every step, and it is apparently the closest and the most real of the usable ones at our disposal; in a certain way it slips under a part of our body, under the soles of shoes. And yet it is far farther than the friend who comes to meet us "on the street" at the "distance" of twenty paces. It is taking care of the environmental vision that decides on the distance and proximity of what is primarily usable in the world-environment. The institution at which caring focuses preferably is for this very reason the closest and regulates distancing as such. When, in caring, Being-There brings something close to itself, it does not matter the transfer of this object to the place of space that has the least possible distance from its body. Close to oneself means: in the context of what is first of all usable starting from the prescient environmental vision. The approach does not start from an I-thing equipped with a body, but from being-in-the-world taking care of what surrounds it first and foremost. The spatiality of Being-There is therefore not determinable by determining a place in which a thing-body would simply be-present. Of course, let's say that Being-there also always occupies a place. But this "occupying" is fundamentally different from being usable in a place within a proximity. The occupancy of a place by the Being must be understood as the removal of the usable environment in a proximity uncovered by the prescient environmental vision. Being-there understands its "here" starting from the "there" of the ambient world. The "here" does not mean the "where" of a simple presence but the "near-what" of a deterrent being-near ..., in one with detaching itself. As a consequence of its spatiality, Being-there is never first of all "here", but rather in that "there" from which it reaches its "here", and this, again, only insofar as it interprets its being- taking-care-of from what "there" is usable. All this becomes completely clear if we consider a phenomenal characteristic of the structure of the detachment of the in-being. Being-there, as being-in-the-world, essentially maintains itself in distancing. This distancing, and the relative distances, cannot be crossed by Being-There. Certainly the remoteness of a usable from Being-There can be seen as distance when it is determined in relation to a thing thought of as simply present in the place that Being-There previously occupied. The "between" of the distance can be subsequently

crossed by the Being-There, but only on the condition that the distance itself becomes something displaced for the Being-There ». (M. Heidegger, *Being and time* , tr. It., Turin 1978, pp. 186-191).

Introduction to existentialism

Means and non-ends are philosophies, the history that lists them is therefore a repertoire of means to be used if you want to dominate the future. Abbagnano develops the positive concept of philosophy by arguing that this alone gives concreteness to every doctrine and guarantees man's freedom. Escape from the apparent emptiness, run towards the pragmatic concreteness of existence. By dint of naming it in a certain way, the world ends up being configured into a small number of components that seem to correspond to its objective existence. They just seem.

Abbagnano states: "But precisely because in this sense philosophizing is a human act, an aspect that we must presume to be essential to existence, the problem of it is the problem that man poses to himself around himself, is the being himself of man as a problem of himself ". (*Introduction to existentialism* , IV edition, Taylor Torino publisher, 1957, p. 16). In short, a self-questioning. But what about? About himself, making himself a problem, entering the primordial forest that still thickens in the life of every man. He does not say it because he does not think it, evidently his forest being a grove of greenery. In this way the search for being appears as a school walk while it is an unknown penetration into territories where sounds and ghosts are rampant. Thus the future is dominated in the dogmatic dream of the philosophers, even if they claim not to sleep, to be problematic and not to assiduously supply the cave of massacres.

The problematic form does not save from contradiction, on the contrary it strengthens it. It does not save because it insists on relying on the power of choice, or decision, here it makes no difference, and because it insists on risk. Simply naming reality is already a danger, it could crumble before us, it doesn't happen but it could happen. All my doing and my doing, my whole being is at risk, not just the important decisions of my life. In a small gesture, crossing a road, all the strength I possess can flow together, my whole life can remain entangled forever. So-called existential decisions are summations of trivial choices, many of which are not choices at all. The indeterminate power that determines me and against which I always fight, without interruption, wanders everywhere.

Thus Abbagnano: «Now, what constitutes the nature of this indeterminacy or problematicity is that it is present in any existential act as an effective knowledge, which determines the nature of the act from within. I know, in any case, that I face a risk and this knowledge of mine is present in my decision and constitutes a necessary element. My decision is not a decision, to which the abstract consideration of the problematic nature that accompanies it and therefore of the risk implicit in it is added from the outside, it is instead a decision that was taken on the basis of the problematic nature and the inherent risk and of which therefore the problematic nature and the risk constitute the essential element. The uncertainty does not come after that decision, but it is within it, it constitutes it on its own. Every existential act is an act of problematic indeterminacy ». (*Ib .* , P. 18). Here the fundamental element is knowledge that determines action. But the action is produced by the whole of consciousness which includes the entire previous world in which I am chaotically immersed. There is no organization of knowledge that can guide me, it can take the form of a sacral world and force me to take an oath of belonging, or a profane world

and sharpen my nails, but these are fields that cannot be assimilated. to knowledge, to organized knowledge. The decision is one side of the question, and the courage it requires to act transforms it into action, that is, concrete intervention that is qualitatively different, not a simple choice between various possible openings. The uncertainty is in the only passage available for action, the overcoming. We do not go from something to something, from a beginning to an end, discrete elements are found only in simple doing, which Abbagnano seems not to take into account in the definition of existential decision.

«My decision tends to ensure that the future is, in the aspect that refers to it, as I want it to be with the very act of the decision. If it is an authentic decision and not a desire or a simple ambition, it moves towards the future with the pretense of welding it with the past in a unity that realizes the total meaning of the decision itself ". (*Ibid*). Unfortunately, the decision is always not full, indecisive, hesitant. It does not exist in its fullness, it is not enough to say "I want". Wanting is a condemnation not a force. More is needed, an interpenetration with reality is needed, not a selected separation in its various elements. What prevails is not the goal but the courage, it is not problematic at the outlet but at the source. If I look for guarantees it is because I lack courage, if I lack courage I need something to put my feet on. There is no bridge between the past and the future that guarantees continuation. The shapeless body of the future wants to be questioned in a certain way to open up and the secret lies in the total involvement of the individual, not a risk guaranteed as much as possible.

“But in the existential act this movement which unifies the past and the future in the present of the decision and which constitutes, in the future, a situation that may not be, but which must be, is the foundation and justification of the situation that has been. This movement proper to the authentic existential act, this welding of a future situation which is indeterminate in its possibility, but which nevertheless must be, with an initial situation, can be called structure ». (*Ib .*, P. 19). Dense paragraph in which Abbagnano reveals his thoughts better. The problematic, once the future is captured, is transformed into a structure, solid, mocking, which is visible against the invisible future as if it were particular circumstances that make the miracle possible. But a structure must be imposed and in this way it cannot express authenticity in any way, it eliminates problems and changes in staticity and guarantee. In other words, it carries in the womb of the future the hypothetical certainty of the past, an operation that is immediately punished by the repetitiveness and stupidity of possession that wraps around itself until it suffocates. Choosing the structure for one's own purpose compromises freedom and it is not worth affirming the persistence of its problematic nature. Here it is a question of words, but the point around which everything revolves is the confirmation, the election of a confirmed, successful and consolidated decision, even if the service door of a possible disappointment that will require structural adjustment remains open. This seems to complicate the life of the structure but in fact it simplifies it, makes it certain in the context of human certainty, makes it true, worth living and all the remaining respectable junk. I know that there is nothing definitive, but choosing a structured world is something more comfortable than writing these lines at the end of one's life in a Greek prison.

Abbagnano's authentic decision is still a decision. He writes: «The existential act of which we have spoken is the authentic existential act. It is a decision of which the consideration of risk, and the responsibility that risk implies, is an integral part. But obviously different acts are also possible for man, acts in which the decision is lacking or defects, and in which man prefers to avoid the risk and not face the responsibility of a decisive choice. In these cases, man lets himself live, so to speak, without

deciding, without choosing, without seeking the connection between the past and the future, without proposing in the future to justify the meaning and to realize the nature of his own past. . Man then lives in the state of dispersion; it does not own itself, nor does it truly possess its possibilities. Its existence is not solidified in the circle of the structure, it is not truly fulfilled, nor does it truly open towards the future. Structure implies for him only an appeal to decision and choice, not an actual decision or choice. Let us try to discern the whole meaning of this alternative, in which man is continually placed between his structural constitution and his dispersed life ». (*Ib .*, P. 21). But when do I have my chances? When do I make them? Certainly not. I possess them when I pass them, I go beyond them, I leave them behind, when I open to the future and I do not allow myself to be pointed out or predestined by an external force. If I shut myself up in defense, I am condemned to follow the modalities of the proceedings up to the secondary recesses, I am captured or at least pursued with ferocious fury. I am the different without structure, the hitter perceived as danger, the one who is difference and non-concordance, I am the only one who does not accept props or justifications.

What a painful conclusion the implementation proposal. I concretize the possibility by realizing myself, I make it mine, so I am the certain closure of my word spoken to the future, I am the monotheistic law and I feel morally superior, in a lethal certainty without counterweights. The structure constituting me protects me and elects me as its protege, at the same time it condemns me. These two aspects complement each other. I am isolated and this pushes me to push back my courage. The possibilities close again after giving me the illusion of openness.

Abbagnano writes: «In the constitutive decision of the structure, man truly identifies himself with the possibility he chooses. In that possibility that he makes his own, he places and recognizes himself: in that possibility, he realizes himself. By acquiring possession of it in the decided action, he truly acquires possession of himself. He no longer feels balanced by different possibilities and no longer randomly chases one or the other possibility, abandoning it immediately afterwards. He recognized it as his own, that is, as constitutive of himself, of his personality: and he realizes in it, precisely, this personality in its unity. On that possibility he has decided, because he has decided on himself, and he has decided on himself in the sense of his unity. He decided to own himself; and to possess himself in that privileged possibility that he made his own, in which he recognized himself ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 21-22). But how can I prioritize a possibility? I can not elect her, if anything is she who elects me condemning me to chase her for life without ever taking her, a cloud catcher?

Whatever this primary and all-encompassing possibility is, how can I recognize it? Am I the possibility of myself? But, in this case, I just have to limit myself to living my life, and in this the structure gives me a hand. Do I own myself like this? Certainly not. I cannot lock myself in a chest, fear itself prevents me. And what would my unit be? Maybe my uniqueness? But then would the proceedings condemn the structure by killing it to guarantee this very last eventuality? It is not possible to answer. It is not true that only unity is real while multiplicity is apparent. If anything, the opposite is true, and this is indubitable if we exclude the uniqueness, linked precisely by the structured presence.

These critical considerations are supported by Abbagnano's subsequent words: «The structural movement is therefore the realization of the unity of man, of his personality. It is the movement for which man commits himself in the sense of his unity and remains faithful to himself. Fidelity truly expresses the sense of structure. In the structure, man decides to be true to himself, to be truly himself, to possess

himself. For it man acquires a destiny ». (*Ib.* , P. 22). Fidelity to the structure is the indispensable seal to the election, it is the irruption from the outside to the inside with all the rights of the first over the second. Fidelity is indispensable because boastful people have no right to the structure, they tell fairy tales and swear falsehood, that is, they give for their own what is not at all. They are dangerous and must be eliminated. I am without destiny. This is the logical conclusion of the proposition on fidelity, which proves what the positive version of existential problems is made of. In the end I discover that the possibility I choose to structure myself is the one that I am obliged to choose, which proves, as if it were necessary, that every choice is closed forever in banality, not in authenticity if it is not directed towards the overcoming.

But fidelity must involve transcendence. Here is Abbagnano: «The transcendental possibility is reinvigorating oneself, strengthening oneself and establishing oneself in one's own initial possibility; it is, in a certain respect, the same initial possibility, but in its entire, definitive and fully expressed meaning, in the meaning proceeding beyond, towards the future. The transcendental possibility constitutes my true self as my final form. " (*Ib.* , P. 23). The possibilities have thus disappeared, their search now takes place in the womb of the gods, that is, it proves elusive. From uncertain and open it is now locked up in the realm of truth, of a true possibility. There is no longer the risk of an imposture, there are no risks, but everything is brought back into a certainty aggravated by fidelity. Freedom was granted to me by this transcendent possibility and sealed by fidelity, I am not free - as Stirner would say - but I am a freedman. To escape dispersion, I had to submit to the condition of self-possession, of self-possession. Now I glide above the difficulties, I no longer run the risk of missing my decision, I am decided, that is, I have set the coordinating poles of my life. I finally realized, that is, I managed to root myself in reality. Not only that, but this condition lies crammed between other human conditions that crush each other, resulting in the conviction that this is the best way to be, that is, they constitute this society. Now I can no longer even get the idea that I am not appropriate to my condition, they are my reality and they are my energy, these two aspects radiate to each other. But there is a further, larger dimension.

Here again Abbagnano: «The being of which I, in my finitude, am interwoven, goes beyond me continuously, carries me continually beyond myself with the very continuity of the movement with which I decide about myself. If the constitution of my individuality is expressed by the possession, which I realize in it, of being, it is evident that it simultaneously implies the constitution of this being. The single and definite possibility that I come into possession of with my decision becomes my possibility only because it ceases to be mine alone, to belong to a sphere that proceeds beyond my finitude. The ontic possibility is such, only because it is at the same time an ontological possibility. My possibility is such only because it belongs to a being that proceeds beyond myself. My decision is the establishment of a relationship between ontic possibility and ontological possibility, a relationship necessarily connected with the act of my authentic constitution. The choice can be defined precisely as this relationship. It bases in being the possibility that is proper to me and that becomes the possibility proper to being ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 24-25). Here it would seem that a hint of the crossing is making its way, but it is not so. This never goes so far as to abandon possession where I am now rooted. It is what gives me the recognition of others, the sign of my belonging to the society of humans. The being that goes into play is the stakes never really risked because I am cheating. How can I take possession of being through a choice that by definition is not given to me except in a random way? Defining it as authentic does not make it any less uncertain. How does it become

ontological and oppose an ontic possibility? How does it go further if I don't really put myself out there and hold tight to myself? Here there is a tension that does not exist in reality but only in the metaphysical void, serving in any case to give appearance to a triumphal entry of being into me. Pondering one's involvement for a long time means not identifying the hidden opening somewhere, it means exacerbating the action in a continuous hesitation waiting for an external support that guarantees me together with my possession. This support can be living in society with other men, but it cannot go beyond socialization according to certain rules, it cannot transcend my condition rooted in possession, limited and fearful.

Instead Abbagnano confirms: «A being who belonged to me by isolating me would annihilate me as an individuality; but the being that defines me in my individuality opens me to coexistence and determines an infinite sphere in which there are infinite possibilities of encounter, that is, of intelligence and understanding, between me and the other ». (*Ib.* , P. 26). This definition - which applies here beyond doubt, it seems - opens me up to coexistence. This clearly can only be a contractual agreement, a declaration of mutually delegated authority, not the indication of a common inspiration, of the common presence of being and not of a deceptive appearance. I saw in this connection - many years ago - nothing more than a metaphysically deformed reflection of the social contract, and I see no way now to change my impression. It would seem that Abbagnano here wants to refer to the strength that everyone has, to a greater or lesser extent, to express himself, a strength that can fade to silence altogether, but this is an indistinct matter and cannot justify an ontological foundation.

In the end, the transcendental possibility assumes a position of command, it is it that imposes on man not being, which would not be enough, but having to be, that is, it imposes on him the pure normative, preceding and authorizing matter of every other meaning. Man's commitment is thus summed up in his own belonging and belonging to the society that contains him, limits him and marks him. Everything else is deceptive. The authenticity of man is therefore a duty to be, a commitment that seals his finitude with fidelity. Abbagnano concludes: «Normativity expresses the profound, substantial aspect of the structure; what the structure is in itself. But what the structure is in itself is the norm of what I ought to be and what I am in me, in my own finitude. If man were to say that the norm is in himself, he would lower it from its essential superiority and annul it as a norm; but the norm is what man really ought to be and therefore it is being itself that founds him in his finitude, justifies him and leads him to his integral realization ». (*Ib.* , P. 28). Being is thus identified in a freely chosen obligation. And since we know that freedom is a transcendental gift, being is an obligation confirmed from above. Each action thus receives an investiture and a sign, an election that indicates it as belonging to being and, in this way, it is postponed to infinity, inconclusive, in need of continuous recognition. To escape the constitutive uncertainty of the world, one is forced to be in the straitjacket of an investiture from above. In fact, how could one speak of structure if not in this way? Man, being and the world are the same thing seen from different quantitative angles, qualitatively it is only the being that is in question. Abbagnano instead speaks only of a close connection.

Thus he writes: «Man, in the coexistence of men and in the common participation in being, implies the coexistence of himself as of other men and of being, in an unconditional totality, which is the world. The world is therefore a fundamental determination of man's structure since this, transcending man, places him in a necessary relationship with being and with men and therefore in an unconditional

totality that includes him. The nature of the world is thus determined by it being the totality of which man is a part, by virtue of the same structure, as a transcendent structure. The condition of the simultaneous coexistence of man, of being and of coexistence in the world is corporeality, that is, the placing of men and being in a connected and yet exteriorized multiplicity, which is proper to bodies ". (*Ib .*, P. 29). Compresence as an unconditional totality, as a world. But how can something that is determined by the structure of man be unconditional? Isn't this the sufficient cause of determinacy? So, if this is the case, where there is structure there is no lack of conditions. Amazing somersault. A general impression of strangeness, of necessity rained down from above. The body is therefore the result of a metaphysical operation. Something terribly intimate vanishes in the vagueness of a system that, starting from choice, returns to choice because it is unable to choose. And in this he demonstrates not so much his metaphysical poverty - which would be a small thing - but his existential poverty, his fear of getting deeply involved. The author, raising his paw to the world, shows his tail.

That corporeality is non-apparent being is a colossal mistake. Abbagnano writes: «Corporeity is irreducible. It cannot be reduced to appearance, because it realizes a fundamental aspect of the structure that requires the coexistence, in a systematic totality, of man with being and with the coexisting community. Corporeity cannot be devalued, cannot be reduced to anything, cannot be neglected in any way by an effective understanding of human existence and must be understood as corporeality, not as a veil or appearance of spirituality. The existential connection between man and being, which manifests itself in the corporeality of the world, makes man, as a body, need the things of the world. The need expresses, within the limits of man's corporeality, the necessary connection of man with his constitutive being ". (*Ib .*, Pp. 29-30). It is precisely the body that suffers the most serious repercussions of the inability to fix being. The visionary sensation is the fantasy of what extraordinary happens in involvement - attention, not on the decision that is always addressed to doing - and has an enormous influence on the body, which remains astonished and transfers the appeal by calling into question the appropriate physiological processes . In the end, by advancing in action, no longer deciding in compliance with the rules of safeguarding, the point of no return is passed and the body enters a physical and mental condition of collapse, it is dragged away. It seems that Abbagnano needed to ignore these problems by speaking of actual, concrete corporeality, and not of veil or appearance. If man needs the world in this way, the parallel that comes to mind - given the place where I am - is imposed: the prisoner needs the prison. Between man and the world there are two ways of knowing, the first is doing with its quantitative location, the second is acting with its dynamically qualitative perspective. Neither man is above nor the world is below, or vice versa. Instead Abbagnano states: "The world is the domain of human knowledge insofar as it is knowledge of things, it is the domain of perception and the use of things as tools, it is the domain of science that observes and measures things in their instrumentality" . (*Ib .*, P. 30). None of these statements escapes the idea of domination and the repeated use of this word clearly indicates what the philosopher is procurator of, of the cave of massacres. But domination, like possession, are philosophical concepts that are beyond the control they presuppose. The more the world tightens, and for me the other is the concrete image of the world much more than the vague and controversial nature, and the more this slips away, it presents itself drastically different each time, reacts, counterattacks, does not allow itself to be possessed, claims its inviolable otherness. And every domain has no return. The relationship started badly and ends badly, his statements, I keep them with me, in my possession, are extreme and unattainable.

The torsion that has imposed itself on the other is therefore irreversible, the relationship is conditioned forever, it remains unbalanced. Putting aside the claims of domination things change, the world remains problematic and the other continues not to allow himself but for different reasons, because he wants to be sought by me, and I have to go looking for him to be with him, not to possess him but to involve him in going beyond doing as mere quantity, to design the possible quality of our relationship for him. In this sense, the world and the other are the same thing.

By confusing doing with acting, Abbagnano places in the decision more future than there can be, it follows that this expands and appears what it is not, involvement appears when it is simply taken away. He writes: «The act with which man tends to constitute in being the possibility that is proper to him, is also the act with which being comes to meet man in order to found him in his finitude. This meeting of being with man is the future, as a fundamental determination of temporality. But it is a problematic meeting, which does not eliminate the risk of man and therefore is precisely a future. Problematicity in its temporal aspect is the possible nullity of man's possibilities, that is, the possibility connected to all the possibilities that man chooses and makes his own of not being able to be founded in being and of being lost. Man's decision, when it is authentic, commits him and therefore guarantees it in his constitution, but does not eliminate the problematic, rather it reconfirms it". (*Ib .*, Pp. 30-31). How is it that the being moves towards the decision of the individual if this is mere doing? Abbagnano realizes that there is a contradiction here and speaks of an "act", but the word is not enough. Obviously I cannot decide to act, I can only decide to do. The time that from the future becomes present to be then passed may very well slip unnoticed on my doing, nothing assures me of this passage of time, indeed there is an industry that builds mechanisms to improve the pastime, and this is precisely the an amused life in Pascal's sense, the administered life which if it maintains a certain consanguinity with life lived in a conscious, qualitatively conscious way, is unable to look at destiny and speak to it. The future can certainly reserve surprises, but this is uncertain and unproblematic. The elimination of the possibility of choice was at the source not at the mouth and there is no "authentic" decision that can avoid it. The action involves me, and vice versa, but it does not authenticate me, it does not guarantee me, and here it seems that temporality flows in view of this foundation. It is not a difference of style but of substance. I am not expelled from doing because I remain a prisoner there but from acting I can be sent away and find myself faced with the "enough" that kills quality. How can I entrust time with the task of sealing my frailty down to the last line if I don't stay on the threshold and on my guard but they hole up "keeping me faithful"? I suspect you want to keep what was previously secured in the attic problematic.

How to agree with formulations such as the following: "Nothing really happens in man's existence without his choice. The structure of man is essentially freedom, freedom that is not indifference, but normativity, having to be: having to be of the finite personality of man and therefore of the universal being that founds it, and of the community that finds its ground in this being. of encounter and mutual intelligence. Man continually finds himself in front of the crucial alternative between being and non-being, between the possession of oneself in the possession of one's possibilities, and the dispersion and trivialization of these possibilities, between an anonymous and insignificant life and a life intense and meaningful that is rooted in history ». (*Ib .*, P. 32). If the equivalence between freedom and norm were true, the statement written by the Nazis about their concentration camps that "work makes you free" would be equally true. There is a difference, and it is substantial, not a thin line, a negligible threshold, and this difference is found everywhere. It is terrifying to make these two

divergent realities come together. Having to be is not being, and Hegel's irony cannot be forgotten about this. There is no universal being - maybe we are talking about life? - which can found the particular being, encountering it in society. Abbagnano continues to talk about community but I suspect, maintained from the distant years, that there is a bit of confusion here. Universal life is a spurious, dangerous and biologically uncertain concept, if only with regard to the limits in which one can speak of life and those in which one must speak of death. Being is and dispersing is not, or does the latter appear only in opposition to the former? I do not know. I would not put the opposition in these terms. Is trivializing one's life perhaps dying? I do not believe. Is teaching philosophy or economics at a major university a crucial alternative to writing these lines in a Greek prison cell on a warm February night? I do not believe. Something envelops my life and tells me with a flash of clarity that quantitative accumulation, success and guarantee are not life. I am tired and old, my feet are sore from lack of blood circulation and I have severe pain in my left shoulder but my heart is steady and my brain has no numbness. I have nothing to oppose to the ancient master, but my accounts do not add up by conducting them with his method. How can I root myself in history thanks to my authenticity? If there is something that allows or facilitates me then it is not I who enter the story but it is a kind concession, nothing to do with my freedom. If this something is my authenticity, then it is always my choice that it is, and so we return to the starting point. And here is the astonishing conclusion: «Human freedom is guaranteed by the constant renewal of this appeal. Of course, man may not even listen to him, and this possibility is effective and real; it is the possibility of sin ». (*Ib .*, P. 32). It is about the appeal of authenticity. Here we remain on the spot, there is no way to justify this step. And so he continues: «Sin is dispersion, superficiality, abandonment, throwing oneself into life as it comes, the inability to coordinate and dominate it and therefore the inability to dominate and possess oneself. Sin is an actual possibility, inherent in the structure. It is linked to temporality, which is the foundation of the possible nullity of man's own constitution. By trivializing and dispersing the possibilities of man, sin makes his life anonymous and insignificant, prevents the formation of his personality, isolates him and hides him from being and from coexistence ». (*Ibid*). In other words, finally evident, sin is the form of life that is not guaranteed either directly or indirectly, the free life that undergoes continuous metamorphosis, that does not accept the gloom of the imprisoned, that does not register, that is unable to found something and to declare it your possession. Sin is the life worth living, which enters without asking permission, which does not exercise metaphysical spells because it does not need it, which does not drown in the pangs of an interminable act. And the demonstration of this negativity of sin is that life is not a positive safeguard of itself but an enlargement, involvement, chaos, dispersion, movement, overcoming, all that can be thought of as contrary to conservation. To preserve is to mummify, to die, to deny life. In fact Abbagnano affirms that in order to "overcome sin" it is necessary "man's fidelity to himself" (*ib .*, P. 33), in other words, permanence. Another amazing statement. «Avoiding dispersion, overcoming sin is possible only with a choice that decides man's fidelity to himself. This fidelity is man's fidelity to his own finitude. Finitude must not be ignored and denied: it must be recognized, accepted and fully realized. If it is denied and misunderstood, it is a chain that is dragged along without knowing it, but that blocks every movement and makes every creation impossible. But if it is accepted and recognized, if it is fully realized, it becomes the very substance of freedom. Man then limits himself in his own finitude, becomes capable of passion ». (*Ib .*, P. 33). Passion is a claustrophobic measure of life, self-limitation. Torturing thought. The choice is free and passionate. Trivia to be rejected, any content worthy of the name is precluded. Let's stay where we are, for heaven's sake, we don't even make any noise,

the negativity could wake up and lure us into a wasteland. There is no way to understand how fidelity can install man in his own destiny. What is the meaning of these words? Does this not mean choosing a hidden and prudent life and covering it, for further caution, with a curtain that deceives the future about our possibilities? Doesn't that mean mistaking a demeaning counterfeit for true?

As proof of these uneven distances, which dominate the many planes of Abbagnano's theory, is the passage of the passion that should revive the doing to make it act in the face of the eventuality of death, always present, not like a veil that covers the reality but as its operational component. Thus he continues: "As a fact it [death] is alien to us, as a possibility it determines our whole nature and our whole existence. The meaning of death is in fact the very meaning of the problematic nature of existence and therefore of its temporality. All man's possibilities are such that they may not be, and man himself, in the general form of his existence, is such that he may not be. This possibility is always there, to determine the essential problematic nature of our constitution. The nature of temporal problematicity is in fact in what it can cease to be problematic, it can degrade from its essence. Man is not what he is with the added possibility of death: he is what he is, precisely by virtue of this possibility » . (*Ib .* , Pp. 34-35). One can agree with considering death as a fact not relevant to our doing, but this means affirming a tautology. Dying is not doing, only killing oneself is, but it is even less an act. Referring to man's possibility of not being here, the wrong word is chosen. Not being is not a possibility, but once again a fact. In any case, it is not the other side of being, its dark side, its sordid side. A moment will suffice and to witness death, in the very moment, its full reality appears as the absence of life, operating in the upset of any precautionary structure. Death is the nothing that surrounds life and not the other way around, if it enters life it does so as fear, as a limit, as a warning - the skull on the table of the mystics - in any case as a stranger, always present and always absent, of the absence of which nothingness has body and consistency. Death can be considered a possibility, certainly it is a possibility of every action, even of the most homely and guarded, it is not of acting. In the involvement death is not taken into consideration, even the mortal risk, physically full, is almost always higher. To live is to be aware of living, that is to go beyond the vital appearances of doing, where in any case the shadow of the cemetery hovers. To live is to act, to do is a resigned living in the shade of the cypresses.

Therefore, Abbagnano concludes: «Whoever resolves not to think about death, frantically chases the possibilities that lie ahead without possessing any and without possessing himself in any. Whoever resolves to think of death as the only alternative of his life, also loses his own possibilities and himself and is dispersed in anguish. Whoever accepts death as such and fears it out of danger remains attached to the possibility that he has chosen as his own and makes it his mission and his fundamental task for all his strength and beyond his strength. In this case, fidelity to death expresses the authenticity proper to the existence that has been realized in the structure, constituting man in his own unity, that is, in his necessary relationship with the universal being and with the coexisting community. It is the only attitude worthy of man » . (*Ib .* , Pp. 35-36). Not thinking about death is typical of doing - Abbagnano does not underline it, he certainly touches it - and it is precisely in doing that one is closest to death. Thinking about it thoroughly, always doing, already means having lost one's life force, living in fear. Accepting it as present even before involvement is a willingness to openness - in Pascal's sense - and therefore truly not letting it enter into one's action, not even as a limit eventuality, not even when it is the action itself that makes it more palpable, closer. In acting, death is no longer there, it is an invisible force that touches but does not condition the action, which does not write on

every page of our life, as it happens in doing. This fact does not concern the authenticity of being but only its overcoming, its passage from doing to acting, its request for a different substance, devoid of apparatuses, of guardians, of apparent safeguards, of reassuring proximity. The attempt to act is free from fear, therefore also from the fear of death, and the action is in this territory that exists, that is, it simply is. On the side of doing dwells fear and the need to keep what one possesses, whatever this possession represents, power and money, love or knowledge, everything is put in the safe, and here it rots.

And here we are in actual existentialism, as a philosophical doctrine. Abbagnano writes: "The first reason for the strength of existentialism is that it is not only a philosophical doctrine: it is not realized only in the philosophers who work to clarify the reasons for it to themselves and to others". (*Ib .*, P. 38). A strong element of existentialism is therefore both its being a philosophical theory and its being an "attitude" deviating from the tasks that man must perform in the world. This position already cuts a small piece of existentialism and reduces it only to the form of the positive philosopher who cannot fail to impose obligations and tasks on himself. How else would it supply the cavern of slaughter? In short, existentialism is a philosophy of life together, to which the individual must bow down, don't you think?

"The second reason for its strength is that it includes and asserts in the concreteness of individual existence all the needs of properly human life. Nothing human is foreign to him. Science and religion, art and politics, equally find their foundation in the actual existence to which it appeals ". (*Ib .*, P. 39). The ancient Latin saying recurs punctually (the phrase of Terentius says: "Homo sum: human nihil a me alienum puto"). All relationships must be admitted, only inhuman ones must be excluded and must never be admitted. This is why there are prisons and asylums. Sometimes the dividing line overlaps and then relationships become exasperated, elusive or overflowing, in any case deceptive. Existence is everything, appearance is nothing. But since the appearance that we nevertheless encounter continuously does not exist, does not everything come into its own in the unification of being and appearing? It seems so to me.

«The third strong point of existentialism is its ability to make the philosophers of the past current, in their truth. It realizes the true historicity of philosophy, because on the one hand it avoids the arbitrary adaptation of the philosophers of the past to our current needs and on the other hand the impossible sacrifice of current needs to the demands of a perennial philosophy that poses itself as such independently of any relationship with us ". (*Ibid*). Here is a pro domo sua peroration. Abbagnano takes into account his *History of Philosophy* , where the hypothesis contained here is made explicit at the end of the work. Except that it fails to convince in claiming to be able to recognize the "true" personality of a philosopher in the act in which "we affirm our personality in the urgency and strength of its claims". Below is the queue of the professor who juxtaposes his work to his life, canceling this to save and justify that. And of a present that wanted to propose itself - I don't say stand up - standing out lonely in a different way? How to face the cataclysm of a method slightly deviating from the aforementioned paradigm? It is not true that it is an automatic thing to establish contacts between different models of dealing with knowledge, because this is what we are talking about. There can be a territory with only one inhabitant, well, if so, this subversive danger must be wiped out. No comment on the enterprise, the flow towards the cavern of massacres remains constant.

Regarding the objective consideration of the problem of being, Abbagnano writes: "The fundamental impossibility that man can know himself and that therefore the

search for his being can be reduced to knowledge, lies in the fact that knowledge supposes that the self and the world are already constituted in their separation, while the search for being includes the problem of their constitution. Knowledge always presents a polarized situation in which the object distinguishes itself from and opposes the subject; it supposes the totality of which subject and object are part in their correlative polarization. But this totality, the world, cannot itself be an object of knowledge. For there to be a world and for me in the act of knowing to root myself in it, it is a problem that knowledge gives rise to but which it cannot solve ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 40-41). Here one might see some agreement with this thesis were it not for the final concept of grounding. In the act of knowing how do I root myself in the world? Already, in this more than announced perspective, the difference between me and the world is spurious and should be re-discussed. The object and the subject are tools that can be used, that is, logical only in the little by little in which knowledge settles itself, that is, it becomes a system under the pressure of a systematic push. Otherwise, you can only make notes in the margin. Knowledge flows in and does not ask for permission on an endless journey. The approach to the accumulation of the already known and the influx of what one is knowing are two adjacent organizations or fields of forces that come into contact, otherwise it is not the world that disappears but knowledge and everything drowns in the fog where they resonate. the screams of the damned.

Regarding the subjective consideration of the problem of being, Abbagnano specifies: «The subjective consideration removes any meaning from the problem of individuality and its destiny, that is, from the problem of truly existing man. By reducing being to rationality, it removes and cancels the possibility of a problem of being, because it substitutes a rigorous necessity, an obligatory connection of determinations and moments for that instability, that fundamental indeterminacy from which the question arises what is the 'to be? This question has value only for the existence and existence of the individual. But the individual, in the case of the total immanence of being to subjectivity, has lost all consistency: he has been assimilated and digested by the universal thought ». (*Ib.* , P. 42). If being is only the reason there is nothing but a necessity and no problematicity in life, which is clearly in contrast with even superficial observation. Doing the same is unsure of himself, has a slightly obtuse but easily vulnerable sensitivity, ready to become more acute in acting, suffering strongly in the face of an impossible transformation. But, even by eliminating an absolute deterministic connection, in the positive version of the problematic there is a basis that re-launches the request for well-founded certainty, for fidelity. Being can neither close nor be closed, these two versions are equivalent separated only by a delicate cobweb and Abbagnano does not notice it. If subjectivism thinks that it is itself what it is and cannot not be, positive problematicism thinks it can capture being in such a way that what one comes into possession of - thanks to the authenticity of choice and the fidelity of rootedness - remain what it is. If the former does not ask, the latter asks a rhetorical question or, at least, a question that awaits a guaranteed answer. Reason wants to dominate, both in the universal and in the particular concreteness. In any case, one is never able to assess the lethal consequences of its extension. The guillotine raises and lowers the cleaver always guided by reason, this is the law of the cave of massacres. Transcendence, starting from myself, arrives - or can arrive - at some foundation without myself, according to existential metaphysics, only through authentic choice, but it is also always a journey into universal reason where the being in expectation would seem to dwell. to be snatched away and brought into the troubles of limited and contradictory coexistence. I move towards being and I carry it with me in appearance, so I identify it by unifying it in me, I believe that such a

suspicion has also come to Sartre. Abbagnano reverses the reasoning. Being is not in the appearance of the inauthentic, by authenticating I take it and carry it with me but I do not nullify it because I am no longer the lost self but the one who has found himself thanks to the authentic choice. And here Abbagnano mentions the overcoming and says: «The individual cannot exist except by transcending himself and moving towards being; but this implies that being is not immanent in the subjectivity he embodies. Existence is rather the constitution of a relationship between me and being; but this relationship is established precisely in the act in which I proceed beyond myself, in which I limit myself in order to go beyond myself. Universality is constituted by this relationship with being, which founds individuality, does not cancel it. Universality is in the overcoming that I make of myself, existing, not in myself. Universality is the scope and direction of my existential movement that seeks being and relates to being: it is not the immanence of being to my reason ". (*Ib .* , P. 43). Okay, but to go where? To stay at home, here is the answer, cross the threshold of the house and then return through the window.

By rejecting objectivism, Abbagnano abandons the cognitive foundation, by rejecting subjectivism he abandons universal reason, thereby subtracting strength both from the cognitive capacity - and here is his radical opposition to my way of approaching knowledge - and from the constitutive and selective reason that organizes and holds the thought. In this way he argues with Heidegger and with Jaspers. In other words, he wants to pose the problem of the relationship with being, the search for being, and this as a response to a tension towards being. Here lies a misunderstanding that was not easy for me - at the time - to resolve. It seems that here we start to the conclusion that going from appearance to being, as a supreme tension, I would unify myself in nothing. Not so, let's calm down. Abbagnano is keen to disillusion us, specifying his position and distinguishing, somewhat crudely to tell the truth, in the following way: "First of all, I can consider as the foundation of existing the fact that, in order to relate to being, it comes off from nowhere. In this case, the detachment from the nothing and ultimately the nothing itself determine the nature of existence. But since existence never detaches itself from nothing, as it never identifies with being, so it is defined in this case by the impossibility that it is nothing.

"Secondly, I can consider as a salient feature of existence, its relationship with being, its transcending towards being. But since the relationship with being that existence can establish is never attainment of being and identification with being, existence is defined in this case by the impossibility that it is being.

"Thirdly, I can consider the very relationship with the being in which it consists as a salient feature of existence. In this case existence is defined by the possibility that it is the relationship with being ". (*Ib .* , P. 45). Heidegger concludes for nothingness as being seized by existence, Jaspers for the impossibility of being to exist out of nothingness, Abbagnano for the possibility that defines - note this verb - the relationship between being and existence, concludes for a positive identity of being in life, even in doing that remains itself and does not go beyond acting.

Going beyond - if this movement has ever passed through Abbagnano's mind - makes sin easy, that is, the loss of possession, thus missing the breath of security, the breath of fidelity. Positivity unfolds downwards, agrees with the reassurance of doing, makes the rift with acting impassable, closes life between the dark walls of fidelity, where it is not easy to get lost. For Abbagnano, Heidegger cannot detach himself from nothing, so he embraces an inferior, chaotic, insignificant life. He sings around it, sublimates it as a system, chiseling the words with the use of a hermeneutic game, and ends in a flash of warlike blades. Jaspers, on the other hand, has no way of re-attaching

existence to being, so vague in the uncertainties of the many substitute situations that offer appearances to the point of canceling themselves out. A surrender of meaning without consistency and coexistence, attributes that fade into the fog, incomprehensible physiology of an unbalanced, substantially negative, impenetrable body. In both cases, Abbagnano continues, for these philosophies: «They reduce existence to a fundamental impossibility - the impossibility of detaching oneself from nothing, the impossibility of attaching oneself to being, that is, to necessity and determinism. With the denial of the problematic nature of the relationship and its reduction to an impossibility, indeterminacy and freedom are denied. They reduce existential decision and choice to deciding what has already been decided, to choosing what has already been chosen. They take away its freedom from existential commitment, they reduce it to a predestined determination ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 46-47).

Denial of freedom and predestination. Here Abbagnano overturns some of the defects of his approach - which he has practically already made us aware of - on Heidegger and on Jaspers, accusing them of determinism and speaks, for the first time, of "free fidelity", a contradiction in terms that invalidates his criticism in more serious than he himself could have imagined. The life imbalance of possibility - which remains a guaranteeing modulation of appearance - is inmedicable, because of it nothing is safer, not even the safety of the high walls that surround this Korydallos prison. Indeed, more often than not, it is precisely the insurance insistence that precipitates the imbalance into the oversize of the wrong path. Fixing - or trying to do it - is often worse than breaking down altogether. On the contrary, my life - according to Abbagnano - cannot enter into reality, that is, be realized, except in the authentic possibility of a relationship with being, or rather, "with the original, transcendental problematic nature of this relationship". He writes: «Existence has no other way of realizing itself properly than that of realizing itself as the possibility of the relationship with being, that is, as the original, transcendental problematic nature of this relationship. Existence is not abandoned or launched towards being, so that it cannot recognize itself except in the impossibility of attaching itself to being or detaching itself from nothingness. Existence places itself in the relationship with being, recognizing itself as a pure possibility of this relationship and remaining faithful to the problematic nature of its structure ". (*Ib.* , P. 47). Life must look at itself, at the relationship with itself. It cannot consider nothing, or rather nothing, as I would say, where there is a profound difference in condition, nothing from which it moves or the being from which it moves, but to the relationship it establishes with itself and to fidelity. of this report. Here it seems that it must remain faithful to its uniqueness and problematic nature, but it is not so. In fact it is the consistency that founds existence in itself, preventing the dispersion into nothingness or the impossibility of being. It is therefore a substance that must be recognized in its original problematic nature. But the latter substance, if it is determined, can be known, therefore recognized, that is, identified, if it is indeterminate it remains a raw and decomposed aspect, very similar to the chaos of being, elusive and unsuitable for modeling. Trying to discover gaps in this crowd is like identifying someone from a rigorous isolation, from a tight seal. There are no possible subtractions, the beat is persistent and sure, immovable. The substance is the classic appearance of metaphysics, there is no substance where there is no cause and there is no cause that is the cause of oneself apart from God. If being is the cause of life there is a circle that it closes, if the cause is nothingness the circle does not open, if the cause is life itself the circle does not exist. The three solutions are all three metaphysical, that is, they have their own justification in the mists of a system. In fact Abbagnano is forced to specify: "If existence is defined with respect to its relationship with being, the need

to consolidate and found this relationship acts as an interior norm in the constitution of existence and as an evaluative principle of the possibilities that are offer. I must choose what consolidates and strengthens me in my relationship with being, that is, what guarantees the possibility of this relationship: I must choose to be the original problematic nature of that relationship. If that relationship constitutes, due to its problematic nature, my substance, I must remain faithful to my substance, and realize it in my decision. The problematic substance of my existential structure is thus the norm of my decision, a norm that removes me from the indifference and equivalence of possibilities and collects and evaluates them on the basis of their substantial unity ». (*Ib .*, P. 48). Where metaphysical words par excellence sound like "consolidates", "strengthens", "guarantees", "constitutes", "remain faithful", "norm", "foundation". How can we speak of freedom in these conditions of administrative recruitment? We only get a safe conduct to justify the supreme metaphysical concept, that of substance, a theoretical gesture as ineffective as ever, which cannot be rooted except in the appearance of doing, a kind of official marketing of indulgences that proposes a linear clarity on a formal level, to then drown in the stagnation of the repetitiveness of doing that provides the cave of massacres.

There is no doubt that Abbagnano is good at formulating and restating his thesis. «Certainly, for me who exist, being is a possibility of being and, as a possibility, it can also be nothing. But my existence does not properly depend neither on nothingness nor on being, but on the possibility of being in which I constitute myself: its substance is therefore only the transcendental foundation, the condition of possibility, that is, the problematic nature for which it is what it is. is. And my task will be to guarantee and strengthen the possibility of my being by consolidating it in its transcendental condition, realizing it in its original and ultimate problematicity ». (*Ib .*, P. 49). Once the positive mechanism has been discovered - let us say, once again, home-made - one sees only the patina of skill, a question of profession achieved on the doctrines of long-studied philosophers. Not being able to imprison being and appearance, it imprisons their unification, nothingness. Life is this nothingness - devoid of quality - if it is not truly lived beyond its quantitative limits. This could be implied by the problematic nature of the authentic choice but the indication of partiality of doing, which instead is lacking in the passage to being, should not be missing. The precariousness of the problematic relationship cannot but remain such, nor can there be fidelity that can change it into something stable or authenticity that can make a corpse live. A problem, in itself, dies in the solution, if this presents again the problem was not a solution but an appearance. If being is quality and appearance is quantity, the problematic relationship is posed in other terms. But here Abbagnano remains far away, and I with him at the time was far from these conclusions.

Thus he notes: «The problem of being therefore defines the state of an entity of which being does not constitute a possession but a possibility. As a state of an entity, the problem does not need to be formulated abstractly or verbally to exist as a problem. It constitutes the entity in the sense of determining all its manifestations and concrete attitudes from within. Doubt and certainty, expectation and fear, action and despair, are all individual and concrete ways of the problem of being because they are all determined by the instability of the relationship between being and being. The happiness of a discovery and a possession, as precious as it is more subject to the risk of loss, the bitterness of a setback, the anguish of an impossibility, victory and disaster, also contain the profound and total meaning of the problem of being, of the instability of the relationship in which the entity is with the being, of the precariousness of its possession, of the risk that is connected to it. The problem of being lives not in the conceptual and verbal encapsulation of philosophical doctrines,

but in the very being constitutive of the entity: in its temporal life, in its limitation, in its destiny ». (*Ib.* , P. 50). This entity - ailments of metaphysics - is man. The characteristics of man constitute his life. Lacks and gaps, doubts, uncertainties and fears, all this is rampant in the desire for quantitative possession and in the unsatisfied sphere of quality. In doing almost always you don't even know what territory you are lost in, you groped in the dark. Disorientation and bewilderment. Amazement and expectation of a guarantee. If the possible loss of a possession is a risk that is present, but one that you want to avoid, you barricade yourself inside, the risk disappears because it is not realized in the overrun and everything remains as before. There can be no happiness in touching this uncontaminated possession, as Abbagnano suggests, because no real risk has been taken but only the appearance of a risk, an intellectual risk. What setback can there be if life is at stake in a university classroom or in the headquarters of a publishing house? An inconspicuous frustration stops life and is thus mistaken for a risky game, for putting oneself on the line. Philosophical thoughts, not a real risk of one's life in the face of the overcoming of doing. To affirm that the problematic nature of being lives in the constitutive condition of man is to see things from the outside, with the appropriately graduated lens of the entomologist. In fact Abbagnano declares: «Man can also reach the security and peace of a possession of being; but he can only reach it on condition that he conquers it and only at the risk of losing it every moment. Man can rebel and escape any determination; it cannot rebel and escape the problem of being because the very possibility of rebellion, as of acceptance, is in this problem that constitutes its nature. Accepting to be something or refusing to be it is possible only for an entity for which being is a problem and to which the relationship with being is given in the form of a fundamental instability ». (*Ib.* , P. 51). Security and peace. Once again cemetery symbols, but precious symbols. However, there is something mocking in this incongruous conclusion based on conquest and possession, warlike terms. As if man can never escape from this crystallized and infantile perspective. It is a bewildering prospect that is frequently found in Abbagnano and which I hope is advanced as a positive response to a probable loss or negative outlook.

The specific condition of man is therefore contrary to all determination, and peace and possession cannot be elements of this condition. He replies thus: «Indetermination is the state proper to man as a possibility of being. Man, in the problem of being, is in the state of indeterminacy because he has been indeterminate. Man is constituted in the indetermination only insofar as the indetermination has already been, only in so far as it is in the past, already surpassed and transcended. The state of indeterminacy supposes a movement that goes beyond indeterminacy. The overcoming of indetermination, the going out of it is to exist (existere). Man exists insofar as, constituting himself with the problem and in the problem of being, he leaves the indetermination that it implies and moves towards the recognition of it. Existence is the act by which man recognizes the indeterminacy of his nature and therefore poses the problem of being as his nature. Existence is an overcoming of indetermination only because it is a return to indeterminacy. Evidently, existence is the concrete movement in which indeterminacy is placed and constituted as a starting point and as a point of arrival. Existence is the proper and authentic position of the problem of being because it is the constitution of this problem as man's own and original nature ». (*Ib.* , P. 52). Important statement. The circle of being is for Abbagnano of a tautological nature. It is born and ends in uncertainty. Where to find assistance and salvation? Uncertainty is the basis of the relationship between man and being, therefore life is this undetermined relationship with a disruptive potential as it is based on transcendental possibility. If this is enclosed in the obscurity of

simple doing, the gift is refused and transformed into right. There is no way to go beyond this claimed right which thus continually rolls on itself, confusing repetitiveness that is always identical to itself with new possibilities of choice. Man's nature is by no means to go beyond his hideous identity as a massacring animal, freedom in general scares him, as does life outside the cave, the dangerous life in the forest that requires courage. He ventures into it only if he is involved in acting, and it is then that he recognizes his own limitation, this is presented to him in a qualitative form, therefore under the species of diversity, not as a further quantity to be defended. Indeterminate is only the qualitatively put into play, constantly relaunched, which never misses an opportunity to be outrageous towards authoritarian accommodation, the meticulous procedures of control and survival, the regulatory ramifications, precisely of peace and security. The "concrete reasoning" of which Abbagnano speaks, which "must not" ignore or deny but realize the indeterminacy, on the other hand exactly are very sensitive and ferocious in denying it, in restricting it. The fact that Abbagnano continually refers to the "constitutive problematic" proposing to consider it "as original" is an exhortation that man's ferocity rejects as all the beautiful and vague exhortations to good and self-improvement. It is not true that this exhortation produces an understanding of life, rather the opposite is true, that life makes this and other exhortations ridiculous, not because they are trivially subjective facts, but because they do not make a real decision, the only possible one, the one that it matures in a different consciousness and explodes in the overcoming. What is qualitatively different in life is unknown, it is the desert wind that brings death and the word of destiny, the absurd wind of chaos that admits no pretensions or delicacies typical of doing, these conditions where everything is commensurate with conservation. , is reproduced in formulas and divided into accessible and justifiable parts, in short, ready for use.

But Abbagnano is even more extremist in the chiseling of his thesis on the original problematic nature, where the accent is placed on this originality. Its main purpose is not to highlight human indeterminacy, but to dominate it and ultimately possess it. Here is how this point specifies: "The unity and identity of my myself, what I truly am in myself and for myself, is determined in that act, by virtue of my decision. For it, I am not abandoned to indeterminacy; but assuming it as my nature I dominate and possess it. And by possessing it I not only possess myself because I am originally that indeterminacy, but I also possess the being that is proper to me in the form, in which it is proper to me, of the indetermination. The decision establishing possession and conditioning my own constitution, however, is nothing arbitrary and the choice implicit in it is by no means a choice of indifference. I cannot decide about myself if not on the basis of what I am, that is, on the basis of the original indeterminacy if I want to be myself. But I am originally nothing but indetermination: the indeterminacy is therefore my true being; the in itself, the substance of myself; it is therefore in it and for it that I must realize myself. The recognition of the indeterminacy implicit in the position of the problem of being is the recognition of the very substance of my being. The confession of what I am is the affirmation of the substantiality of what I am; it is the commitment for the future ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 54-55). Everything revolves around the concrete refusal to experience the risk of indeterminacy and is opposed only by the recognition of its original condition. If I decide for myself it is because I know what I am and what I want to do - and this is acceptable - but if I know this, mine is an appearance of decision not a real decision. It is but a formal appointment of my human right to possess myself, a bureaucratic practice. Instead, by shaking the patina of doing, the abuse, the prevarication, the murder, elements that underlie that practice and substantiate it, immediately appear. To realize oneself is to mystify

oneself, to make the being apparent so that it is accepted in the society of ghosts, where what the law of the rulers says and does, who feeds the cave of massacres, hovers. If my substance is indetermination it is indeterminate like me who is constituted by it. So why talk about substance? Doesn't all this cast a grim and distrustful light around it? No. Abbagnano does not notice it, he uses the most trite paraphernalia of metaphysics, the old tools of his trade. Here it is: «The substance is undoubtedly the foundation and guide of my choice, the sufficient reason for my decision; but this does not mean that in it my choice has already been chosen and my decision has already been decided. That substance is in fact itself uncertainty and problematic and only as such can it be valid as the foundation and norm of my decision and my choice. The in itself of the substance is the pure, original problematicity, the absolute, transcendental indetermination, the condition of every other indeterminacy. It does not imply any choices already made, no decisions already made. Of course I can only decide in conformity with what I originally am; and so I must decide. But what am I really? The answer to this question will be given only by my choice. The act with which I will decide will be the act with which I will recognize myself, my substance. The decision is the recognition and the recognition is the decision. Existence is not the abstract consideration of equivalent possibilities between which I am balanced; it is the passion that engages me in the fundamental possibility, at the bottom of which I find the realization of my substance ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 55-56). "Foundation" and "guide", "sufficient reason", "in itself", dated concepts that arise here to support a supposedly different speculative plan. It is a dubious behavior about which many conflicting hypotheses can be advanced, but in any case it is a suspicious behavior, taking into account the uncertainty. If the transcendental in-self is problematic and indeterminate, why is it substance? And what is it of? If it is my substance, it reveals its purely metaphysical consistency precisely when I recognize that my indeterminate existence is devoid of real substance in the banal everyday life and hides behind the mask of appearance. If I access quality this is not a new and different substance, but my personal risk, an involvement that cannot be founded in any way, so much so that sooner or later I fall back into doing and I can only remember it, not crystallize it into a stay. The statute of stability does not belong to the different experience.

Why is substance a condition of reality? Abbagnano writes: «For man, existence is an identifying relationship. Relating to the substance, man identifies himself, defines himself and acquires the maximum importance of which he is capable. But individuation is possible only insofar as the individuation movement transcends the limits of individuality. Man is identified only in relation to the substance and beyond his single finitude. The movement in which the relationship is established determines at the same time individuality and that which transcends or embraces individuality: being and the world. The individual is not such except in relation to a totality that includes him. Man cannot place himself as a man if he does not place himself in the world. Man's consolidation in himself, his return to interiority, his tendency to realize himself and only himself, place him in a necessary relationship with the world, that is, they determine his existential situation ». (*Ib.* , P. 59). But what do I individualize? If the identity of the walls of my prison remain in the daily life of individuality, of my single finitude, I have an apparent vision, the one projected into the cavern of massacres. It is not true that this is how I place myself in the world, this is how I place in the world the diffident vision of my possession that doing continues to produce. My life is consolidated in this way around a parody of itself. There is no truth that can emerge in the qualitative void and truth is a quality of life not of doing. There is no clarity I can do around me surrounded as I am, besieged, by my defenses and my

own cognitive means, both emanations from the cave to which the theories I produce flow. No position of mine in the world can be so real, it is defined in this way, as Abbagnano says well, that is, it is regulated, accepted by the world that is pleased with it, but it is never let go for itself, it cannot undertake the long and difficult journey to the crossing. In turn, the world shows me its truth, which is lies and infamy, its way of being which is what finances and corroborates the accumulation of the underground lake of blood. We are two accomplices who look at each other and walk together in the crowded territory of meanness disguised as reality and consistency. The normative substance, as Abbagnano says, cannot push me "from the inside", it can only pathetically comfort me from the outside. I have no well-founded hopes of looking at destiny and my commitment is only limited to the productivity of doing, this is the decision that grips me and cannot free me. Engagement is the exact opposite of engagement. The latter seeks a quantitative dimension, finds me and marks me in the world, it is my modest fortune that I have to safeguard, my peculiarity that I am going to place in the most remote place. For the rest I am absolutely devoid of quality, I wander around within my "individuality" in the sense of Abbagnano, trying to furnish it as best as possible, but in these forced conditions I am a capable and expert person only in small parts. The qualitative essential escapes me, and if I try in these conditions, that is, bringing with me the baggage of my experiences of doing, I am chased away.

In fact, and here Abbagnano seems to have a suspicion when he writes: «The world remains an appearance for me, until I have decided about myself. It offers me only the shifting and fleeting perspectives of equivalent possibilities among which I am unguided. It is devoid of consistency and seriousness, it is a futile game in which events without meaning, which leave no trace, follow one another. But when I have decided to be what I am called to be, when I undertake to realize the substance of my being, then the world arises and reveals itself in front of me as a stable and consistent reality, in which what happens is not me. indifferent, because it affects me or my tasks and in which therefore nothing useless happens ». (*Ib.* , P. 60). And it is so if my decision is simply the one according to which "I have decided to be what I am called to be". Here there is the suspicion of a mark that can make the decision different from what it normally is, a factual choice, that is, a prisoner one. But what is this mark? Only my commitment? It is not possible. My commitment is not a "call". Who is calling me? The substance. It is therefore this entity that bubbles and marks my life in a certain way. It seems to read Augustine. But I know that's not true. Abbagnano is not Agostino. This is a little scam of words. There is no one who marks me, only my fear seals me in the world of forced action and makes my situation precarious. For which Abbagnano concludes: "That the world is appearance or reality, that the totality in which I live, the beings with which I am in relationship, are inconsistent and fallacious ghosts, or valid and effective realities, is not a theoretical problem that can be solved with an investigation of thought: it is an existential problem that I have to decide, deciding about myself ». (*Ib.* , P. 61). This is a courageous affirmation but misleading because it is always made to fall into the decision that by choosing safeguards and does not put everything into play. Here, right here, remains the most extreme contrast between my theses and hers, not so extreme at the time of our acquaintance, much more extreme today, but now it is of little importance. What matters is the current disposition of thought, its crystallized, mine in constant transformation. I have never gone beyond the point of no return, although recently, precisely during this last incarceration in Greek soil, I have come very close, almost to the point of smelling the rancid odor of death, he has no never raised the sails, he died without realizing he was dying because he was already dead before and you

cannot die twice.

"Why am I what I am and nothing else?" Abbagnano asks himself. And he replies: «In any circumstance of place and time, I would be what I am, if what I am is the substance of my being. My vocation places me above the variability of circumstances, facing a task that cannot be modified by them. What I ought to be, the substance of myself, urges me from within with a call so passionate and irresistible that it does not allow me to admit any other effective direction of my existence. I have chosen to be what I essentially am: my destiny is decided ». (*Ib.* , P. 62). Once again the words of his trade betray him. "Vocation", "task", "I have chosen to be what I essentially am". Nothing with this obsolete paraphernalia can give color and strength to what is "urgent", a concept that is not philosophical, at least not necessarily, and that gives the idea of a catapulting out of me of something that remains forced and prisoner in me. But there is no vocation to freedom as there is no destiny that has already been decided. A sign that distinguishes freedom has never been identified, there are no free behaviors recorded in doing, there are small movements of the chain, gilding or lengthening, no abolitions. Nothing indicates a being called - Abbagnano is repeated here - to freedom. There are no free men and that's it, there are courageous attempts, overruns and reminders that provide indications regarding the paths of freedom. The same for fate. Talking to destiny means sending him a message that concerns his own life. If this is forced, fate will also be forced and mute. Otherwise things will be in the case of the overrun. The desert wind, after all, reaches him. Movements are expected to be subtracted from the will to possess. In the face of destiny, Abbagnano attempts a sort of rigorous reduction to the original element of the problematic nature of the decision. Thus he writes: «Once again the position of a question on the theoretical level reveals an existential insufficiency which makes its solution impossible. Once again it is a question of existing, that is, of deciding. The choice of fate is the decision I make about myself. If I feel and am an ordinary man, any fate or story would suit me. But if I am truly myself and have committed myself with all of myself to the task that is proper to me, the question is already resolved: this I would be in any case, in all circumstances; this, and nothing else ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 62-63). The operation fails, it is too open, too superficial. Life is not subject to the comparison of a periodic table, it does not rebound props, these fall like pins at the first breath of wind. On the one hand, the minimal components - the choices - are sought and one is identified as transcendental, on the other hand destiny is set as a counterpart and tries to capture it by pursuing it in its meanders located in the future as if it were leaving behind a phosphorescent strip. In an attempt to make a safe refuge in doing it closes the door to destiny which thus reveals itself for what it is, the continuation of a bad business, a construction as safe as a coffin is safe from which the corpse has no intention of escaping. Reasoning about destiny from the starting point of doing is madness, a macabre dance to remember a dead life. But there is another way of speaking to destiny and it is from the desolate territory of the crossing, where every possession is called into question, placed at risk. Not the theoretical risk that Abbagnano suspects, not realizing that he is stuck in it, but the real risk in which life goes in the way, not the appearance of a status that could be compromised. In the extreme game of qualitative research, freedom comes to meet me and can destroy all my certainties, all guarantees, all protection. This is the voice of destiny that suddenly arrives and nullifies the science that has illuminated my doing up to that moment.

Why do I have to live in the world as a task to be fulfilled? Abbagnano poses the problem and does not solve it, he goes around it. «Existence is the movement that continually takes me beyond myself, not only in the world, but also among others. By its very individualizing character, existence establishes my vital connection between

myself and others: because my individuality is delimited and constituted by a complex of determinations that go beyond me and necessarily include other men. My existence, by being mine, is existence with others. I cannot attribute to myself a task, as modest and limited as one likes, which does not include my coexistence with others as its necessary condition. I do not reach the existence of the others through any discursive or theoretical procedure; it is connected to my own existence in a vital way ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 63-64). Here my dignity and that of others, of all the others, coincide. Good. But why should this happen as the fulfillment of a duty, under the protection of a norm? Shouldn't freedom rule everything in the world? But freedom would put me in too random a game to be able to make me realize in the world. So here I grant others the same rights as mine, the equality of the least common. If I choose the appearance of doing my relationships with others will be effectively apparent, if instead I involve myself - that is, I do not choose or decide - but it is the very overcoming of the forced world that imprisons me, if I access quality, I drag with me the world in an adventure of which I do not know the results. There is no guarantee for me and not even for others. All solidarity is denied me, so I am an outcast under close scrutiny. The world becomes suspicious of those who reek of danger, isolates them and accepts for them only the symbol of secular funerals. "Interhuman understanding", "effective and active solidarity between men bound together by a common historical task", these democratically squalid formulas are Abbagnano's most certain contribution to the cavern of massacres. After all, in the freedom and in the quality in which freedom reaches its maximum tension, man is alone and Abbagnano has very harsh words against isolation. Thus he writes: «Existential isolation is proper to dispersive and improper existence. Isolation is a break in human solidarity, it is incomprehension. It has nothing to do with the solitude in which man gathers to better hear the voice of other men near or far and to devote himself freely to the task he has chosen. Isolation is voluntary blindness to oneself and to others; it is the disregard of what we are for ourselves and for others and what others are for themselves and for us. To isolate oneself means to turn one's back on one's own substance as men and to refuse one's own realization to oneself. Complete isolation is madness, for which man is definitively lost in the disorder of total incomprehension ». (*Ib.* , P. 65). There is not a single word of this diatribe that I shared when I first read it, more than half a century ago, and even today I still do not share a single word. To isolate oneself from the appearance of solidarity is to be in solidarity, where being means what is and cannot not be. The seer's loneliness makes me smile, and I think it made Abbagnano smile too, but isolating oneself from the doing that all men have in common in their busyness around murder is the only acceptable condition of life for a man who does not consider himself a coward. . In fact, solidarity in the world has been absorbed in appearance and takes the revolting form of assistance and the enslavement of work if not imprisonment and is satisfied with the delegation of each one, in the political slime everyone has the opportunity to give their little contribution to the lake of blood that fills up more and more. In this way we understand each other reciprocally in indifference and estrangement, society - abusively defined as a "community" by Abbagnano - is a mixture in which sordid corners grow and spread where obscure businesses have taken the place of human feelings, disguising them as clownish attitudes. Svidrigajlov's bathroom is the world, the cobwebs are its growths, its tumors, its marks. The world is merciless with those who challenge it and it must be so because that challenge that expresses freedom could question its foundations, the very foundations of order, while it is based only on the iron execution of certain rules, on the implementation of certain correspondences. Time, history, life, destiny are only part of these rules and correspondences. Woe to those who question them, they are immediately expelled and locked up in a suitable place, prison, asylum, etc.

Abbagnano knows all this but goes on his way. For him, destiny can be possessed and therefore, possessed, constitute knowledge in the sense not of a known one but of a decision that engages in the face of time.

Here is how he expresses the problem: «Man is placed by existence in the face of the choice between time and eternity. Time is the very nature of the indeterminacy of its state. Uncertainty is, as we have seen, the fundamental instability of man, the problematic nature of his relationship with being. Problematicity means the possible nullity of the relationship, the possibility of its resolution. Due to the instability that is constitutive, man can lose and lose each and every one of his possibilities of being and is therefore defined by death and time. Time is the possibility that each of man's possibilities will be lost; death is the possibility that all his possibilities are canceled and that he himself is canceled. Death and time or, in general, temporality, therefore essentially determine the nature of man as it is indeterminacy and problematic. Temporality is not an accidental circumstance of man's existence, a provisional state of his being, from which it is conceivable that he was removed. Temporality defines nature, the ultimate constitution of man, because it is the very problematic nature of his being. All that man is, he is by virtue of his problematic nature; and this is the same temporality. An entity that was not subject to time and death would not be a man. Any consideration of man is devoid of truth if it disregards his constitutive temporality ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 66-67). There is no possibility of anchoring in the eternal. The very concept of "eternal" is contradictory to that of "temporality". This proposes a development and a strong compromise of one's own certainties, that is simply and that's it. It is time that overlaps the eternal and covers it by swallowing it. Abbagnano, in his need for security, overturns the relationship and uses the majesty of the immovable to articulate the foundation of the uncertain that moves, canceling its extreme consequences, which are those of chaos. It is this - which he improperly calls "nothing" - that lodges at the gates and that urges man not towards the eternal, in which the solicitation fails, but towards an acceleration, towards extreme compromise, towards the quality that it is a different world, neither eternal nor temporally codifiable, but punctual. In doing, the eternal is not even seen, everything is contingent, but it is precisely this precariousness that shows how the eternal could only be a continuous, immutable, forced act, a kind of winter without spring, long, cold, immovable, monotonous. In making there are no appreciable differences, as in the eternal of which the anchors of Abbagnano are fabled, there are no gradations, everything is devoid of color and flavor, bland and gray. And the eternal provides the appearance of a safe haven with no storms and no pigmentation.

Seeking this impossible safe haven, which is not found in any nautical chart, Abbagnano writes: «Due to the uncertainty of my state, the future comes to meet me and I do not know what it brings me. My being is a possibility of being that can launch me in many directions and even into nothingness. This dispersive and nullifying possibility is part of me, indeed it is myself. But recognizing it as myself means bringing it back to me, unifying it in my unity and for my unity, that is, subordinating it to the task I set myself and the choice I made. I anticipate that possibility with my decision and bring it back to the past; and thus I place my past as my future, I escape the threat of dispersion and establish the unity and consistency of my self. That possibility of being, at first sight dark and threatening, lights up in the light of my past. I will have to be what I have been. The substance of my being normatively solidifies my future with my past; and therefore himself constitutes my past in the future, making it the norm of myself. I will have to be in the future what I have truly been, what I have always been: I will have to be that myself who has overcome and overcome momentary dispersions, not what has sometimes been lost and dispersed.

The reduction of the future to the past is also the constitution of the past in the future. This reduction and this constitution form a simultaneous act which is the historicity of my being ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 68-69). The eternal thus becomes fixed to the past. I "must" be my past, which sounds more like a condemnation than a real opening. It is the "substance" of my being that "normatively welds" the future and the past. Note the legal term chosen here to better establish the concept. My "historicity" is this rootedness, the present that is "defined" in its details, which takes me away from the chaos and makes me be myself. This would be the freedom as opposed to the dispersion that rushes through me if I ignore temporality. Abbagnano welded a cosmic circle and closed himself inside. Any overstepping is made impossible, indeed avoided as a danger. The dimensions of doing apparently multiply in their fictitious diversification, but it is only appearance, their being is the eternal frozen and gray winter. But even if we want to accept this compulsory condition, it does not at all guarantee the foundation sought. In fact, inside it hatches forces that cannot be restrained, they are camouflaged in the eternal repetition, but then something of them breaks the magic circle that hypnotizes it and moves towards the opening. In every man, even in Abbagnano, there is the power that can access quality, it is a question of seeing if the opposing forces, those of fear and the desire for security, do not end up winning. It is not a matter of decision, it is not the sphere of the will that can be more or less involved, but the conscience, the man in his autonomous solicitation for completeness, this is what moves. If Abbagnano states: «The decision removes me from temporality as dispersion and insignificance and leads me to historicity as unity and permanence of meaning. The historicity in which I place myself with the effective decision realizes the unity of my own individuality and at the same time the universal meaning of being with respect to which my own unity is defined. Historicity thus achieves the simultaneous constitution of my true self and my true being: in a word, the substance of existence ». (*Ib.* , P. 70). It does not explain why "historicity" constitutes "unity and permanence". The forces of chaos have not disappeared at the simple sound of the word "historicity", they act freely and wildly, they dance on my heart, they challenge me to go further, not to let myself die in the tedium of forced action. There are no guardians of freedom. The great theorists of philosophy - this is not the case with Abbagnano - have tried in every way to propose themselves as archons of this ideal, they have all failed, their contributions have ended up in the cave of massacres. Abbagnano is more modest, he knows he is not a great philosopher - then in everyday life everyone is under the illusion of being what he wants - and he seeks a simpler level. The tools of his reasoning, as any attentive reader of these pages can see, are of a sometimes disconcerting banality. There are no elements for a theory that can make the word "being" resonate in our hearts, the technical formulas taint the same element common to his theses, the indeterminacy, which had so fascinated me, and this happens because the concept itself it has no way of developing towards its natural conclusion, freedom. The philosopher intervenes first and runs for cover, he avoids that something dangerous can blossom, acquiring intensity that then would no longer be attributable to control.

But the surprises are not over. Abbagnano continues: "The movement that realizes the authenticity of existence by bringing it from the insignificant dispersion of temporality to the significant unity of history, from threat to risk, from self-ignorance to self-intelligence, can be described in its totality as an interpretation existential of substance. In fact, in it the original substance of existence is realized as a return on itself which is an act of self-interpretation. The return of the substance to itself is not an act of reflection to which the self to which one returns is already presupposed, but it is an act that poses the problem of the self to which it must return. I must remain

faithful to myself, to my substance; but until I have actually decided on this fidelity of mine, I do not have a myself, a true substance of my being. The implicit return in the decision is at the same time the act of recognition and of the constitution of my original substance: which therefore by this act is interpreted in its truth ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 70-71). The movement with which certainty is rooted therefore has a hermeneutic nature. The thing is not clear but it performs a sort of sealing task. What I did by deciding now I do it by deciding behind an interpretation of my decision. My substance is not only decided by me but also interpreted in the truth that underlies it. Why then the decisional hermeneutics can make the truth emerge from what I am, by remaining my being self-sacrificing in forced doing, it is not possible to know. Basically, the interpretation is limited to reconfirming and consolidating - again reassuring verses - my substance, and thus seals it double-handed in its "normativity". What if someone decides to burn this gravestone that weighs on the doing and makes him forced? What if he decides, of a decision that goes with his own life, not that makes it possible to look at it while I'm deciding, to burn it and get over it? What if he refuses to accept a historical document on which his fate is written? Abbagnano's response is disarming: «The interpretation has eliminated the threat, not the risk, of existence. The risk requires that I remain vigilant in the task with which I have identified myself: that is, that I continue and renew the act of interpretation, deepening it incessantly with a repetition that is not simply its reiteration because it is the very vital continuity of my fidelity to myself. same". (*Ib.* , P. 71). "Vigilante", what a word full of detective meanings. In many ways we can delude ourselves, but this is one of the most repugnant, and it is necessary that each of these words of recovery be accepted in its scope and in the breadth of its implications.

How can it be that "The interpretation of substance is the realization of the transcendental"? (*Ibid.*). Hermeneutics solicits a word, a theory, even a condition, it also solicits it incessantly from within, it broadens its act, even making it become an immense accumulation, until it never stops taking a circular form, but how does it to realize the transcendent? Maybe doing travels towards quality even when I see myself surrounded by the walls of a prison? Maybe, but Abbagnano seems to me ignorant, and safe, of this doubt. Originality for him is not an a priori but an interpretative return. So here hermeneutics has only something intimate, a sort of solicitation of the immediate conscience? It is not easy to say. He affirms: «The relationship with the constitutive being of existence comes from the interpretative act brought back to its original possibility and based on this possibility; this possibility is the transcendental condition of that relationship and that is of the entire existential movement ». (*Ib.* , P. 72). The circle is thus welded, but only apparently, it is the metaphysical technique at work. Transcendence is a producer of normativity and shapes the value of each statement so that everything remains confined to the happening of what has already happened, so that the real, concrete risk dwells outside the door. Ultimately, the feral privilege of blocking doing in its forced continuity belongs to interpretation or, if you prefer, "the transcendence of substance becomes the transcendent of existence". It is an all-encompassing, eminently abstract movement that exists independently of any attempt to prevent it. Abbagnano does not realize this but, with his own metaphysical concepts, he is describing the functioning and the power of forced doing in its relation to the cavern of massacres. Here murder accumulates and settles beyond the benevolent intentions of the philosophers and their more or less consenting students.

The positive slant emerges from the many articulations of Abbagnano's existentialist philosophy. In particular, he talks more about it when it comes to the constitution of the ego. Here are his words: «The authenticity of the problem therefore opens the way to existential analysis towards a positive consideration of human existence as

such. Relationship, indeterminacy, problematicity, constitute existence in its fundamental positivity. This positivity expresses the capacity of existence to consist in itself and to decide and define itself. This capacity is revealed in the first place in the constitution of the ego as the final term of man's relationship with himself. The position of the problem of existence on the level of authenticity leads immediately to place the problem of the ego on the same level. That existence is intimately constituted as a problematic relationship immediately implies that man himself is internally constituted as a problem of his own finitude, as a problem of the ego. The constitution of the ego neither precedes nor determines the problematic relationship, but occurs precisely in this relationship. The ego is constituted in the act in which it recognizes as authentic and faces the existential problem. This act is a placing of the ego in front of itself, it is a recognition, the ego realizes that it is not given to itself, that it does not enjoy the placid and exclusive possession of itself". (*Ib .*, Pp. 83-84). The reasoning here develops in the best known procedures. The acting subject this time is the ego that seeks a unity of foundation in order to escape dispersion. Whether it is man who recognizes himself as I in the unity that overcomes the chaos of possible attitudes or vice versa, the thing is the same. Recognizing its fundamental problematicity, the ego returns to itself from dispersion. Metaphysical attempt to come out of the endless and aimless multiplicity, which is not apparent, of doing. The incessant swarming of ephemeral appearances in life governed by doing cannot be stopped with an anchoring of the ego in the metaphysical terrain. It is necessary to look for another kind of movement, more irregular and difficult, to stop this tidal movement of doing and go beyond it. We need to go towards a more intimate force. Towards a different consciousness seeking a different world, not just a different way of anchoring the same world of compulsion. This condition is as cruel as the nudity of the qualitatively other is cruel. It tends to overwhelm doing at the heart of its major productive commitment. For his part, doing must be forced to break his chains, he cannot do it alone. The will governs him in a rigid way, forcing him to want to repeat himself. This is not the dispersion from which the self must return to unity, but unity itself. Chaos, on the other hand, is freedom, a different qualitative world where man cannot access except by acquiring a different conscience and this is the negation of positivity in the sense in which Abbagnano understands it.

But let's get back to this positivity. In order to exist, it must recognize itself as founded on reason, it is not just one of the two ways of evaluating the reality in front of us. For Abbagnano, reason is the ego itself: "The problem of reason is connected with the problem of the ego, considered and placed in its authenticity. The act by which the ego withdraws from the dispersion of its incoherent attitudes to the substantial unity of its problematic nature is the very act by which it confronts those attitudes as a judging principle or activity, as intelligence or reason. Realizing himself as an original problematicity, he realizes himself as a judging reason. Having rediscovered the norm of his constitution, he makes this norm the criterion for an active and constructive judgment of himself and of the world. This active and constructive judgment, this intelligence that man realizes of himself, this reorganization that he undertakes of the attitudes and situations to which he is linked, constitute his rationality, his intelligence ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 85-86). Anchored to its own constitutive condition, made certain of itself, the ego becomes judging reason, that is, judgment on the world and on things, reorganization and rearrangement, rationality and intelligence. Yet this cautious and circumspect definition is not convincing. If I understand correctly, it tries to remove the ego from something extraneous and refractory, illogical, which attracts it and wants to conquer or at least entice it. A grain of logical insolvency dispersed in the world of doing totally covered

by the correspondences of the little by little. Abbagnano seems to feel the squeeze in the neck that the ego takes when he considers himself in the face of the coercion that administers him, but he does not realize that even those who feel this squeeze are in turn taken by the neck by something else and that he is seen by something else while he too is being taken by the neck, and so on indefinitely. The world is this infernal circle of forced action in which one communicates by grabbing the neck. There is no harmony in this but violence, not reason but oppression. Or, if there is reason, this is violence and oppression.

Abbagnano realizes the validity of this incongruous relationship when he writes: «In reality, rationality does not in itself constitute the way of understanding and penetrating the nature of man and his situation in the world. Considered by itself, it appears either as a dialectical and objective organization, or as an absolute subjectivity which is the act of this organization. In either case, the problem of rationality escapes the domain of rationality; yet this problem is fundamental for the very constitution of rationality, which is not active and constructive except because it is problematically constituted, emerging from the dispersion and disorganization of the ego and the world ». (*Ib.*, P. 86). Condition in which the ego would be devoid of any possibility of anchoring, it would remain at the mercy of the aforementioned concentric circles, where each circle reproduces the previous one and enlarges it but does not deny it, rather it confirms it. More. Within this mechanism the ego would not even see the circles, would not have access to them, would be strangled and strangled without something helping to understand, just as it would be an unaware provider of the cavern of massacres.

In this way, the aberration called rationality - says Abbagnano - would necessarily be doomed to live the same nightmare. "Rationality placed at the foundation of itself, that is, of the intelligence of the ego and its situation in the world, would take away the authenticity of the existential problem because it would make the problematic nature of existence meaningless. The law of the constitution of man and the world would be fixed in advance. It would not be up to man, as well as to decide, not even to recognize this law which would infallibly act in the very interiority of its constitution ". (*Ib.*, P. 87). In the proposed solution there would be not only a way out of the aforementioned infernal circles but also a reconstructive way, blocking access to the cave of massacres. Reason is in charge of this pious illusion. When the ego recognizes its nature, reason is born, that is, its rational unity. The passage and the opening that have thus emerged are wasted in the relapse into the world of forced action. In Abbagnano there is no sign of going beyond. The unity that founds the rational order is the same unity of the ego, that is, the problematic unity of its nature. Yet Abbagnano notices a difference, that which constitutes the unity of the ego is the commitment in the decision, only not realizing that this decision in doing is subject to the power of control, he cannot but accept the dominant reason, also from that control and from that organized and administered power. Doing is an application of the controlling power of the world and reason is the way in which this power becomes concrete power to do according to certain rules. That man is not automatically reason but can be does not move the problem if he remains within the domain that controls the unity chosen by the ego. Man is obliged to make this choice not for a dispersive attitude, on the contrary precisely for his commitment to produce and guarantee the product from the uncertainties of destiny. The great ocean of power that administers everything according to the rules of the cave of massacres, must be faced with the courage of overcoming. Man and his life are in quality, in quantity they languish and die.

Abbagnano's statement is not surprising at all: «Nothing can be objected, in a certain sense, against the Hegelian aphorism: everything that is rational is real, everything that is real is rational. The being of the self is unity; and unity is rationality, the principle of judgment and evaluation. The being of the world is its order and order is rationality ». (*Ib.* , P. 88). And it doesn't matter that the ego has to transcend if it wants to come into being and the world needs the ego to come to being if they both drown in the mud of the cave where the lake of blood is. That this extraordinary active trade wanders in the lowlands of everyday life, impregnates with itself the human life that in slavery flounders crouched among the excrements, surrounded by splendid architecture or peeling plaster, it does not seem to upset Abbagnano. There is something crazy in all this metaphysical tinkering to defend prison structures, tutelary and guarantee settlements, small strips of small lives, all this misery. And in fact, looking back, Abbagnano affirms: «The recognition of the existential problem allows the integral conservation of the results that philosophical speculation has achieved over the centuries by proceeding on the path of reason. But these results are enriched and placed on the foundation of a true intelligence of man ». (*Ib.* , P. 89). And what are these results? Why do they make the eyes of old philosophy professors glued to their academic benches sparkle? It's the supplies given to the killers. The ignoble descent, more or less conscious, to the cave of horrors. In this claim to a definitive and progressive settlement there is something crazy, something that shines in the sun of every theory but which does not at all give the impression of a noble task but rather of an ascent to the underworld, since the goal is clearly overturned. . Generalized suffocation does not allow to breathe, we should go further, but the sovereign power of control and guarantee prevents it.

How can the ego reach the intelligence of its unity with the world through the authentic approach to the existential problem? Abbagnano replies with a repetition: "in the relationship with the world". Which would be like saying in the relationship with oneself. He writes: «The truth of the world, that is, the revelation of the being of the world (of its reality) is conditioned by the self-fulfilling decision. It is certainly not the ego that places the world nor is the world in any case immanent to the ego; the world has its reality its being in itself. But reality or being in itself in the world can reveal itself to the ego only in the act of its authentic constitution. Before and independently of this act, the world is an inconsistent appearance, it is a scattering of insignificant events, it is a disordered succession of facts. Coming to being the I as a unit and placing itself, by virtue of this unity, as the principle of objective evaluations, the world reveals itself in its being in itself. And thus revealing itself, it constitutes itself in its unitary organization and offers the ego the guide to conduct itself in it and to dominate it. The constitutive rationality of the being of the world thus finds its transcendental condition in the unity in which the ego gathers with the act of the realization decision. The being of the world is transcendent, just as the being of the self is transcendent. In any case, being is transcendent. It is the final term of the existential relationship, a term towards which existence continually transcends when it returns to its original problematic nature. Only in the act of recognizing oneself in this problematicity, that is, in the act of realizing it as original, does existence establish and found the transcendental that is at the basis of every being ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 90-91). A mutual revelation as being in oneself, the self and the world. The world - with its ferocity and its absurdity - rationalizes itself in the hesitant soul of the philosopher who contemplates it, transcending his own problematic nature. I stayed a long time, when I was little more than a boy, sitting in front of my work table, with my head in my hands, reflecting on this passage. I don't want to resume the same position. What can I do in the face of two transcendences that meet in mid-air in a

triple somersault? Anything. Here the closure of the argument is entrusted to the ghosts of philosophy, helpful nightmares of the demons who resume their work in the underground streams of murder. An argument that does not exist cannot be proved unfounded, it can only be said that its author is cheating at the game. The key to the world is not found in a transcendental movement which in the most benevolent of cases means a generalization, it is not just found. It is the world that opens to me like a can of sardines and makes me perform puppet movements, clown acrobatics, whatever you want, and this is exactly what corresponds to me in the world, which is corresponding and supportive to me. If the clash becomes concrete it is because it is I who ask the questions, not just any medium in a philosopher's coat. And if my courageous rebellion as a man who seeks and fails to be satisfied with what passes the convent, goes beyond the forced world of doing, then no transcendence is possible and it is not worth setting obstacles or rewards in the name of order and stability. If the different consciousness is rampant, the play of the forces that collide is between the chaotic and free quality and the self that is no longer such, because now it lives a different life, even if for a moment, a life of which it will be able to remember something and not. simply tell an experience like a train journey is told. The quality and quantity, the action and the doing, can also ignore each other and the man then builds his own theater where Chinese shadows concretize the appearance in the wall of the cavern of massacres. It is easy to imagine how these shadows can long mimic the qualitative being different and how the annihilation of the quantitative appearance can last for a long time.

The confirmation of this unresolved dichotomy is given by Abbagnano with the problem of corporeality. Here it is: «But that man is an element of the world implies that the world is a totality of elements of which man is a part. The existential relationship thus determines the constitution of a totality of elements, in whose order man is inserted by virtue of the same relationship. By virtue of this insertion man is conditioned by the world: he needs the elements of the world for his own realization. The situation of man in the world is therefore defined by the need in which his sensitive nature is expressed. Need implies the reciprocal exteriority of the elements of the world among themselves, and with man as an element of the world, that is, it implies the corporeality of these elements and of man himself. The consideration of the elements of the world in their bodily objectivity is knowledge: and inasmuch as knowledge is organized systematically, it gives rise to science ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 92-93). The need is an expression of man's loss in the world of doing, of the everyday life and vanity of his efforts to survive. All this, as we know, is far from life, that is, from being. Abbagnano notices it but does not understand why. He affirms that "man is not being, nor does he have being, but he is in relationship with being", but he does not explain that if this relationship were authentic it would give man the life he deserves, qualitatively satisfying. Instead it is precisely the need that nails him to dependence on the world. It is a fiction that long maintained becomes the real reality. Closed in doing, curled up on the defensive, sealed by the opacity of the philosophers' affirmations, where can man find the courage to overcome this condition of dependence? Abbagnano replies: «Man can clarify for himself his necessary dependence on the world only in the act of affirming his freedom: that is, only in the act of recognizing his original nature in the problematic nature of his relationship with being. The authenticity of the existential problem allows man to face his dependence on the world without bitterness and without illusions and to transform this dependence into domination ever better through science ". (*Ib.*, P. 93). It is not an answer, it is a petition of principle. The qualitative adventure is something else, it cannot remain locked up in the control room and it cannot be triggered by any

transcendental metaphysics. If we wait for a sign from the philosophy books, it will never come. Basically we spend our lives waiting for a sign, a way forward, a satisfaction of needs. This is why life is exhausting. We all get hot asking for something. We are given forced action, a substitute for life, we all wag our tails happy. Humanity is a boundless mass that is lost in the darkness of quantity. From time to time a flash breaks the leaden horizon, someone has broken the banks at their own risk. Abbagnano does not conceive how something like this can happen, for him life is a problem for man because it is a problem in itself, and only in this way does he realize the foundation of himself and of man. However, the process can be reversed. No rupture, just an existential circle. The most serious problem that has ever occupied the mind of man is trivialized in a transcendental correspondence between existence and coexistence.

He writes: "If existence did not transcend man, man would be the totality of existence in his finitude. There would be no existence beyond the individual, beyond me. But since existence transcends man and is given to him only in the relationship of transcendence, the finitude of the individual does not exhaust existence. Existence is transcendence of the individual towards existence such transcendence is coexistence ». (*Ib.* , P. 94). But what existence is he talking about? Certainly not of quality, a different experience that man can live totally in involvement, putting his life on the line, trying to be freedom himself, the supreme quality of all. Of course, the life of forced action corresponds to Abbagnano's specification, but is it life or is it an appearance? For which he continues: «The fundamental problematic nature of existence is therefore the root of its coexistential nature. If the existential relationship were given to the individual in an exclusive and total form, there would be no coexistence. But it is given to him in the form of finitude, that is, of problematicity and transcendence. And then the individual cannot proceed towards the being of his self and of the world if not on condition that he originally proceed towards the being of the other individual, of the other self and of the common belonging to the world. Coexistence expresses the original form of existential transcendence. The relationship with oneself and with the world is originally the relationship of the entity with the other entity, of man with man ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 94-95). I know this brotherhood of outcasts well, it has been my daily life for months, in the Greek prisons where I write these lines. But when will someone be able to show the hidden intention that lies within every appeal to democratic coexistence? When will we be able to show the monster that lives inside this mausoleum of respectability? When will the invisible tribes take aggressive form and break the chains? If it were true that man seeks his being and that of the world he would not be able to accept to live by gasping, instead he tries to make only that much air that allows him not to die, or rather to die in installments. There is no authentic foundation of the existential problem except by breaking the chains of possession deriving from forced action.

Abbagnano insists: «Problematicity must be pushed to the bottom and recognized in its ultimate root, which is not the instability and indeterminacy of being, but the instability and indeterminacy of existence itself. For this ultimate problematic nature of existence, man needs man, not as the things of the world, which are the means and instruments of his realization, but as for his very existence which is intrinsically constituted in the relationship with itself. ; that is of the man with the other man, of the I with you ». (*Ib.* , P. 96). Right, but not present in the world, here, on the contrary, man is the link and instrument for man and doing produces the other man, and the relationships that bind me to him, in the same way in which he produces goods. There is no difference between objects and relationships in the world of forced action. Here man needs man as any object, here is the claustrophobia of the world in

which the administered and not the lived one dominates. Everything is governed by the prohibition and every break with this prohibition causes the necessary balance for control to fail. If I look for the other in a different way, that is, not reducing him to an object, I have to give him an appointment in quality not quantity. However, Abbagnano insists: «The originality of this relationship is the foundation of the rational nature of the ego and the world. It has been seen that the ego constituting itself as a unit poses itself as a principle of judging reason and determines the rational organization of the totality to which it belongs. But judging reason has no other norm or criterion than the unity proper to the ego, which is a single, concrete and unmistakable unity. How can such unity be valid as the foundation and criterion of universal evaluations? The foundation of this universality is in coexistential transcendence ». (*Ibid*). Once again a fictitious overcoming, that is, a transcendence - Hegel had done better with his dialectical removal - not an overcoming. Nietzsche slipped like oil on Abbagnano. The judging reason, therefore the authentic way in which it is chosen, is given and controlled by the principle of coexistence. Nobody should disturb, freedom is an administrative matter like many others, the product of a clash of opinions. One can speak of it like this only because the philosophers do not know it. And here is the conclusion: «The constitutive transcendence of unity, founding in the constitutive transcendence of coexistence, realizes the universality of unity. This universality is not an abstract requirement: it is the concrete transcending of existence towards existence. It is constituted by reason, but it has its foundation in the existential relationship. Once again reason refers to existence, and precisely to its ultimate root, to the transcendence of existence towards itself ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 96-97). Universal unity, union of the self and the world in transcendence, is thus realized in reason. Terror always comes this way, the process that goes from unity to reason is a process of strengthening power in the world of doing. No massacre has ever lacked its reasons. Something treacherous crawls under these arguments and pushes man to eavesdrop at the man's door, not to look him in the face bravely in the context of qualitative involvement. The shapeless mass of doing crawls towards the cavern of massacres. Bad fury is mistaken for loving brotherhood in the dust of forced action. Hypocrisy advances by stealth and takes hold of the heart of man.

The root of existence is identified by Abbagnano in birth and death, once again it is life at stake, but without specifying or distinguishing doing from acting. This risks reducing everything to biological corporeality and therefore not realizing how many living dead populate the world. He writes: «Birth and death refer to the coexistential foundation of existence. Existence arises from existence, man from man. Birth is the possibility that man creates man, existence. Death is the possibility that man is taken from man; existence to existence. Birth and death are not the extreme terms between which existence runs: they are fundamental determinations of existence, constitutive of its essence. Existence is, in its very nature, birth and death ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 97-98). Of course, biological reduction is only this, but man is also something else. To reduce man to the root means to annihilate him by stealth, while something that can be considered obvious is being affirmed. And every flattening of man to his incontrovertible animality is gloomy and lacerating, although this is perhaps the most suitable description of an active life, closed in the limbo of quantity. Man is not birth as he is death and vice versa, between these two poles there can be countless other births and constant deaths, either inadvertently or sensed. One can be born to a different life and continue to live by dying a little every day without realizing it. Abbagnano does not say it but he suspects it when he affirms: "Birth is therefore the recognition and decisive realization of the originality of the coexistential bond and the resolution of fidelity to this bond in its concrete bonds that condition any

transcendence towards oneself and towards the world". (*Ib .*, P. 98). But it is not fidelity that guarantees belonging to society - Abbagnano insists here on speaking of community, which is something else with another kind of relationship - but on the contrary, the abandonment of the forced bonds of coexistence, the acceptance of an openness to quality. The same misunderstanding affects the reflection on death. He says: «On the other hand, the recognition that existence is, by its very essence, death means the decisive acceptance of the negative aspect of existential problematicity, insofar as it is the possibility of loss. The relationship of existence with itself, being purely problematic, can at any moment be lost and destroyed. Possibility is also always the possibility of the non-possible. The threat of the resolution of the coexistential relationship always hangs over this relationship; and the threat also concerns man's relationship with himself and with the world. Existence can always be torn from existence; man to other man, as well as to himself and to the world. This threat must not be deceptively veiled, but must be recognized and looked in the face: it must be assumed as the unavoidable risk of every truly human attitude. The acceptance of risk implies the acceptance of finitude ». (*Ib .*, P. 99). And of the death that is lived every day as a compulsory condition of existence and which is called life? The pure and simple everyday life is comparable to death if it does not receive the flash of quality. In the long run, the misery of this life gets used to living fleetingly but concretely a miserable existential certainty, what is lightness and superficiality from simple appearance becomes being, concreteness, existence. But not for long because a tremendous tiredness and an irrepressible boredom strike the action and condemn it to the supply of the cave of massacres. Existential solidarity, the counterpart of risk taking, no longer exists. Everyone tends to survive their fate and the fierce oppression that marks them.

In Abbagnano's formulation, freedom seems an obligation and not an involvement that puts one's life at risk. Thus he writes: «Consider the situation of man in the world. He is thrown into the events of the world, subject to luck, chance, adversity, the will of others. Things determine him by his need for them. Other men determine him in a thousand ways, influencing him in his innermost feelings. In the very interiority of his conscience he is subject to a thousand different and dispersive solicitations. Interests, aspirations, passions influence his attitudes in the subtlest and most subtle ways and therefore ultimately form his character and his very nature. He cannot break the thousand invisible threads which subordinate his inner motions to extrinsic determinations of all kinds. What he concretely is and does seems entirely traceable and referable, as with sufficient reason, to the situation to which he is linked.

On the other hand, he must be free for his task. The situation itself, which seems to determine him, demands freedom from him. The tasks that await him are such that he cannot abandon himself to the easy course of things. If it limits itself to being the wheel of a mechanism, it becomes unequal in its tasks. Commitment, decision, energy are required from him. A heavy burden is imposed on him that he can carry only if he feels and is truly free for his mission. Operative enthusiasm, fidelity, sacrifice are asked of him. And these things he could not give her if his existence did not pose as freedom and was not, intimately, freedom ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 103-104). Here everything revolves around the word "must". But how can one have the duty to be free? When one is not directly and fiercely oppressed, one tries to forget one's painful condition in fun, in escaping from reality. This alternation of pain and disengagement is an absurd but coherent condition, it is a set of forces that act on man forcing him to do, to exhaust himself in doing, even when he supposes that he is no longer doing something, even in idleness and in dreams. . Man's life is exactly captured as what Abbagnano says it must in no way be, like the wheel of a mechanism. Asking man, as

Abbagnano does, for fidelity and sacrifice is to break down an open door. He is faithful to the chain - how could he not be? - and is sacrificed on the altar of possession, of which he deludes himself to be the holder. Small businesses of doing develop tensions not commensurate with their paucity, even a modest obligation can become an unbearable burden. Indeed, the smaller and almost insignificant are the forces that oblige us to make man and the more evident are the elements that concretize this obligation. Freedom lives elsewhere. Precious are the tensions that push towards the overcoming, the anxiety about the life one leads is one of them.

Abbagnano, while also basing himself on the concept of having to be free, does not accept Kant's thesis. Thus he writes, referring precisely to this last thesis: «The principle of freedom as objective rationality found its most rigorous expression in Kant's work. Man is free insofar as he acts out of duty; and duty is the law that derives from his own personality insofar as it is reason. Reason is universality and objectivity». (*Ib.*, P. 105). But this thesis, by becoming radicalized, shows its own consistency as a law firm. Reason limits and denies the multiplicity of motives of free human life. And so Abbagnano concludes: «A solution of this kind is not an answer to the existential problem of freedom. It does not concern my concrete situation in the world, from which that problem arises. Accepting the concept of intelligible freedom in the Kantian sense simply means eliminating the problem of freedom because it means returning freedom to an intelligible world which is the pure and simple negation of human existence as such. The problem of freedom is not properly addressed». (*Ib.*, P. 106). Denial that, in a different way, takes the form of a reduction in the hypothesis in question. To the close of doing man seems addicted and asleep, yet contradictory forces act on him, the missing quality whispers its breaths of desert wind and develops dreams and appearances which, on the side of doing, remain precisely such, yet they come the same suffered, interpreted, connected to daily misery. This is how a different consciousness is born that looks with other eyes at a repetitive and monotonous scene that is only a bad memory in passing.

But not even subjective reason can found freedom. Here is Abbagnano: «Freedom cannot be understood on the basis of an objective rationality. Is a subjective rationality better suited to founding it? Consider in man the absolute subject, the universal spirit or the self-conscious Idea. His life will appear as the manifestation over time of this absolute subjectivity. The fundamental determinations of existence will be entirely traceable to the moments of the absolute subject; while in their inevitable oscillations, in their instability, in their imperfections, they will be accidental and negligible elements. Man's freedom will then consist in his coincidence with the absolute spirit, in his return to it entirely, eliminating all accidental and empirical characteristics. The freedom of man will coincide with the necessity of the absolute Subject. The order of the moments and of the fundamental determinations through which the life of the Absolute unfolds will be the condition of human freedom. Man will be free only insofar as his life will be identified with the life of the Absolute and with the necessary order of his moments». (*Ib.*, Pp. 106-107). The refusal of this identification - which Abbagnano is more afraid of than the previous one - is given by the presence of a fundamental and constitutive element of human freedom, its problematic nature. This element cannot be absorbed by any dialectical necessity. Right statement. But it is not that the relationship with the absolute is not guaranteed because it is problematic, it is not guaranteed because the absolute does not exist. Even less is there an absolute problem in overcoming, where freedom is captured in its qualitative bearing. It is a different experience that we cannot cope with except by fully involving ourselves. If we recalculate everything is lost in the return to the seduction of what is already guaranteed. The different experience is not a fun in

regards to doing, it is a different perception of the world. Lived, it can disappear forever or leave a trace that must be understood and that has no fixed relationship with doing but can affect the chains making them no longer weak but more intolerable. And it is in this experience that man understands that freedom can lie neither in forced doing, marked by the order of the purposes to be achieved, nor in the absolute subject, in which appearance measures a hypothetical foundation of being removed from doing. , but only in an illusory form, a form that does not need courage or involvement, in fact it is precisely the solution chosen by weak spirits, just as the previous one was chosen by lawyers.

For Abbagnano, freedom is more modestly a relationship with being. He writes: «The possibility of the relationship with being is the only possible foundation for an understanding of man as freedom. And if this possibility defines man's own way of being, that is, existence, it must be said that existence is the only possible horizon for the understanding of man as freedom ». (*Ib .*, P. 109). But this is a first joke. Between remote transcendence, not directly attainable, and human limitations, specifically for me those of doing, how to establish a relationship? In addition, a relationship that is free, how to fix it? And, on the other hand, if existence is not identified with being, it means that it cannot detach itself from nothing. This hypothesis leads to the conclusion that freedom is freedom for nothing, that is, for death. Hence the fear, the fear of living outside the administered life. But Abbagnano rejects this conclusion. Here is what he writes: «To define the relationship with being because of its impossibility of identifying with being as the impossibility of detaching oneself from nothing, means denying the very possibility of the relationship, that is, denying existence. In this case the interpretation of existence is the negation of existence. The interpretation of existence, implying the recognition of the impossibility of it emerging from nothing, would imply the denial of the relationship with being, that is, of existence itself. The relationship with being is impossible in existence, if existence is properly the impossibility of detaching oneself from nothing. And if the relationship with being is impossible, the recognition of this impossibility is not an act of freedom, it is neither choice nor decision, but passive acceptance of the nature of existence, which is and remains impossibility, that is, necessity. The choice then becomes the choice of what is already chosen, the decision of what is already decided. Freedom is lost in the most radical necessity ». (*Ib .*, P. 114). Impossible to found and give guarantees by denying. On this dense page, Abbagnano is too complicated but basically he is right. For him who is looking for a positive foundation, nothing cannot satisfy him. The suffocating and narrow process of doing for him is always better than nothing, which appears something incomprehensible and abstract, having no effort here to have or form any idea of being of which nothing is the sum with appearing. Here there is not even the stale air of repetitiveness, there is little more than an empty affirmation. As if to say that existence could be nothing, that is death, but as long as it lives it is not. For those who are afraid, the desert wind is terror, moreover, it is terrifying everything that is outside their room, which thus, without knowing it, communicates with the cave of massacres. And the more stories are told about the dangers of quality, the more fear increases but also the satisfaction of staying warm.

The solution to the problem of freedom is indicated by Abbagnano as follows: "The intelligence of freedom will therefore be achieved only if existence, even in its simple configuration of relationship with being, is capable of rediscovering in itself a fundamental positivity , a substance ". (*Ib .*, P. 115). The point is therefore positivity, the one that assigns and justifies what man must do. This is the culmination - and if you prefer the highest point - of Abbagnano's speculation. The existential analysis must be, Abbagnano continues a little further on, "intelligence and the realization of

freedom". But positivity cannot solve all the problems of human capture in doing. How long does the winter of dullness last? All life, one might reply, a long, persistently monotonous life. Even in the best moments of making the sky is leaden. Drastically opposing any transformation is the rule of positivity, it lends a hand to appearances only to dress the bride better. Its prerogative is to reduce fear immediately, that is, to guarantee and protect, and this makes you happy and stupid much more than you think. Doing offers many diversionary opportunities, none different, the latter must be faced with the risk and courage capable of abandoning the certain for the uncertain. The atrocious foundation of doing is the foreclosure of fate. This in essence is just the future identical to the present, repetitiveness and boredom. This is self-sufficiency in misery, there is nothing more outside, only further doing. In the world there is a deep uniform wound that leads like a river into the basement of the massacres. On this river pass theories and wars, noble and absurd thoughts and cold-blooded assassinations, and there is not even real resentment or revenge, everything is apparent, only pain and blood are real and constitute that part of being that offers itself to union with appearance to give life to nothingness. The world without quality is nothing. Every ferocity, even the most brutal, and with the worst consequences, is born from the appearance and dies in nothing. Ferocity, murder, death are not qualities but products of doing. All doing is forever linked to doing, the existing, the being is elsewhere.

Abbagnano continues: «In the relationship with being, transcendence is not presupposed, but recognized and established. Being arises and reveals itself as transcendence precisely in the relationship and by virtue of the relationship. And the relationship itself is in turn transcendence; it moves towards being, aspires to conquer and possess being. If transcendence were such beyond and before the relationship, the relationship itself would be impossible: existence, which is this relationship, could not even be constituted. But that it is established means that the relationship is possible and this possibility is the positivity of existence. As a relationship with being, existence is fundamentally, substantially the possibility of this relationship ». (*Ib.*, P. 117). Indirect reconfirmation of a possibility of positive existence. For Abbagnano it cannot choose "the impossibility of not being nothingness" nor "the impossibility of being transcendence", it "must be realized in itself". That is, in his own positivity. Yet this is not the case. Doing is the realm of appearance, which is still nothing but can in the long run find its annihilation in being that could summarize it by annihilating it. Acting is not transcendence as it is not waiting for me somewhere but I must be the one to give it life in the overcoming. My acting in quality goes beyond doing and therefore leaves on this side a lack that wedges itself as a dangerous contradiction within it. The remembrance of the adventure in quality remains for making a mystery, however deeply this clandestine void caused by my abandonment may be engraved, it is incomprehensible for appearance. Being is always far from appearing because it fears the annihilation that would result from excessive proximity.

Abbagnano is afraid that something might escape him, that is, he is afraid of the emptiness that the search for quality would create. Here it is: «Now, the possibility of the relationship with being places this relationship on the level of problematicity. The relationship with being is possible: this means that it can exist and it can not exist. But this means, first and foremost, that it must be there. If existence is the possibility of the relationship, in that possibility it immediately finds the norm of its constitution ". (*Ib.*, Pp. 117-118). Once again, when fear grows in intensity, the concept of "duty" comes into play. Ignoring the relationship with being means getting lost and ignoring one's existence. The extreme and contradictory part of this fact is that in doing it is

precisely this relationship that is ignored, and if the words have a proper meaning, the relationship with being could be said otherwise as a relationship with quality. But this statement is a mere stretch. Yet there is another step that comforts me in this sense. Man can never be just quality, he would be burned immediately by going beyond the point of no return. And Abbagnano also says: «Certainly the relationship with being can never produce identification with being. Indeed, it is precisely from the relationship that being is established and constituted in its transcendence; and that relationship is itself transcendence, in the sense that it moves towards being as that which is beyond itself. But if the relationship with the being is never identification with the being, existence can have no other final term of realization than the recognition and strengthening of its nature of relationship. The initial possibility of the relationship must be recognized not abstractly or objectively, but with an act of implementing decision, of final fulfillment ». (*Ib.*, P. 118). There is a strange point of closeness here, but only under the condition of considering being as a quality, which is not authorized by any element of Abbagnano's analysis. Obviously it would be a stretch. The fixed point is the lack, or at least the distance, of being from doing. This resides in a world as if it were a tiny dark and underground chamber, works not far from the cavern of massacres, does not want to be disturbed in its mechanisms and shuns someone's attention. Its strength lies in the public secret of the administered life, impoverished, constantly brutalized by commissions to be carried out, often gripped by the terror of losing blows in one's own mechanism.

Abbagnano realizes that freedom is not a possession of doing, even if he does not understand how it can be a quality. He prefers to lock it up in a human decision, but a choice is not an involvement, we have encountered the difference several times. The quantitative dimension of the choice does not access the unitary condition of involvement where there is no way to separate what is risked from what must be preserved and guaranteed. Thus Abbagnano: «It is evident that the problem of freedom cannot be solved by considering whether freedom is an attribute or a capacity proper to human nature. One cannot understand freedom or, more properly, understand man as freedom, through an objective analysis of human capacities or a generic consideration of man's powers. In no case is freedom a capacity or a power that man enjoys in fact. In no case, therefore, does the problem concerning it present itself as a problem of seeing whether in fact man is free or not. The problem of freedom really arises before man only in the act in which he seriously faces the possibilities of his existence and decides on it. Being free or not free is an option for man, indeed the fundamental option. For him, being free means recognizing and realizing himself in the original possibility of his relationship with being, that is, consolidating and grounding himself in this possibility. Not being free means disregarding and losing that original possibility and therefore making existence improper and dispersive. But in its very constitution, existence includes the norm which must solve the problem and decide the option. If it is relationship with being, it has no other way of being and of realizing itself except by consolidating and founding the relationship ». (*Ib.*, P. 119). But the option is precisely the most canonical choice there is, the one between two paths to take. Basically, the decision lies in the very constitution of man, in his existence. Man has to do nothing but establish a relationship with being and beware of both the encounter with being itself and with nothingness. A balance is always a good thing, as it was to be expected. Not just the balance but the consolidation of the choice. Now, that this is a simple way of doing things, he does not take Abbagnano off guard, he does not even grasp the problem, he goes on looking in the same place not only for consolidation but also for the foundation and the norm. He repeats this concept in a few lines four times. By this

absurd reiteration he means that the same is fixed deeply in the reader. Having done this, he goes back to insisting on an alleged being of freedom which would then be the reality or option of freedom. Here the ego recognizes itself and is grounded by evading dispersion. He writes: «The option of freedom immediately removes man from the uncertainties of a life devoid of a dominant interest, and restores him to the fullness of his energy. Man becomes available for his task; he is no longer distracted or scattered by ever new ambitions, he is not thrown into the world without direction, nor abandoned to insignificant events. He lives collected in the unity of his dominant interest and leads back to this interest, as a fundamental measure and criterion, the variety of events ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 120-121). This would mean that the relationship with being, consolidating itself in the option of freedom, establishes the relationship of man with himself. As if to say that a blind possibility - a choice - only one, the choice that could be defined as the choice of life, founds the life of man as something that happens upstream of all the conditions that this life governs and marks, among the first the dispersion and repetitiveness of doing. In this demonstrative trend there is the rhythm of mythology. The context is not dealt with critically but repeatedly taken up with small variations and narrated once more, as if the narrative proliferation around the nodal point of the relationship with being could give the latter a greater force of conviction. Recombining the same elements to present a different discourse that ultimately remains the same is an ancient habit of philosophy and Abbagnano is certainly not immune. But the rhapsodic modulation of the same theme is nothing but the counterpart of the repetitiveness of the world where they have a perfectly adequate air. The philosopher knows that this rite of circumlocution is precisely his profession and, in the end, he does not even realize it, indeed he assumes that there, right there, lies the core of the demonstration, the ultimate level that ensures the validity of his task. These theoretical movements, of which Abbagnano here as in other places of his work gives ample proof, are concretions of doing, products of the darkness of life that survives in the darkness of forced production.

But freedom, for Abbagnano, cannot be free, it must be locked into a task. Thus he writes: «Freedom means unity of the ego, unity of its task, unity of the ego and its task. This threefold unity is in reality a single unity: the unity of one's own or authentic existence. But it does not concern only the ego. The I is not free (that is, it is not I) if not in unity with its task; and his task does not concern him alone, but also the world, in which it must be realized. The constitution of an ego, free for its task implies the constitution of a relationship between the ego and the world, for which the world places itself before the ego as an order of instruments and means suitable for the realization of that task. The unity of the self and its task determines the unity of the world. This unity is an order in which things are situated according to their availability and their use for the human task ». (*Ib.* , P. 122). Unity means order, order, that is, control. As if to say that freedom is control. This is truly a nightmare born in the basement where the ordering desires of the philosophers flow. The opposite, for Abbagnano, would be the loss of the ego in the "scattering of his attitudes". This would correspond to the loss of the world in an "objective determination" of tools and things. But what does the unity of the world mean through which the world has being? Anything. The world is encoded in misery and everything is in the midst of desperate, and disparate, attempts to survive. The world lives indoors and when it confronts nature it first subordinates it to its closed conception of life. The freedom of the world is called a prison, where you are free to move in three square meters. The digressions of the world are modules of appearance, small walks in the air of the prison, provided for by law and not an ancient institution. This nightmare universe ceaselessly produces things and dreams,

it makes no difference because everything is apparent, but its final production, to which things and dreams related to them flow, is the compact surface of the walls of the cavern of massacres. Here nothing transpires of the external bustle, it looks like another world and instead it is the world of doing in its most intimate productive womb. Within this unit that makes the world compact and comfortable - just like the cell of the Greek prison where I am writing - the appearance speaks of being and shows the ghost it produces projected on the impassable wall of the cave. The words with which these appearances are produced and evoked are always the same, monotonous repetitions of an I want obliged to want and unable to free itself. The soul of these words is the maniacal dedication to the product, the addiction to the mechanism.

Abbagnano is however out of these considerations which radically penalize his way of seeing. He insists: «Freedom calls man back to the unity of the self, the world to the unity of a necessary order; and in this order, through freedom itself, man inserts himself as an element that participates in it and dominates it at the same time. He participates in it, insofar as he himself is an entity in the world, insofar as he himself places himself in nature as nature. It dominates it, as it uses its order and laws for its purposes and subordinates it to the fulfillment of its task. Rooted in the world and made of the world a consistent reality, man can find in it the path of freedom. Recognizing himself as nature, he can realize himself as nature and thereby determine nature itself to reveal itself what happens in art. But both as a necessary order of things available and usable, and as nature participating in human existence and revealing itself to it, the world finds and consolidates its being only for freedom. Only the unity of the self and its task determines the order of the world, that is, its true constitution ". (*Ib.* , P. 123). But how to break this order? How all the orders that seal the world are broken with the revolt. There can be no freedom in the world through the unity of the relationship between me and being. No "necessary order" will ever deliver the freedom, except the freedom that slaves have to die under the whip or to be killed immediately, in order to no longer be slaves, rebelling. A mass of available and usable things is nothing but the world of quantity from which quality has been taken away. This does not accept the idea of summation, of accumulation, its message is directed to me, which is that of freedom, and it is I who must overcome my forced condition if I want to reach it, albeit for a different experience that will never be quantifiable. Quality is the extreme rarefaction of the word, there is no space to say in the sunny territory, you can only guess that you are free, something like experiencing chaos in action. It is not a question of decision but of involvement, we do not stop to see how things are going and which party should choose. We are in action because we have overcome the level of control of the immediate and active conscience and we have entered another level, that of a different conscience. Here one is being, one is not in relationship with being. Here you are free and every mistake is paid for with your life or with the return to order. There are no duties, no tasks, no order here. The desert wind blows and no one can store it. Acting is not only overcoming but it is life, that is, being, that is, the rejection of everything that awaits a signal from someone to move sleepily and dreamily. To act is to reach out suddenly, what decent people consider irremediable vulgarity and of which they have a sacred fear. But in the action the contact with the being is not even felt, everything flows away fluid and new, like the water of a spring, without exaltation but also without hesitation. The danger, mortal, is not visible, it is implicit in being itself, in the movement of the force field that constitutes it, and in my presence in quality. And it is the danger of no return. Basically I am not made for quality, my life is quantitative, only that a quantitative life is not life, and that is why I go beyond it and access

quality with my different conscience. This movement should not be sought with the will, if I choose a different consciousness this is once again an appearance, I have to wait in the mire of doing and prepare the most unsuitable tools - knowledge is the most remote there is from quality - because in the right moment they too can be my means of overcoming and I will experience them differently from how I live them in the world of forced action.

In conclusion, Abbagnano writes: «Freedom is the movement by which existence returns to its original nature, recognizes this nature and, by recognizing it, truly realizes it. And since existence is the relationship with being, that recognition turns to the possibility of this relationship and is its foundation and consolidation. In this way existence finds, through the work of freedom, its interior positivity, its substance. It is subtracted from dissipation, from appearance and from insignificance. The self constituted as a unit takes root in a world that is order and reality, at the center of an effective coexistential solidarity. With this the relationship with being, constitutive of existence, is realized in its authenticity. It becomes such a relationship that being truly arises in existence in it: the I, the world, coexistence come into being and are determined as the historical future of existence. Freedom is the foundation of the historicity of existence. In this historicity, being is not immanent because it is incessantly constituted in its transcendence; however the relationship with it is not elusive, apparent or inconsistent but authentic and true ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 126-127). Everything fits together, this condition heralds the greatest suspicion in philosophical theories. Abbagnano wanted to close his theoretical project in a sealed way and could not do otherwise. The same premises required it. And this closure demonstrates, among other things, the fictitious starting point, the dream of something that has remained a dream, that's all. Freedom, even risky, cannot be "conquest and possession". The basic problem is that the professor has remained attached to his habits and is therefore disarmed in the face of the very difficult problem. By curbing freedom in the sphere of order, he transforms it into a cog for transporting material into the cavern of massacres.

The order Abbagnano seeks is found in historicity. He explains thus: "There is no historicity that does not move towards a permanent order in which the multiple of experiences and facts find their necessary unity. But there is no historicity that does not move from this multiple. The necessity of an immanent reason that reveals itself in the individual determinations and all links and justifies them, and the freedom of the individual who affirms himself in the singularity of his destiny, also enter into constituting historicity. Historicity asserts the universality of the meaning that transcends any particular determination to affirm itself in the totality of the succession: but it also asserts individuality in its absolute singularity and irreplaceability. Historical research can preserve and enrich the achievements that man gradually accomplishes; but conservation and enrichment presuppose at any moment that those achievements can be dispersed or lost. It tends to reveal the ideal eternal history; but he cannot reveal it except by tracing it in the courses and recurrences of temporal events. History is absolute necessity and rationality; but if it were only this, if necessity and rationality did not arise from the contingent and the insignificant, there would be no historical research and there would be no history at all: there would be the permanence always the same of a necessary reason or essence ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 128-129). The clash of many opposites produces historicity where it reaches the solidity and unity of a "necessary order". Another anchor that can be lost, hence the need for a search that saves the past and conditions the intelligence of myself. It follows that for Abbagnano history is absolute necessity and rationality. And here comes back the pragmatist (and in some respects perhaps Crucian) background,

immersed in the contingency and partiality of the distinctions and differences on which life is based. But why questioning the past leads to both the chatter of documents and the ever-changing hermeneutic re-emergence of the insiders? Because the past is shrouded in a silence that rejects. Yet, if thrown back, man turns back to the past because there he can find the key to involvement. But he must know how to distinguish between what was merely doing and what was transformative action. History must be distinguished from remembrance where quality is spoken by the risky word of a different conscience, where with a thousand defects a different light emerges in history, a different ascent. Is it meaningless to remember one's adventure in quality? Is it meaningless to remember that of others? Then history is just an exercise for need seekers. Taking eternity as a firm, Abbagnano critically places himself against anti-historicism and against historicism. Against the first he says: «The controversy between antihistoricism and historicism presents two typical ways of destroying rather than solving the problem of historical research. In the first place, the contrast between time and the eternal can be considered decisive and fatal, and we can reduce history to time by separating it from the eternal. The rational order then appears as a superworld of values or ideas that has its own reality that is complete independently of history. And history appears as a succession of contingent and arbitrary events in which only at times a reflection of the eternal order makes its way. History proceeds between vicious turns and comings and goings from failure to failure, from error to error: the order that it should realize is beyond it; and, if it were realized, it would stop and cancel history. In this case, man cannot draw anything from history. The consideration that can guide him is not that of the idle comings and goings of the past, but that of reason that discovers the necessary order that is beyond history. The realization of man is, in this case, linked to the denial of historicity and entrusted to a reason that affirms and imposes an immutable and necessary order that is valid for itself, beyond any reference to the changeability and contingency of time ". (*Ib.* , P. 130). Only salvation, the necessary order that absolute in itself denies historicity, this is anti-historicism. Basically Abbagnano says something similar but he says it in a different way. Against historicism he states: «For historicism every reality is history, that is, it is rationality, order, dialectical development determined by pure concepts or categories. Time does not exist as the domain of the individual, the contingent, the arbitrary. The individual itself is such by virtue of the logical force of the universal which is an identifying force; the contingent and the arbitrary appear such to a superficial and improper consideration, but reveal themselves in their necessity to a thorough and truly historical consideration. There is no irrational or negative in history. Certainly only the individual acts in it; but in the individual the universal, the eternal, the category acts, and the more deeply one scrutinizes the individual, the more deeply one finds the universal. And the universal is substantially immutability ». (*Ib.* , P. 132). Here too, the eternal and necessary order denies historicity as a process and provides salvation in exchange for determinism. The two results are essentially the same, identification of time with the eternal. Denying time is possible only in the productive sphere of doing, where it is reduced to appearance. Abbagnano rightly states that assigning time to the "dominion of the individual" is an appearance and a negation of being. The same for historicism where history is the unity of absolute reason. Yet he himself remains in the context of a historicist pragmatism (contradictory, of course), not absolute but problematic. The place of man is for Abbagnano in history because this is the only reality. But what reality are you talking about if you only have the history of the massacres? If philosophical and historical theory shake hands in the cave of the lake of blood? Is it true that history gives meaning to life or is it exactly the opposite? Is looking at history an illumination of life or can one die of history, as I said in my distant article

on Bakunin? Is what makes sense the only nonsense thing, which is what happened? Why must man necessarily find a place in history? Or so far this has been only the remembered, attested and guaranteed history, not the remembered one that speaks the quality and thus vanishes into being, transforming its chaotic existence that reverberates in man without being codified in a precise memory or in a document? But what does it matter? Making produces objects and the history of making is an object, worn out like all objects. He can go step by step in human affairs and say nothing, as happens to do, describe only ghosts. The reasons why time escapes both antihistoricism and historicism are also valid for Abbagnano. It is not enough to affirm: «Historical research must therefore be based on the intelligence of time. And in fact there is only history of the past. Historical research aims rather at liberating and rebuilding a permanent order; but this standing order can free it and rebuild it only with reference to the past. The so-called contemporary history concerns a more or less close past, but still past. The past seems to contain in an eminent, indeed exclusive way, the character of historicity. In a certain sense, therefore, historicity necessarily reconnects to a single determination of time, that is, only to the past ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 137-138). Here Croce returns again (perhaps). Any story is contemporary history. But the history of making is also making, an object produced in a forced manner, which goes as far as a certain point - the boundary wall to be precise - and does not go further. It is not that the present can make sense of the history of doing that is meaningless, because the present is a direct child of the future. This is no less meaningless. Of what could be history - in the qualitative sense - words are lacking, remembrance tries to remedy it but it is not history, it is a different experience in the quality spoken on the appearance, an attempt to put being and appearing in contact, nothing. When Abbagnano writes: «The unity of the past and the future, achieved by historical research by virtue of the binding decision, is a principle of choice and judgment that proceeds to determine and found the historical world. The historical present is the very unity of the judging principle, organizer of the historical world ». (*Ib.*, P. 140). Basically it says nothing, a principle of choice is a choice and choice is forced production, nothing has changed. I do not know which road leads to remembrance, I only know that it is a step backwards of the experience in quality, a reaffirmation of the quantity on the disruptive force of the different conscience. And I also know that qualitative experience does not leave man as he found him. This guarantees a difference between history and remembrance. The second, in doing, finds all doors closed and a long road of interpretation that never ends. It seems that remembering is like telling the story of a different experience, but at a certain point it deviates and always keeps the same distance from the shadows cast on the impassable wall of the cavern of massacres. These reminder movements are as casual and whimsical as those describing an unfamiliar place that is not well lit. The lack of words is a fundamental obstacle, but not entirely. Every reference, every description, while working in the appearance of doing, gives indirect life to the experience of quality, which thus, within certain terms, is caged and encircled in something that, this time really, could be called history. But the logic of doing - and of little by little - understands remembrance as an individual and dispersive outlet, as words that go around in circles, thrown away without importance. Yet they are words that speak, in their own way and improperly, of quality, words that are scary. And the story must be scary or it is trivial to do, exercise for professors of philosophy. Abbagnano, on the other hand, remains anchored to the terrain of doing, his attempt to overcome the two concordant limits of antihistoricism and historicism is inert, he looks upwards, towards an indefinite place where, as he writes, "the historical present" constitutes "the authentic individuality of man".

And here are his words about the relationship with destiny. «Historical research is the confession that man makes to himself of his original temporality and is the decision of fidelity to this original temporality. History is nothing more than faithfulness to time. In this fidelity the historical personality is constituted and with it the transcendental unity, condition of the historical order ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 143-144). The concepts of always return, the decision, fidelity, transcendence, with which we want to talk about destiny. But this does not listen to the words that are governed by these concepts, it is directed elsewhere not towards the melancholy of doing but towards courageous involvement. He does not wait for an archaic word to urge him to do, in this direction the administered unfolding of the future has only one surprise, death. On the contrary, he wakes up in the crossing, when a sort of dull but living light strikes him, a reflection of a very different sun that shines hot in the desert sky. Destiny does not ask for the hospitality of the present and does not respond to historical solicitations. In any case it is not faithfulness to time. Abbagnano is wrong in stating: "For destiny man undertakes to preserve and consolidate the unity of his personality through the incessant effort to reconnect the future to the past and to make the future the realization of the true meaning of the past". (*Ib.* , P. 144). There is no direct passage between future and past. In doing, the future - not destiny which has a word only for quality - is equal to the past, appearance and supply of the cavern of massacres. The story, faced with destiny, is enclosed in a fog, where it is guaranteed and mocked at the same time. In destiny there are laws different from those of the rest of the world, it has a different physiology of the future, just as appearance is different from being. The future, for destiny, is a sort of chronological or topographical reference, there is nothing in destiny that recalls time. The future is its opposite, it is calculated by doing in terms of time.

Abbagnano insists on an antinomy between thought and action in history and concludes: «Historical research is not only historical judgment, nor only historical action; it is the totality of man's own way of being: a way of being of which judgment and will, knowledge and action are improper and generic classification and abstractions. Historical research is an act of realization of one's own historical personality towards a world that emerges from the dispersion of time and becomes order and universality precisely by virtue of the existential commitment of the self ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 145-146). But what action are you talking about? There is no such contrast between thought and action, instead there is a subordination between thinking and doing, yes. Historical research is nothing but doing and thinking is also doing, they can meet on the plane where the forced administration of the second guarantees the coercion of the first, a meeting between prisoners through bars. Making history is no longer important than making any object, in the same way reflecting on historical facts is still making objects, putting them aside and then remaking them. Action is something else. There is nothing within them that can be considered as "the totality of a man's way of being", assuming that this phrase makes sense. In making, this statement, albeit abstract, of totality is incongruous, everything is here absorbed by the apparent mechanism in its absurd repetitiveness, addressed to the cavern of massacres. There is something incomprehensible in this mechanism so studied and deepened, and it sinks into its absolute closure as soon as radical questions are asked, because the professor's high lectern does not allow you to look at what happens in the basement. Knowledge flows but has nothing to do with history, when they meet they remain separate and this happens to all the objects of production, which have only a joint interest in the overall production, not in overcoming it. In the reality of appearance, nothing is truly completed until it is registered, that is, recognized as a fact and subjected to an appropriate quantitative signature.

There is no historical order, this is deduced from the fact that there is no order in doing that is not forced, but this order does not organize the productive result, only the production which is the cause of that result. Abbagnano instead writes: «Historical research is a movement of transcendence that goes from temporal dispersion to historical order. As revealed and constituted by the transcendent movement, the historical order is transcendent. It places itself at the limit of research as the term towards which it moves, as the being to which it aspires to rejoin. This same transcendence is linked to the temporal structure of historicity ». (*Ib.* , P. 148). How does historical research, which is to do, draw upon this order which should dominate it, which should impose the conditions of research itself? If research is the object of production, it cannot have an order that organizes it that is not itself another object of production. No "fidelity to time" can overcome the indefectible heterogeneity of the objects produced. Any other attempt, any immanence, is to be excluded - Abbagnano agrees on this - for which the heterogeneity of the story remains unless it is a reminder, that is, a story of involvement, but in this case it is a story that is individual history that can be talk and its consequences on the shadows cast on the wall of the cavern of massacres. Instead Abbagnano does not admit any possibility of history that is not a connection between "the transcendence of the historical order and the finitude of man". He seems to seek an individuation, that is, a foundation, in the continuous production of doing, and he assigns this task to history. But doing produces non-fundamental objects, produces documents that can be consulted and bottles of wine that can be drunk. What is the difference? It is difficult to imagine something that comes out of the productive mechanism to become a foundation or transcendence. The dirty clothes of the missed opportunities to go beyond, the unrest not transformed into a different conscience, the renunciations and betrayals, all accumulate in the basement of the cave of the lake of blood. On the contrary, and going further, Abbagnano insists: «Historicity is the fundamental normativity of existence. It is the intrinsic need of existence to come out of the dispersion of time to be realized as the unity which is the principle and foundation of an eternal order. It is the duty of the human personality over time ». (*Ib.* , P. 149). The tuning is elsewhere, in the sign of duties, elsewhere from where I would admit a historical research is possible, m0a is an elsewhere exactly located in the context of productive doing. Here, unintentionally, Abbagnano places the person well as appearance and connects them to time. And it is no coincidence that right here you speak of "human personality". Basically, the psychology of philosophers is bare, it does not present many complications, they are people who work in dealing with the absolute lack of any other intention. Their ideas and theories have an air of family with life but remain behind the scenes. In reality they play a powerful role as an appearance that is added to other appearances, providing a sort of interpretative mediation always in the context of doing. They are juxtaposed to the unmanifest that acts in quality, but they do not even touch it, they remain on this side of the opening. Each philosophy - and that of Abbagnano, despite my youthful blunders, basically limited, makes no difference - produces an exhilarating and satisfying atmosphere, but as a surface effect, as soon as the exterior patina is scratched, the suffocating air is immediately felt. and oppressive of the underground, the air of a continuous restlessness for the lack of real questions and for the abnormal spread of surreptitious answers. Philosophers give the impression that they are always under pressure from above, as of something beyond their strength. A tension that is not easily bearable, and it is the belief in a higher order and in the highest possible completeness. In this way, psychologically naive, they manifest the abysmal fear they have for the chaos that as such, by these professional organizers, is despised but also flattered, in a more or less open way. Think of Abbagnano's problematic nature and

Sartre's nothingness, the latter even more extremist. As for the murder, of which the history of man is only the story, the philosophers remain in their blissful unconsciousness.

The purpose where history finds its completion, according to Abbagnano, is coexistence. He writes: «Historical research in its concrete modalities reveals the fundamental condition of insufficiency in which existence is in the individual. To affirm itself as an individual and freedom and to be realized in its own unity, existence must transcend towards existence and connect man to another man. Man is not the totality of existence: he is not identified with the fullness and stability of existence. Existence arises in him as a relationship with existence and transcendence towards existence: a relationship and transcendence that make existence a coexistence. Coexistence is the ultimate foundation of the existential structure ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 150-151). Which shows a vision of the world that we know, the respectable and elusive one that triggers an uncontrolled democratic euphoria. It does not mention extreme forces, unknown gods or demigods, it does not interfere in the life of a philosopher, but commonplaces of the most trite metaphysics yes, these are real stumbles. To say that "existential solidarity" is the "very structure of man" means bringing into play two semi-divine appearances, solidarity and structure, which are either objects produced by making, therefore appearances, or are objects without production, that is, impossible, ghosts that still enjoy a vicarious production, that of being demigods made to be born from the philosophical mind. The myth was much simpler and even religion, in some respects, they referred - to the exclusion of poets and theologians - to the imagination and the heart. The philosopher wants something more intricate, he produces objects so refined that they are directly functional to the cave of the lake of blood. Confronting these objects through conscience, that is, developing a textual criticism, is a way to add consistency to their strength which is sometimes little more than a whisper - this is the case of Abbagnano's peep.

Is truth the goal of historical research? Could this be the truth? Abbagnano thinks so: «Historical research preserves and frees the truth of the past. This truth is undoubtedly order and rationality. But order and rationality in history are the transcendent term towards which the personalities of history move and in relation to which they are constituted. In history the same historicity is historicized. The historical order is not a fact, but a must. It is the movement of transcendence, it is the search for historical being. Historical research can only reveal the truth of research. It does not lead to a total and complete order, to an order in which everything that was meant to be is or has been. It does not refer to an infallible necessity that has worked cunningly in the bosom of the most insignificant and dispersed events to implement an immutable plan of its own. Historical transcendence can only find itself in history, in its genuine nature, in its insufficiency, in its effort for completion and realization. History is the act of historicity that is realized as such. And since historicity is transcendence towards an eternal order, historical research is the recognition of this transcendence, recognition by which transcendence itself is realized in its original nature and brought back to its principle ». (*Ib.* , P. 153). But what truth can there be in the making of the past? Only one's forced reconfirmation, that is, one's appearance reflected in another appearance. And certainly if we call this deformed captive reality truth, then it is necessarily "order" and "rationality". But virtue, as a quality, belongs to freedom, so it is neither captive nor identifiable. If we consider it as a reflection, history can photograph a document and hermeneutics make it speak, but the truth lies elsewhere. I am not talking about an ordinative claim that implies the capacity of history - in Abbagnano - to identify the absolute truth, but the relative one, the historical truth. This is the illusion I am discussing. Historical

research does not achieve the "resolution of time into the eternal", but only an order accomplished without losses. Here, this thesis of Abbagnano is not acceptable. The world, historical or not, past or future, is not completed in doing, in doing or drowns or survives, it remains incomplete anyway. There is this impatience in doing that takes on the aspect of restlessness. This makes us think of a manifest but apparent part, doing, and an unmanifest part, which is simply being, acting. The unmanifested part, even in ancient theoretical experiences, is increasingly vast and unbridgeable compared to the manifest part which remains smaller because it can be measured quantitatively. Since quality requires courage and risk, involvement, it is generally pushed aside, it gets by in doing so. If we think everything is contained in doing we are faced with a kind of secular blasphemy without even the theological alibi. Reducing everything to doing means reducing the time per procedure and the destiny to happen, that is, a procedure to be carried out in the future. With some problematic variant, not concrete but drowned in metaphysical chaos, Abbagnano is this thesis he espouses regarding historicity. He says: «In history there is no infallibility and necessity, but problematicity and freedom. For it man does not deny his temporality and his limits, but recognizes and reaffirms them, he does not close himself in the illusory pride of an infallible vision, but works with vigilant humility. Therefore history is the most solemn and fullest reaffirmation of the humanity of man ». (*Ib .*, P. 155). But they are free variations, in essence they add nothing to what has been said. The very concept of "vigilant humility" is very suspect. What can be humbly watched over? Perhaps human pride that seeks absolute domination? Perhaps infallibility and necessity? Doing, in its very winding up, guarantees the appearance of all this, bulky machines seem to have been made on purpose to reassure about its real abilities. The world produces a well-behaved way of doing things that would never claim to simply want world domination. He no longer needs God to aspire to completeness, his own process to infinity is enough for him. Its manifestation defines itself as free and this is what Abbagnano means when he speaks of coexistence. Thus he writes: «Here is the root of the universality of history. This universality is not the impersonality of a judgment in which the very unity of the eternal order is expressed, but it is the coexistential solidarity of men in their common transcending towards the eternal ». (*Ibid*). This is the democratic way of understanding the relationship between men under the oppressive light of forced action. But there is a very small lighthouse in the impenetrable wall of the cavern of the massacres, and from this light the restlessness peeps out fearfully.

Does man belong to the world? An inappropriate and inappropriate question. Abbagnano takes it for granted, like everyone else. But what world are we talking about? If it is the world as a whole, and it is the case of Abbagnano, it should contain man, doing and acting. However, this is not so obvious. He writes: «Existence, which is man's own way of being, is not being but relationship with being; however, precisely as a relationship with being, it falls back into being and is rooted in it. Being includes it as its part and conditions it; and in this way it poses itself as a totality. This totality is the world ». (*Ib .*, P. 156). That it is man who makes the world total because he includes himself in it with his own decision by fixing the terms of his relationship with being, seems to me an enormity. Only by accessing quality does man achieve true inclusion in the world as a totality and, in this way, make the world total or complete. It is not the presence of man and his forced act that makes the difference, but the experience in quality. In short, the totality is placed on the distinction between the manifest and the unmanifest, a border line that more properly is an opening that can be, whenever one seeks it, systematically lacking because one does not have sufficient courage. Everyone revolves around the totality of the world but exercises only an

infinite commentary on its limits, now seen larger, now smaller. All start from the sum of the facts, which we sometimes call acts due to neglect or ignorance, but they never produce - nor can they produce it because this product is not in the production line of making - an all-encompassing interpretation, that is, capable of suspecting quality as lack. Here is Abbagnano: «The world is configured as the absolute totality of which man, as existence, is a part. That man is part of the world is a fundamental determination of the nature of man as existence; but it is also a fundamental determination of the world as a whole. Only with the recognition of man's belonging to the world can the world be recognized and placed as a totality. The affirmation of this totality is the act of an inclusion, the recognition of a necessary belonging and of an absolute comprehensiveness. Recognizing or considering the world means recognizing and considering oneself in the world. To propose the problem of the constitution of the world means to propose the problem of oneself as an entity in the world. Therefore the first clarification that the problem of the world must undergo for the purposes of its authentic consideration can be obtained only by making explicit and evident the act of self-inclusion that is at the basis of the problem and in general of the consideration of the world as a totality ». (*Ib .*, P. 157). Here we find, once again, the conduction between fact and deed. Self-inclusion is considered an act of existential transcendence, but it is always the making of the decision that appears under another formulation. It is a tolerant vision, uncertain but capable of a certain magnanimity. I transcend myself by including myself, but I don't really know what I include myself in, because I am a product of doing and not its demiurge. Maybe I could act, but I don't know how, I just have, in self-inclusion, a kind of restlessness incompatible with the arrogance of doing, nothing more. Maybe I'm just talkative and I spend more time than I should. This is certainly good critical reasoning, but it is not Abbagnano's. He specifies: «But the movement towards being is never identification with being. Man can and must consolidate himself in the relationship with being, but this consolidation does not cancel the relationship in a total coincidence. Therefore the movement of existing to the extent that it reaches the consolidation of the relationship with being also reaches the constitution of the world as a totality. Now the movement towards being is the very constitution of being in its finitude. That movement is therefore the simultaneous and correlative constitution of the entity and the world: of the entity as finitude and of the world as totality; of the entity as a part and of the world as the whole; of being as conditioned and of the world as condition ". (*Ib .*, P. 158). The part is included in the whole and the being - here the professorial metaphysics returns - is included in the being. But this equation can be solved only if being constitutes itself as a totality. This operation requires the intervention of quality, that is, of being real, not of quantity which is appearance. Thus it turns out that the part may not be part of the part. All this either ends in quality or is a constant regression into the incongruous. Life needs the world to live, but the wording could be reversed as it happens to almost any sentence like this. This does not mean that the world of doing, as an appearance, is nothing, on the contrary it is the source of need as it provides the means to survive and also to go beyond, to go into the experience of quality. This passage is not a transcendence but a permanence in being and in appearance, as in the quality there is a different experience that is remembered, therefore an experience that remains in a certain way in connection with the quantity of doing. If this were not the case, there would be no remembrance. And remembrance is, in a way, a transition from quality to quantity. Not direct, of course, but through a vast network of wanderings, where words that had remained inactive in making return differently, gathering unexpected meanings. The context of making does not wait for a savior, on the contrary it rejects remembrance, even if this is forced to humble itself in the shoes of the object manufactured according to the

rules if not logical at least grammatical.

Abbagnano feels a necessary dependence of man on the world, but does not like to specify the partiality of the second element. Thus a relationship seems to develop between the part and the whole. He writes: "If by the situation of the entity in the world we mean the necessity of the relationship that the existence of the entity establishes between the world as a totality and its own finitude, it can be said that the situation of the entity in the world is defined by need. Need expresses the necessary dependence of man on the world insofar as the world is necessarily qualified by man's belonging to it. The need for this qualification is the same as the need for that addition. Precisely because the world is not such, that is, it is not the totality, if man is not part of it by taking root in it with existence, man is conditioned by the world and needs it. Man's dependence on the world revealed by need rebounds the need for the relationship between the world and man for the purposes of the constitution of the world as a totality". (*Ib.*, P. 159). It seems that reference is made here to a need for completeness, which is obviously out of place. In doing, which should be discussed, man's need is normalized in quantity. There can be shortage and misery, not a lack of apparent self-interest. This participation is assured and, for other reasons, it is precisely that division between included and excluded, of which I have spoken elsewhere, which generates deficiency and misery and drowns the existential need in the need for survival. What do you expect? This is the question. Not the satisfaction of the need to be, that this must always be renewed, but the overcoming. Except that there is no way to go further if you don't put yourself out there. There is no traffic on this road, only few travelers.

Is man in the world a part among other parts? Is totality just summation? Or does each party have to take a safe distance to maintain its autonomy, guarantee itself with its own normativity? The world of doing leaves this problem dormant alongside its own mechanism, a mechanism therefore incomprehensible to him. He hears, in the screeching of the working pulleys, that here there is a hidden lift of uneasiness, but he cannot explain why. Abbagnano does the same: «The constitution of the world as a totality and of man as part of this totality means the rupture of being into a quantitative multiplicity. As a totality the world is a connected set of parts defined by their mutual exteriority. The parts as such are mutually exclusive and their way of being is a simultaneous coexistence that demands their impenetrability. The whole would not be such if its parts were not co-present; and the parts would not be co-present if they could penetrate each other, nullifying their exteriority. The impenetrability of the parts thus conditions the constitution of the whole. But impenetrability is nothing but corporeality. The constitution of the world as a totality therefore means the corporeality of the parts that compose it. Only bodily elements can be simultaneously present to make up a world. The entity in the world can therefore only be a body among bodies. And if its constitution in the world is necessarily connected to the existence of the entity, this means that its bodily life is necessarily connected to its existence. The being in the world is always necessarily a living body. And his life is defined by need: because corporeality, signifying his belonging to the world and his dependence on the world, expresses and concretizes the conditionality that the world exercises on him". (*Ib.*, 159-160). Here the productive normativity of doing is sketched out in a satisfactory way, separations of objects, their corporeality, space and time conflicts together. The perverse continuity of production, its implied immutability, is also underlined. Even the invisibility of the disappeared mechanism, this in the multiformity of appearance. The praise of doing quantitative could not be better, given, of course, passively, something that is there and cannot be fought against. The corporeal simultaneity of objects is not totality but

summation. This escapes Abbagnano, the totality is something that includes the unexpected guest, the quality, and here the philosopher flounders.

But can the world be rejected? Abbagnano answers yes. With escape from the world and abandonment to the world. Let's see the first case: «The flight from the world is the renunciation of the possibilities that the world offers for the realization of man. It is moved by a radical distrust of such possibilities: because it is a total renunciation, which is an end in itself". (*Ib.* , P. 161). Not the partial renunciation of those who concentrate in isolation but the total renunciation of existence. Now, according to what we have said several times, is this escape the overcoming? Certainly not. The world of doing, only that, is left behind with the duration of the experience that is different, qualitatively different, but then it is almost always rediscovered, indeed it is with this mechanism with rigid walls, also a producer of cognitive tools, that the relationship is established. reminder. Quality is not understandable for doing, which considers it a remote, unmanifested residue, sometimes present in everyday things, but degraded to value and not entirely itself. However, doing the same protects itself and raises its cognitive barriers to maintain its productive relationship in an exclusive way, separated from unmanifest and distant disturbances. The second case is abandonment to the world: «In this form [of non-acceptance of the world] man does not really realize the nature of his being, the instability and precariousness of his existence. He is then easily inclined to believe that everything in the world is accommodated to his needs, that the very constitution of the world is ordered in order to make life and happiness possible for him, and that therefore there is nothing in the world that cannot be measured at all. meter of its usefulness and its criterion ". (*Ib.* , P. 162). As we can see, as regards the relationship with the world, at least in Abbagnano's sense, the differences are not many. Indeed, in the second case there is the vital acceptance of a relationship that seems to be missing in the flight. But these are matters of detail. The substance of the speech is that in any case it is the world of doing that we are talking about. Only in the struggle for quality can we understand the human dimension of forced life which, for better or worse, we all experience but not all of us manage to overcome. Getting entangled in the benevolence of the chain is a form of abandonment to the world, but not the above. It is not enough to wander around like a hen without a head, in this form of petty freedom there is the same tragedy as walking for prisoners, it is important to survive to breathe a little outdoors, but it is also a weakening of one's own forces of resistance. I write this knowing well what I say. In doing, in its forced mechanism, there is this form of subtle malice that blocks any aspiration to a totally indomitable, different, strange and unacceptable life for order and security. Quality is the experience of a free, raw, violent, perhaps unbreathable, shapeless, chaotic life, which cannot be chosen as a normal condition if not by going beyond the point of no return, facing the absolute loss of oneself. There is no remembrance of this and one is swept away by doing as a rejection. Adequate productions provide for the separation first and then the elimination.

So acceptance of the world. Abbagnano does not indicate, as usual, which active world we are talking about. He writes: «Acceptance of the world therefore implies that man feels solidly planted in the world as part of it. The feeling of man in the world implies not only that he is in the world in conformity with the way of being that is proper to the world, that is, as a body, but also the foundation and recognition of himself in this way of being, taking it as a foundation and revelation. of the reality of the world. As an entity in the world, man is a body suitable for recognizing and guaranteeing the reality of other bodies. As such it is sensitivity. Sensitivity on the one hand roots man in the world making him a body, on the other hand it reveals the world in its corporeality to man. Taking root in the world means for man, at the same

time and by virtue of a single and simple act, to be a body and to feel the other co-present elements as bodies ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 166-167). To live is to have a sensitive body, to be produced as an object and to have other objects, equally produced, called sensibility in their interaction. This grounding process encompasses both the subtlety of philosophy, which appears to but cannot keep its hands clean, and police brutality. The two aspects interact together and coexist in the same mechanism, indeed they are often the prerequisite, one of the other, for the influx of massacres to the cave. A look at quality, with the indispensable overcoming, eradicates that rootedness and provokes the irruption of another disturbing fragment, recklessly introduced for sabotage purposes into the production mechanism, that is, into the well-guaranteed life that Abbagnano is anxious to talk about. This is enough to spread the terror of inadequate acceptance of the world. That is, it suggests the way of opening towards quality, it makes it possible to be seen. It reveals an intertwining between being and appearing, between quality and quantity, which could negate the positive consideration of any philosophy that aims to support and justify the world.

Abbagnano's insistence on corporeality is interesting. He specifies: «The body of man is defined as a body by its impenetrability and by the simultaneous presence that impenetrability makes possible, but his being transcends corporeality because it is rather its condition. As a condition of corporeality, it is sensitivity; not in the sense of being a simple apprehension of corporeality, but in the sense of constituting itself as a totality of functions that condition the constitution of corporeality itself, that is, as a complex of capacities capable of guaranteeing, controlling and determining the corporeality of the elements present in the world ". (*Ib.* , P. 167). Not totality, imprecisely fixed, but the sum of capacities capable of producing. Here Abbagnano is one step away from clarifying the partiality of doing and its distance from quality, but he misses the opportunity. Life and doing are never so intertwined as in the sensitivity, with which the defects of the protection made by the great machine come to light. Active individuals from all points of view, acute and constant stewards of the abyss of massacres, can be so sensitive that they live in a sort of vertigo in constant fear of remote, unmanifest gaps and voids. There is never an intertwining between two extremes as distant as doing and acting, but neither is there an absence of one in the other, and vice versa. These strengths, values and reminders, cognitive means in the opposite case, that of quality, end up by contrasting the very distinct traits of being and appearing. Neither of these two extremes threatens the other with annihilation, only their absolute interpenetration would achieve nothingness, but this is not possible as long as the world exists as we believe it to be known. Looking at the remembrance, which brings with it the indelible signs of the desert wind, one feels a certain admiration for the cognitive power of doing, and all the remembering effort, with which other and unknown signatures are delineated in the cavern of massacres, is not other than to do. Conversely, doing warns of its own partiality and, if necessary, sometimes only in a hilarious way, sometimes openly, denouncing the circular trend of every cognitive effort and the very inconsistency of every attempt at completeness made in the forced sphere.

The conclusion, after so much hope, is very modest on this point. Thus Abbagnano: "Now, if by sensitivity is meant not simple learning but all those complex functions of observation and control that work and technology implement, the term soul can be used to indicate the whole of human sensitivity and he can say that the soul is the fundamental way of being of the body. The body, as the body of man, is soul. It is co-present with the totality of the other elements only in order to condition them in their co-presence, and yet it can condition them only on condition that it is understood by them and conforms to their fundamental way of being. Man is soul only on condition

that he is a body: he can condition, understand and dominate the totality of bodies only on condition that he is included in this totality as a body between bodies ». (*Ib.* , P. 168). I am well aware of Abbagnano's final choice regarding sensitivity as the sum of knowledge. It was the opposite of my youthful understanding of the problem when I was a war machine. I talked about it at length in the introductory note to this work. What kind of ideas came to my mind at the time, that's more or less how the controversy could be closed. Only those ideas, minus the cognitive war machine, are more or less what I have now, at the end of my life as I write these lines in a repulsive hole. I had to accept the world as it is, here is the suggestion of the time and what many other impressive philosophers continue to impart from the top of their professorships. And precisely, continues Abbagnano: «The acceptance of the world therefore means the acceptance of sensible experience as an act of self-insertion into the world. But the acceptance of sensible experience as such is not the subjecting of it, nor is it the recognition of a given: it is a search. The acceptance of the world transforms the sensible experience from a pure and simple collection of data that is undergone without ordering them or giving them only a provisional and accidental order, into a slow, progressive and methodical search that tends to discover the objective order " . (*Ib.* , Pp. 168-169). Here is the transformation - still a misplaced term - of the chaotic confusion of knowledge, continuously acting as a force field under the influence of cognitive arrivals, in a slow and orderly search and mainly in an objective order. In particular, the following words weighed upon me with an unbearable burden: "And indeed the non-acceptance of the world, both as an escape from the world and as abandonment to the world, does not eliminate or destroy the sensible experience as such, it eliminates and destroys but the search for order. Sensitive experience remains in those cases as something temporary and accidental that does not reveal and does not guarantee an authentic object. Only the recognition of the essential character that his belonging to the world has for man, leads man to consolidate himself in it, taking on himself the sensitivity in the form of a search that has the aim of guaranteeing and controlling the objectivity of the world. same. In research, the sensible experience is consolidated and collected by ordering on the one hand as a system of controls, measurements and technical operations, on the other as a system of objective determinations. Research constitutes man as a real subject of the world and as such capable of understanding and dominating it; and it constitutes the world as a real object of man, as a totality of instruments that help and limit him at the same time. But since research, being nothing other than the recognition and acceptance of the world, can only lead man to realize the nature of the world, and this nature is defined by corporeality, so it essentially consists of a ' investigation into the nature of corporeality as such " . (*Ib.* , P. 169). On the contrary, I think - the present is a must - that if order does not kill knowledge, facilitating it at first, then it conditions and recomposes it making it usable, that is, ready to produce objects thanks to the monstrous machine of making. To call this guarantee the term "sensitivity" is another of the many philosophical deceptions. It is no coincidence that Abbagnano uses this term here to indicate storage and production ordered according to repetitive rules and monotony. Doing is a sordid and suffocating movement of living, but it is still sensitivity, that is, the ability to understand, if nothing else, the cognitive process. In this way, abstraction and concreteness, appearance and being, are mixed in a precise and calibrated way, obtaining an amalgam that makes crossing over more difficult. Basically, for Abbagnano, knowledge is aimed only at "world domination", therefore at the conquest of coexistent body space. The conclusion of this thesis is, once again, modest: «The measure of the external relationship between bodies is space. Research is essentially the spatial consideration of corporeality because, aiming to control it in its true nature, it subjects it to rigorous methods of quantitative measurement. Spatial

consideration therefore leads to recognizing in bodies discrete quantities separated by measurable intervals and leads to recognizing as variations of these intervals all the changes that bodies undergo. The interval between these variations, also measured spatially, is time as a determination of the co-present elements. Space and time are but the measure of corporeality, and they express the whole essence of that corporeality. The research that moves us to discover the authentic nature of the world as a corporeal totality can only be a space-time consideration of it ». (*Ib.*, P. 170). Here we enter into problems that cannot be treated metaphysically. Science, of which a new chapter opens here and, for the moment, just mentioned, needs much more critical considerations. Abbagnano elsewhere will try with poor results.

If science objectifies the world, it removes man from totality with the world itself and this causes the loss of homogenization. In other words, man loses world domination. Strangely - but not so much because we are faced with a dialectical process which is not uncommon in Abbagnano - this objectification allows for a more solid conquest. He affirms: «Faced with such a world, man cannot claim any supremacy and any claim to anticipated domination. Domination must be conquered. But he can conquer it precisely because the world is such as to appear alien to him; precisely because in it there are only measurable things and therefore ascertainable in their instrumentality; precisely because in the world there is no longer the image of man. Thus science was born; which, arising from the controversy against animism, finalism, metaphysics and in general any form of non-acceptance of the world, is the explicit recognition of the world as objectivity and the search for this objectivity as a space-time order. Science is not a sensitive experience because it is research; and research is the consolidation of the sensible experience in the authentic form of the space-time consideration of the world ». (*Ib.*, P. 171). It is always about conquest and the technique is considered by Abbagnano as the true realization of man. We are at the bottom of the problem. The professor has deployed all his instruments of war, a far-reaching discourse is no longer possible. Obedience to the rules - but which rules? - is an absolute principle, that is, absolved of any demonstrative necessity. We are all so imprisoned in a definition and here we struggle unaware of our forced future and unable to question a destiny that we do not want to grant. The more guarantees bloom like cobwebs around us, the more we want to increase caution. We can go beyond doing, we bitterly regret it if we stand still and, at the same time, we want to stay away from risk. We lack the courage but we do not know where to look for it, we are basically unaware of everything and the knowledge we acquire alone is not enough to get us out of the chair.

Abbagnano's words on scientific research are irreplaceable: «Scientific research appears and is above any human will, of any particular interest; it appears and is all strained in the effort to discover nature in its objective truth. But precisely because it is above any particular will or interest, it connects and identifies itself with the more essentially human interest which is that of rediscovering the possibility and conditions of existence in the world. And it is precisely because it tends towards nothing other than the objective truth of nature, determining itself in this effort as a system of procedures from which every preconception or anticipation goes beyond, it is able to serve man and to provide him with the necessary means for his affirmation in the world". (*Ib.*, P. 173). We now know perfectly well what a Philistine is. A philistine is one who always knows how to behave in the mean of choices, which are never true choices, but only equivalent decisions. He knows that science is the measure of productive force and technology its armed arm that directs it towards the lake of blood. He knows all this but does not get his hands dirty. He also knows that philosophy maintains a higher level of analysis, a certain fluency of views, but also

great caution, in order not to smell the blood. The philistine is a shrewd philosopher, he knows how to limit his words to an indifferent and insignificant level because he is always under surveillance and could unintentionally betray himself. He calculates and measures, he looks around and, especially in matters of science, almost always knowing little about it - other than the case of logic and methodology - he always feels in a state of siege. I still think today, after so many years, that in the face of knowledge the only immediate, that is to say, effective solution is the acquisition without claims of control or domination. Afterwards, continuing in the usual and ankylosed movement of doing, in the long run, knowledge becomes an intractable baggage, it must be emptied without fear of making mistakes or committing harmful waste, because the same cognitive weight becomes a brake on overcoming while it should be a tool and a strong point. add up to courage. Abandonment is the condition of involvement and wisdom. We are now very far from Abbagnano and his idea - only apparently corrective - that the technique is used by man but the nature of man is not a problem of scientific technique, nor can it be its object.

Regarding the relationship between existence and art, Abbagnano's thought can be summed up in these words: «Art can approach nature or move away from it; it can claim to reproduce it or to ignore it; it can confess itself inferior to it or it can affirm its own superiority of reality and value. But in any case it will constitute itself in its secret relationship with nature and will necessarily include within itself a movement of return towards it ». (*Ib.*, P. 177). The thing is not clear, it is not enough to speak of a metaphorical "genuine concreteness" of art, nor to affirm the indissoluble union of art and nature. But what nature does the philosopher speak of? Perhaps the one that doing changes continuously? Is there in doing, crammed into its infernal machine, its indefatigable pulleys, the necessary core of nature? Or, better still, is there in making the whole existence, therefore without deficiencies, therefore including nature? Abbagnano is not clear why he does not distinguish between doing and acting and produces the world as a summation assuming it as a totality. In fact, he writes about this fantastic "return": «You cannot return to nature if you have not already been in it, if you have not always remained in it. The return assumes that the connection between the subject and nature has never failed. It supposes a necessary continuity by virtue of which we can find what we are looking for. It also supposes a kinship, a real affinity, which has never failed, but which in the act of return is restored and brought back to its true meaning. Therefore, placing himself as a pure subject of the return to nature, the subject recognizes himself and reconfirms himself in his naturalness. It moves towards it not because the bond that bound it to it has been broken or can be broken, but precisely because this bond has never failed and is such that it must be recognized and re-established in its genuine essence. Through the subject, through the initiative that constitutes it, nature itself returns to itself. The subject's initiative does not sever the relationship between nature and itself except to restore it immediately in the form of a more intrinsic and essential connection. If a return is necessary, it means that the naturalness of the subject must, through the return, be reconfirmed and strengthened with the recognition of the originality of the bond. The subject returns to nature because it is originally nature ». (*Ib.*, P. 179). Here a reasoning without openness seems to close. There is a suspicion that the promiscuity between the concepts of nature and life cannot be resolved in some distinction. Life would seem a concretion of nature, and with this it is not understood that it is of appearing active and of its compulsion. Yet in making there is a matter in elaboration, corrosive of nature and radiating order and control, something that does not exist in nature except as an image of necessity on which philosophy has long practiced. At the bottom of forced reality, with its rules and the monotony of its

superintendents, there is a ridiculous chaos that is badly hidden, but hidden, by repetitiveness. It is here that the precise belonging to a necessary and cautious division is decided, and this decision is passed off as an authentic choice.

Abbagnano continues: «The return to nature therefore presupposes as a first condition the belonging to the nature of the returning subject, being nature itself. This primitive naturalness, which exists only to become original in the return and through the return, is sensitivity. Sensitivity is the primitive naturalness of the returning subject, that naturalness which, by virtue of the return itself, becomes original because it is recognized beyond the possible dispersion ». (*Ib.*, P. 181). Again the circular movement seen before, with the added sensitivity that we have already discussed. That this is a kind of "primitive naturalness" is only understandable in the sense of doing as a capacity that man rediscovers in his continuous reinventing what he does. However, this suggestion is not feasible because it would seal the doing even more in itself, in an implacable way. There is no possible opening from this consideration. Quality is and remains remote, surrounded by a light of incomprehensible strangeness. Here the possibility of a distance between nature and life is indirectly grasped, but who can say it clearly. Certainly not Abbagnano, enmeshed in his dialectical overcoming. In fact, this is how he continues: «But sensitivity as a primitive naturalness is already transcended in the act in which it is constituted. The return movement constitutes it only to overcome it. The returning subject poses itself as a sensitive entity only in view of his return. Through the return, the primitive naturalness is recognized and actualized as original. What was the beginning becomes the term, what appeared the condition becomes the conditioned. As the end of the return movement, naturalness becomes original naturalness and sensitivity becomes pure sensitivity. Original naturalness is the condition and possibility of primitive naturalness. Pure sensitivity is sensitivity that has become the condition and the end of itself ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 182-183). Here the guiding word is "overcoming" and needs no other explanation. Man is by no means reflected in this analysis by Abbagnano, less perhaps than in other analyzes.

However tenacious his dialectic of bailout - here we must call things by their name - it goes deeper and deeper into the unresolved contradiction between the sum of objects and totality. Who could ever claim that they are synonymous. Basically, the world of forced services that administers the productive process is only a part of reality, the one where appearance is rampant, it is not a self-sufficient world but it is as if it were because for this world what matters is precisely what it speaks of itself, and this saying is part of its own production. Quality lies elsewhere and there is no artistic sensitivity that can grasp it except in an involvement that it is not capable of due to lack of courage. Exchanging a refined and even senseless doing for art is a way like any other to forage the cavern of massacres. Abbagnano does not face the remoteness of being in this way, he thinks that this can be crossed by the decision, but even this thought is often affirmed in a wavy and enveloping way, making use of dialectical mechanisms that are not well defined in their origin and in their functioning. Here the knowledge of the philosophical subject veils the speculative thought, in short, it is the risk to which professors are exposed. There is something in this superficiality that does not notice the evil in the world, that is, of how these respectable and progressive statements are functional to the massacre, there is something that arouses dismay. When and where will it be possible to attack such an all-encompassing and well-oiled mechanism? Making rises to the terrible concreteness of mechanical perfection and shows, precisely in the apparent harmlessness of Abbagnano, something feral with which to defend the inevitable flaws of the production process, perfects it with energy, attention, theoretical means of relief.

Here is the essence of the entity. Abbagnano always has a formulation for his affirmations that rarely avoids being essential. Here is how he expresses himself: "Art begins only when man, instead of abandoning himself to primitive sensibility by dispersing it in the multiple interests that individual things arouse in him, turns the things themselves and their characters, as well as their production and manipulation, to the only purpose of sensibility itself. And man does this only in the act in which he recognizes his original principle in sensitivity, assumes it as the unique and total essence of his constitution, and subordinates to it the things or elements of the world to which he referred, as if in terms definitive, its primitive sensibility. The return to nature is the recognition that man makes of sensitivity as his nature and is therefore the assumption of sensitivity into a final form to which the elements to which it seemed primitively addressed are subordinated and directed ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 184-185). Still an original principle, sensitivity is on duty. But purified, made "pure sensitivity", obtained from the "returning subject" to nature. Nothing about the productive overload, the mechanism that leads to the cavern of massacres. The world seems to be the best of all possible ones. Yet these pages were written during fascism and during the war. Abbagnano does not take it for granted, as if he had lived in a soap bubble.

But his intention was more modest, as he has the time to notice between the lines, when he writes: "Pure sensitivity is the determination of a vital interest of man for nature and at the same time the approach of nature to nature. man, the effective participation of nature in properly human existence " (*ib .*, p. 185), does not want to say exactly what his words seem to say, he wants to stay on this side. In short, no more than doing. Here it is: "Primitive sensitivity is the simple recognition of the real presence of an object that is there, and as it is there, it can be observed and used." (*Ibid*). Phrase that does not need further references. The reflection on art, immediately after, is disarming: «Seeing means that an object is there and that it can be recognized in its reality and its characters. But painting means making one's purpose visible, creating an object that makes it entirely possible. Pure or artistic sensibility thus implies the determination of an object. But it is an object that is no longer valid as a thing or instrument, but only as a realization in the final form of sensibility as such. The object of art is not a thing: it becomes a thing again only if pure sensibility is not recognized in it and is not implemented as such ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 185-186). The example of painting alone is worth an explanation. Abbagnano talks about what he does not know and about something that no longer existed at the time, or almost. Unfortunately, what happens to him here - as we will see better later - will also happen to him in other specific fields of knowledge. Big blunders accumulate, illuminated only by the poor philosophical light, too little to show the limits and deformities that are sometimes truly disconcerting. It is easy to read his best pages, which are precisely these of the *Introduction to Existentialism* , but it is difficult to digest the worst ones. One hears more, in the latter, a dull sound of pulleys at work, a production of appearances that collapse one on top of the other with a dull noise. The psychology of philosophers is still an unknown chapter. There is a certain stubborn resistance in Abbagnano in not wanting to abandon the ground in which he deludes himself to remain safe. At some point, even the most benevolent criticism - and mine is certainly not particularly bad - must drop and stretch its claws. From this point of view, that is, from the psychology of philosophers, there are no small or great thinkers, but all small men, immersed in their idiosyncrasies. Full of zeal, they shuffle their cards and have no respect but for their alleged correspondences, games of appearances, not movements of being.

Again the dialectical game: «Human existence is not nature except because it is a

return to nature. Existing for man means not abandoning oneself to naturalness, but recognizing it and putting it into action as an original and final form. The authentic realization of naturalness in man is art as pure sensitivity.

“But if this is so, the naturalness of the aesthetic object consists solely in its effective participation in human existence as such. The aesthetic object is the actual possibility of pure sensibility. It is nature itself that humanizes itself by becoming an intrinsic possibility of properly human existence. By returning to nature and recognizing it as his origin, man authentically becomes nature. Which means that nature authentically becomes part of its own existence » . (*Ib .* , Pp. 186-187). The reasoning revolves around the term "participation" of an object produced by doing - which is defined as "aesthetic" is a graceful attempt at misdirection - in human existence. Nature becomes man. Concept that we see how it ended up corresponding to reality. Art cannot fail to grasp the smell of death that today permeates the forced world that surrounds us. Nothing suggests that Abbagnano has noticed. The frenzy of his dialectical technique, at this point is accentuated, becomes a continuous shuttle between the opposites and the distinct, an unconscious homage, perhaps, to his ancient enemy? I do not know. I don't want to be bad. In any case, it is evident that he remains attached to reality and to “utility”, which inevitably recalls doing productive even when he speaks of a “return” to nature, not an abandonment but a return. Here is what he writes: «But man can also, instead of abandoning himself to nature, return to nature. In this case, his vital interest is directed not only to the reality and utility of things, but also and above all to his own sensitivity as the condition and foundation of that reality and utility: which therefore is not denied or destroyed but preserved and justified. ” . (*Ib .* , P. 188). Sensitivity is thus confiscated and guaranteed, that is, produced and stored. The philosopher remains attached with his teeth to the mechanism of conservation and justification, after all this is his real decision, the only one that is possible for him. This story of sensitivity is a small dialectical movement, one of the smallest among the little ones, emblematic of how appearance works to make what is only phantasy appear correct. And it is only in this dimension that man conquers a particular type of shadow which he calls "freedom". In these false movements there is a sort of implicit lowering, one glimpses the renunciation of any attempt to go beyond, towards quality, and one sees even the intentional and obtuse forgetfulness of this opening. Furthermore, we must not forget that everything that sounds different is dangerous, the very being with its chaotic presence that cannot be codified is misleading precisely because it is basically considered unattainable and even a little oppressive. Indeed, oppression and control view freedom as oppressive, and this is a consequence of the terror that inspires the unknown. Quality has its own trace in making and from this the mechanism has the suspicion that something superior - not really anything else, but superior - could crush it. No mechanism can conceive of overstepping.

All the reasoning on art conducted by Abbagnano thus remains a prisoner of quantity. Here is how he expresses himself: "And since the existential commitment in the sense of pure sensitivity determines not only the constitution of the returning subject, but also that of the aesthetic object, so there is no art without an object being determined, that is, without that there is the actual production of the work of art. Art is always production, work, technique. The technique is the moment of the realization of the work of art: that is, it is the moment in which, realizing himself in the form of pure sensibility, man realizes in the one and the same act the object that is the condition of this form " . (*Ib .* , Pp. 190-191). Man is not just sensitivity - that this too would be the production of an object - but he is a producer as an artist, that is, as a technician who makes the "artistic" object, whatever that means. The artist is perhaps

the least suited to grasp quality, he has a particularly acute strength - sometimes, not always - to make it take shape as a residue in the sphere of making. This makes you feel a short shiver that can strictly be characterized as "aesthetic", that's all. The quality is different, very distant and inaccessible if you don't put courage into play, a lunar territory full of strange holes and diaphanous mountains.

Abbagnano feels the need to explain how art as an object - therefore how to do it - can be explained. He writes: «If art, as an existential commitment, is always necessarily the production of the object, that is technical, it is evident that the taste for art and art criticism are completely different from art. We can designate with the expression intelligence of art the aesthetic taste and in general any capacity for evaluation and criticism as well as all the feelings, emotions and passions that can be aroused by an object of art ». (*Ib .* , P. 192). Here too we remain prisoners of the conditions that govern doing, even if we try to transcend these conditions in the bond of community and solidarity. Even the desire for "glory", instead of being compared, as we see more and more clearly today, to a market motive, is inserted in this coexistential dialectical process. Hence the artistic intelligence, that is the understanding of the art object, he writes: «... always and only addresses the aesthetic object; but in the aesthetic object it does not consider and can only consider the individuality of the artist ». (*Ib .* , P. 193). Here the stereotype of the artist is maintained as someone who does not know what life is like, a being wrapped in a mysterious aura that he shares with others up to a certain point. There is an air of family that goes back to the original existential problem, then things change as the artistic product is imprinted with a particular sign, which the market is in charge of marketing. In himself, the artist is a producer of appearances that feed the infernal machine that governs him and makes it agreeable. The misery remains and its pieces - once expelled from the artistic object - are now reintegrated into it, only it is made more tolerable, embellished. In the artist is visible, through his work, the potential of producing, the extreme limits and boundaries of its extension, where quality could begin, it could but it is not, because in those border lands, cultivated by the force of expression and sign that the artist places in the product, there is only some residue, a fictitious value. An impossible dream, through art, insinuates itself into forced production, in its low and despicable productive coordination and takes the appearance inconceivably far away, without shifting the breathless gravity that hovers over the world of administered doing. Abbagnano concludes in an almost modest way, inadequate in every way: "For artistic intelligence, the work of art is both the revelation of nature and the artist's autobiography: it is an appeal to that return to nature which is the of the authentic realization of man as nature and at the same time an appeal to a non-transitory form of human solidarity ". (*Ibid*). This coming and going does not give art its effective autonomy, it does not recognize the highly perceptive aspect that belongs to it, albeit within the limits we know. He pulls her by the hair in a dialectical movement that ends up giving her an inappropriate task. There is always an aspiration in art that is wider than the simple factual content, crushed by the object mechanism and by the laws of the market, this aspiration does not always blossom. Abbagnano instead wants to imprison her in historicity to guarantee her a life, wretched but always a life.

He insists: «In historicity the past is constituted and preserved in its fundamental and eternal meaning. History is the recognition of the past in what is worthy of survival: it is the construction of the past as a future. Art, as a return to nature, is not in history: it is itself history. It is history for the intrinsic movement that constitutes it. The return to nature is a return to the origin: it is a recognition, it is a putting it into being and making it count as such; it is making the future of it. And as it is history, art never repeats the past. The repetition would suppose that the past was such out of the act

of recognition; and that this recognition demanded a faithful reproduction. But in reality, recognition of the past is the constitution of the past, it is the revelation of its true meaning; and only in its true meaning does the past become the master of the future. Tradition in art is often more revolutionary than any innovative will; and truly an innovative will has no effect if it does not bring art back to its true essence, that is, to its origin, and if it does not make it recognized in its own past. The historicity of art leads it once again to the solidarity of existence among men, recognition of the past is the constitution of a tradition in which a community of men in solidarity is formed and lives. The art and the intelligence of art determine, by their historicity, a coexistential community in which only men find themselves because it realizes the individuality of each one, his original nature ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 194-195). The circle closes and integrates with other circles. The historicity of the past and the original return to the future - attention, not destiny -, the return to nature and the historicity of art, the authenticity of the existential choice and the "novelty". All this is a very constant but feeble appearance. He denies the evident repetitiveness of doing and hides it behind the vitality of the artistic tradition. It attacks the "innovative speed" and does not realize that the critical point is in the blind will and not in the innovation, that if it is productive it is and remains forced. Art is tradition and innovation at the same time, because it is production and as such follows the rules of productive administration, it could not be otherwise. For this reason, except in rare cases of overstepping, which the artist realizes by paying personally - and then it is a reminder -, it is born old and well-known. In Abbagnano's dialectical procedures there is undoubtedly a lot of philosophical craft, and this explains my partial obligations of a remote time, but there is little, concrete, philosophical intelligence. Often these supposed demonstrations take us to a remote place that has nothing to do with the starting point and there we are left, more perplexed than ever. These movements are an appearance that covers itself with veils and dresses up to show itself, without being able to hide the ancient idealist matrix that is often only poorly understood.

Abbagnano's conclusion is in harmony with what we have said so far: «The return to nature includes and implements the entire metaphysics of art, closely linking it to the authentic realization of human existence as such. The metaphysics of art, of which I have briefly exposed some of the cornerstones, firmly connects art to the constitutive normativity of human existence ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 195-196). The word "metaphysics" now bursts like a glimpse of light. Not that terminology has to get the better of conceptual reality, if anything it's the other way around, but sometimes it's important to emphasize verbal cues because they indicate something that persists, crouched inside like an old cat, ready to jump. Nor is it by chance that right here, at the end of this *Introduction to existentialism* , the word "normativity" returns as a constant motif and funeral toll of all the work. The reconstruction of existence and its problems, which had to be grandiose, turned out to be a pantomime where the technique replaced the problem leading it towards apparent solutions, in perfect harmony with the ghosts we are talking about. At the center of the scene is the "problematicity" which is made to appear like a demiurge and then withdraw it into the narrowness of an "authentic choice", "original", with the silent assistance of mere dialectical expedients. The whole context is prudently kept away from the concrete world of doing and does not even have the suspicion of a different world, where quality lives. The most penetrating impression I get today, after fifty years and more since my first reading, is that there is a wasted strength, an advance and a rest, a terrified sleep with a reckless clash of centrifugal and centripetal processes. Too meticulous, too detailed and demanding, his words would have deserved greater courage and, from this obviously unavailable availability, different conclusions. Its very logical inflexibility,

abstractly condensed in dialectical movements, is often wasted, that is, not applied in all its consequences. Thus, contradictory erupts sovereign and there is no way to stop it, indeed the more he advances, the more it envelops him in an invincible way.

The prudent Abbagnano, in advancing, looks around from all sides, watches over himself, looks for foundations to support his theses in a definitive way. The emanation of a continuous danger of loss seems to hover around his saying, but it is only an impression, it is not a question of real restlessness. Abbagnano is placid and confident in his progress, he knows that in appearance everything and the opposite of everything can be made from time to time appear and disappear. Where should the danger come from? Perhaps from some imprudent critical consideration on doing? There is nothing to speculate between the world reconstructed in appearance by Abbagnano and the quality that overwhelms every obstacle. Nothing is more remote here than this qualitatively different world. Of course, even if remote, the world of overcoming, albeit as a nightmare to be chased away, is always around the corner and it is enough to move in an inappropriate way to find it in front of you. This is why Abbagnano is so cautious and tries to put obstacles in this dangerous encounter that he supposes possible, even if he is not sure what it is. For reasons of administered guarantee, nothing must move from the forced world of doing, if not plays of shadows, appearances.

Positive existentialism

Man "seeks being". This fact is considered by Abbagnano as a "search for stability". His whole thinking revolves around this assumption. Whoever seeks something means that he does not have it, therefore research proves that man is not the being. He writes: «Man seeks in any case a fulfillment, a completion, a stability that he lacks. Seek being. This condition is characteristic of its finitude. If he seeks being, he does not possess it, he is not being. Realizing this finitude, scrutinizing its nature in depth is the fundamental task of existentialism. But realizing it or scrutinizing it does not only mean making it an object of speculation but taking note of it and deciding accordingly. Here the new perspective of existentialism appears clearly. It demands from man the commitment to his own finitude. It demands that in the search for the being that constitutes the substance of all his daily or exceptional attitudes, he does not forget or disavow precisely this substance: he does not forget and disavow that this research has a meaning or a foundation only by virtue of its limitation. constitutive, only by virtue of its insufficiency and instability and that therefore every step in that research does nothing but consolidate it in the finitude of its nature ». (*Positive existentialism* , I edition, Taylor Torino publisher, 1948, pp. 5-6). This is somewhat different from what we saw in *Introduction to Existentialism* , but only apparently. There is a sort of arrest, a form of blocking on the problem of completion, then the intervention of metaphysics - now declared - saves everything. He affirms: "This commitment is at the same time the recognition of the ultimate nature of man and the metaphysical self-definition of man as finitude: man is the original, transcendent possibility of the search for being". (*Ib .* , P. 6). Research in finitude, therefore in the reduced and impoverished condition in which doing moves. Nobody can do their own thing, everyone has to follow the rules. Nor should another eventuality be assumed and the traces of this extraordinary journey must be erased as soon as possible. Working within the limitation, there is nothing but a deaf uneasiness, a dissonant background that is immediately canceled. The commitment of doing, for Abbagnano, is an "authentic" choice, but this other position does not even touch the hypothesis of overstepping, any real risk must be excluded. Thus Abbagnano: «[The commitment to finitude] already gives a sure direction to

existence, it already gives it the norm of its authentic constitution. It excludes distraction, dispersion, it excludes everything that breaks man's existential bond with himself and with others; since it requires the concentration of one's own strength and effective solidarity with others. Finitude, as the substance of existence, becomes the norm of existence. And this norm, leading man to realize himself as finite, brings him at the same time continuously beyond himself, since it consolidates him in his capacity for research, in the possibility of his relationship with being ». (*Ib.*, P. 7). Here is the rule to re-emerge from the apparent risk, the doubt resizing in certainty, the impotence in "strength" and "power". The basis here is the "choice", but more than a choice this existential decision-making seems an emanation that permeates the air that spreads everywhere, a residue that has the scent of theology. There is never a real epiphany of this authenticity, one always remains vague. The ego is "transcendent", its choice that is original to it is also such. Abbagnano writes: «The ego is not a psychological or anthropological fact, it is not an objectively observable fact; it is the fundamental requirement towards which man moves in his search for being, the term that he tends to constitute and found in his relationship with being ». (*Ib.*, P. 8). Metaphysics has fantasized a lot about transcendence. This is the tabernacle of power, the magical tool with which philosophy deludes itself into solving its problems. Like any impudence of words, transcendence irresistibly attracts the philosopher and thus ends up that his theories frequently get involved in it. There is in transcendence a comforting color that banal logical demonstrations do not have and this color persists, it shows no sign of diminishing with the rootedness in doing, which is inevitable for all philosophies. The metaphysical validity provides power to the anguish deriving from the lack of foundation, this is an enveloping element that transmits, or rather radiates, the strength of the pulleys at work.

Abbagnano writes: «The elimination of all data, the resolution of the whole being in its problematic essence, makes the movement of transcendence appear in all its enormous importance. Since, as the ego is continually transcendent for man in so far as he must continually relate to it to realize it, so is the being of the world transcendent. Realizing oneself as I means becoming passionate about one's task and becoming passionate about one's task means bringing the world out of the dispersion of insignificant events and recognizing it in the seriousness and consistency of its order, in which everything is a means or an obstacle for the realization of the ego. ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 8-9). Everything revolves around the word "order". Faced with this concept, which is the basis of administered doing, Abbagnano always has a sort of glamor. There is a shadow around the order that has no equal, warms the warm heart of philosophers and allows them to collect their salary at the end of the month. Any doubt about the legitimacy of the use of this concept is not so evident, it is reduced to a slight disturbance taken as an excess of softness. From transcendence comes coexistence. The metaphysical dream continues: «All forms of coexistence are based on the finite nature of man as the possibility of the relationship with being. Man cannot seek being or relate to being, except by coexisting. Man cannot rediscover himself and constitute himself as I nor recognize the reality and order of the world, except in the act of relating to others, of recognizing the originality and essentiality of his bond with others and of to decide, consequently, to be faithful to the community to which he belongs, to love and friendship ». (*Ib.*, P. 11). Birth and death, relationship with other men. Everything is connected and the philosopher underlines it, but he does not indicate the possible tragedy of doing, enclosed in his careful consideration of the world. In this welcoming order - apparently - man leads his existence from one extreme to the other, is born and dies. But life is something else, not the sweet and caressing murmur of repetitiveness disturbed only by the sound diffractions that the

pulleys cause in the basement of the lake of blood. The more fear mounts, the more you need comfort, praise or good words, even if deep down you know that it is all a game of roles in which appearance is dominant and being remote as never before. The perfume of transcendence smells of incense not of God, as it would be logical to suppose, it is the matter of priests of the virgin and infertile goddess, who makes the bird of the night fly up.

Dialogue with destiny, in these conditions, is impossible. Abbagnano does not realize this and assumes that the necessary key is fidelity. He writes: "If the future were already included and preconstituted in the past, if history were a continuous progress, a necessary order from which every conquest was made definitive and every value guaranteed forever, no dispersion, no confusion of individuals could prevent it or upset him. But in reality man must rise to history, that is to the order in which the meaning of his being is found as of the being of the world and of the community, laboriously moving from the insignificant and dispersive events of time. Man is not history: he must become history by rediscovering himself in the world and in the community. He must escape the threat of time, which is always ready to submerge him in the insignificance of his banal events, and face the risk of his success in history. Now this risk can only be faced by disposing to fidelity: by moving towards the future with the decision to reinforce it in the past and to rediscover in the past its true self and the true form of its coexistence with others. This fidelity is destiny ». (*Ib.*, P. 12). Rejection of the myth of Er and of what it means in Plato, opening to destiny based on the authentic choice that everyone must make in their own life. But there is no real choice, this would be possible only in the freedom of involvement, that is, in quality, but Abbagnano is far from this hypothesis that scares him. Hers is therefore a subordinate position that usurps the profound meaning of the word destiny. His true interlocutor is time - space, as we have seen, is for him a corollary of time - and the future, he lacks the word capable of speaking to destiny. Destiny lives in me, in an intimate niche of my life, and talks, and offers me real choices, only if I go beyond my compulsory conditions of doing, otherwise I don't receive any message. Everything is silent in the future, only the unexpected guest will one day show up without warning first.

It is true, Abbagnano is right in saying that "the free man is the man who has a destiny", but his philosophy ignores this free man because he speaks only in the context of forced action, therefore he ignores destiny. All the positive discourse of existentialism lives in a state of subjection towards the "norm", that is, of all sorts of guarantees, it is subjugated by the conditions that doing imposes, it never leads to doubt, more than evident, given the partiality of produced object, of a quality that is elsewhere, not exactly remote, but unmanifest. This rebirth crouched in the warmth is the most unpleasant sense one feels when reading Abbagnano. It is no coincidence that this philosophy openly declares that it is far from both dogmatism and skepticism, but this equidistant distance, without measuring exactly, what does it mean? Only commitment, work, loyalty and tenacity. In short, everything in positive existentialism converges towards a point, the certain position in the productive sphere. The various supporting elements of this philosophical position all end in the rejection - bordering on silence - of chaos and imprecision, elements that are far closer to the idea of being that comes from quality. Considering the narrowness of doing outrageous does not mean rendering them a good service, it is precisely this narrowness that produces the tools that allow, thanks to the courage of involvement, to access quality.

The problematic nature of man and the problematic nature of philosophy. Quite right.

No certainty, therefore no positivity. Instead Abbagnano assigns to existentialism the task of a definitive break with philosophical naivety. He continues: «Faced with every philosophy, we must ask ourselves whether the concept of reality, to which it refers, makes possible the problem, from which it arises. If it does not make it possible, the implicit result is always the total and irremediable emptiness of philosophy. Now existentialism intends to escape from this emptiness. It demands that philosophy must ultimately come to justify its own problem, to demonstrate its intrinsic possibility. This is, it can be said, the fundamental characteristic of existentialism ». (*Ib .*, P. 19). But what is the problem of philosophy, if not that of saying what one cannot say? So it is a question of how and why what must be said cannot be said. Can these obstacles be removed? Or is there a bad plot that innervates philosophy and condemns it to a helpless life? A prisoner of doing, doing itself, philosophy cannot answer these questions. It should be the philosopher who twists it in remembrance, but of what? Of his passing, his of the philosopher, of course. But philosophers are seated in their armchairs, and when they don't get any they crave it for life. There is therefore in their saying an exacerbated tension that would mean but cannot because it is too risky, so that in the end the tension subsides and the philosopher only knows how to defend his miserable cognitive possession, the one that makes him static and guarded. There is no lingua franca of philosophy with which to say quality. If even a significant change - a war, for example - cannot disturb the supreme contemplation, think of a personal involvement, an opening in defenses. Of course, a bomb can also kill a philosopher, but this belongs to chance, it is not his reckless exposure to the danger of being overstepped. This is why the war for the philosopher is only a small disturbance to his philosophical behavior. This is the problem of philosophy Abbagnano talks about, failing to hide it sufficiently.

He continues: «In its apparent simplicity and abstractness, this question is full of consequences and resonances, not all of which are easy to perceive at first sight. It is on the very asking of the question, on its inner meaning, that our consideration must stop. We immediately see then that it is both a question and an answer, and that it can be assumed, without any change, as the very definition of philosophy. "Why is philosophy always a problem to itself?" it may mean that philosophy is essentially his own problem. In this case, its problematic form is not appearance and provisionality, but substance ». (*Ibid*). Indetermination which, by solving itself, establishes the problem itself. This is the central idea of philosophy, according to Abbagnano. But in doing there is no real problem, there are only difficulties that are split into minor difficulties and thus overcome, but it never happens that a problem arises that is not a tautology. What is done is absolved in the objectivity that encloses it and here it finds its rest. If it does not find it, it is because a different tension has intervened, a residue appears on the horizon, even a small deformation in the mechanism, a trivial change in the rhythm of the pulleys. From a small dysfunction it is possible to compromise the whole functioning of doing. Quantity needs a method, a project, a future. He doesn't want to deal with mood swings or restlessness. The philosopher does not feed dysfunctions, he is the diplomat who knows how to choose the words that lead to the cave of massacres.

Although Abbagnano has long proclaimed the possession of existence, to be protected and guaranteed, it does not seem to draw on the possession of philosophical knowledge. He explains: «It is immediately evident that, due to its problematic nature, philosophy is not and cannot be a divine knowledge of the world. That is, it is not the firm, definitive, total possession of all possible knowledge; it is not even the possession of any knowledge; it is rather the problem of knowledge, a problem that is continually reborn from its own solutions ". (*Ib .*, P. 21). This is just a play on words.

Philosophy is possible knowledge, but once this knowledge is achieved with authentic reality, it becomes a possession. Of course, always problematic, but possession to defend. Here the essential logic I discuss is confirmed. Any knowledge - ultimately all knowledge is philosophical - can vanish into thin air or immerse itself in a force field where it is no longer available in the primitive state of influx, must be subjected to control in order to be stored and become an object of possession. It can be lost or found but, in the end, it has to lock itself up somewhere. The task of philosophy seems to be that of the jailer who solves the social problem using the key.

Abbagnano continues: «Man is the only finite thinking being; problematic knowledge therefore constitutes man's condition and way of being. If man's way of being is called existence, problematic knowledge defines and expresses existence. At this point the trait from which existentialism takes its name is revealed: the identity between existence and philosophy ». (*Ib .*, P. 22). Which reaffirms what we have said. A forced condition produces a forced, dimidiated existence. Philosophy reflects it and justifies it, in a certain sense, it seals it. After all, many dialectical hairpin bends are pretexts for establishing prudent and guaranteed behavior. Indications of behavior, willing to put everything in its place, in the order of all things. Bringing chaos back to order would be the extreme philosophical ideal, unattainable because philosophy only passes from one order to another.

Even philosophy as a word is considered by Abbagnano in the same way. He specifies as follows: «On the other hand, the technical elaboration of philosophy, which is essentially the construction of a language that expresses in the most rigorous and precise form possible the authentic philosophizing that is existence, also acquires a new meaning. The intolerance and dissatisfaction sometimes generated by the so-called "abstruseness" of philosophical technique are made impossible by the explicit recognition that human experiences and fundamental attitudes seek their expression and their logical-linguistic arrangement in that technique ». (*Ib .*, P. 23). Do you banish abstrusities? Not exactly. It is not a question of saying things simply - nothing is simpler than appearance - the difficulty is in saying them. The specialization does not impress anyone, only when it is aimed at covering the contribution to the murder is it to be indicated carefully, but who can shout at the auctore? Certainly not the greasers themselves. Can you be safe? But safe from what? From the all-encompassing mechanism of doing? Not exactly. Philosophy tries to secure itself from the risk of overstepping. Going into the unknown is what philosophy - or rather, philosophers - does not like. It always lives under the threat of its secret contribution being revealed. That is why he cries out in scandal against those who do not follow the rules. Whoever embarks on the adventure of quality is considered like a foreigner, immediately placed under suspicion. In fact, he speaks another language that cannot be codified in factual production. One can only examine remembrance accounts, dubious texts, however belonging to the effective quantity but heterogeneous, which speak of extraordinarily different experiences, in many respects fearful. Philosophy does not like the desert wind.

If Abbagnano affirms that "philosophy is not contemplation", one wonders what it is? Perhaps a dialectical game of forced correspondences? No. It is a duty. He writes: «Philosophy cannot be founded on the illusion of making man a disinterested spectator of himself. Every clarification that man succeeds in obtaining about himself and even that which he only deludes himself to achieve, immediately enters to constitute his existence, which is modified by it. This means that philosophy has no object, in the proper meaning of the term; but only one task, and that this task consists in committing man to that form or way of being which he comes to regard as

his own. On the other hand, this does not imply that philosophy is more practical than theoretical and that it concerns action rather than speculation. Theory and practice, action and speculation, are conventional and useless ways of classification for philosophy. Which always concerns man in his totality, in the problematic being that is proper to him and entirely engages him in the form or attitude that allows him to choose ». (*Ib.* , P. 25). Here there is a critique of phenomenology understood in the exclusive and reductive sense of a suspension of judgment or, if you prefer, of decision. Paci proved this superficial criticism unfounded. But Abbagnano is too tied to the concepts of "authenticity" and "fidelity" to realize the limits of his position. It is clear that there are aspects of philosophy that cannot all be merged into Abbagnano's claim, many try to understand, if only by asking the question, what happened to completeness? And, among the philosophers close to Abbagnano himself, there were not a few who asked this question.

Philosophy - for Abbagnano unlike science - is without interested knowledge. He writes thus: «To deny that philosophy is disinterested knowledge does not mean that disinterested knowledge is not possible for man. It just means that, if it is possible, it is not philosophy. It exists, in fact, so it is possible; but it is natural science.

«The attitude that underlies science is that according to which man is only one of the possible objects of scientific consideration, without any title or right of privilege over others. Man is subjected in science to the same observation and measurement procedures to which other objects, whatever they are, are subjected, and cannot expect any favorable treatment in it ". (*Ib.* , P. 26). This is a questionable concept widely used by philosophers. The "value" of science here is divided between its alleged objectivity and its approximate incompleteness. As a basis of doing, science follows the laws of partiality and here, like the rest of the forced world, it is mere appearance. Even monstrous mechanisms such as the atomic ones, capable of incinerating the planet, are only appearance, they are not being. But these problems, miserably drowned by Abbagnano, will be discussed elsewhere in this book. Here I would like to note that science is by no means a "disinterested knowledge". The interest, however, is not that of being but that of appearing, since doing takes the initiative. Knowledge can help to move away from doing - scientific or philosophical, it doesn't matter - but it must be taken on differently, as a conscience capable of going beyond the rules that constrain it. No matter how long this experience will be possible - time is not a unit of measurement that trains quality to be quantified - what matters is the consequence and the transformation that the different experience can bring about.

Abbagnano specifies: «These clarifications show that man is not problematic except in the very act in which the problems, which are rooted in this problematicity, include him as one of their possible terms. This implies that scientific knowledge, like the common knowledge that prepares and stimulates scientific research, is essentially connected to existence and constitutes a fundamental aspect of it. The claim that man can do without science is chimerical, it only expresses attachment to a more rudimentary and less effective form of scientific knowledge. This also implies that man cannot recognize himself in his original nature in front of all the other beings or things of the world, if not recognizing himself with the same act as being or thing of the world. The relationship with the world is just as essential to man as his relationship with himself; the exteriority in which he lives constitutes him no less than his interiority or consciousness ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 27-28). The guiding term here is "problematicity", a magic word that encompasses all of Abbagnano's philosophy, yet in itself this term does not explain but, on the contrary, needs an explanation. Of

course, there is a difference between problematicity and dialectical demonstration, yet the two philosophical concepts, the two metaphysical techniques, are both used thanks to the intermediary function of "transcendence". The fact is that if problematicity inspires reverence in compulsion, opening fictitious possibilities to appearing, dialectics promises to put things right without the need to resort to longer and less convincing linear demonstrations - cause and effect. We are faced with logical monstrosities - and I must remember my ambitions of method when I first faced them - that do not want to wait to be codified and push on the door all at once. Thus he can affirm with impunity: «These determinations and exclusions constitute a first step towards a positive direction of existential philosophy. A further start can be had by considering that the philosophy of existence decisively breaks the framework of necessity within which every dogmatic philosophy moves. The horizon that it recognizes and within which it moves is that of possibilities. The recognized problematic nature of philosophy, and of the man who is its only theme, brought about this change. From the point of view of a problematic reason, no necessitating nature, no immutable data, no determining law can be discerned in man, and in any other reality that in any case enters into a relationship with man. (*Ib.* , Pp. 29-30). Only possibilities, but what possibilities? Those that require a decision, but which decision? Everything is fictitious. The possibility first of all. Everything wraps itself up in the ghost's sheet. These possibilities can also be defined as "authentic", but they are not real choices because they do not involve the existence of those who choose. They just move a finger, left or right. What matters is their equidistance from the existence he chooses. The result does not change except in the external form, appearance, not in the quality, the being is not called into question, this remains other, distant, placed beyond the opening that in any case the philosopher keeps barred. There is no future as destiny for this decision, there is only a consequent future, perfectly adequate to time, looming like death. Abbagnano specifies: «Neither inside nor outside of himself, man can ever come across something more stable, more resistant, more solid, than possibility. One possibility is, for him, himself, that is, his own self, which is the possible unity of his inner attitudes. Possibilities for him are other men: the possibility of concrete relationships of work, solidarity, friendship, love. Possibilities, and precisely possibilities of use, are for him the things of the world. Possibilities are works of art, which become pieces of canvas or stone, that is brute material, if man does not have the taste to feel and appreciate them. Possibilities are the documents on which history is based, and which say nothing, if man does not know how to understand them in their value as testimonies ». (*Ib.* , P. 30). Great arrangements that stack on top of each other but don't move the problem. A choice must be heedless of the consequences, neither blind nor prudent, if it involves too much or too little it is not a choice, and in any case it must bring with it whoever chooses, it must put the world aside, not leave it in its ceremonial dress as at a funeral. What makes the choice in quality compromising is the overcoming, the abandonment of the rules, the shocking occurrence of chaos, the jarring doing that does not accept the clash and tries to resist, the angular consequences of remembrance. He speaks of possibilities and, in a certain sense, considers his philosophy as an open proposal, but it is not enough, the mechanisms on which it is based are always the same and are repeated on time. Warranty is your primary concern. This indicates a sense of guilt, as if the philosopher felt the responsibility of the cavern of the massacres. Hence the flight from Kierkegaard, the theorist of negative possibility, and from Kant, the theorist of positive but one-way possibility. But these distances do not do justice to the two philosophers. This is an out of place hustle and bustle. After all, Abbagnano remains in the middle of the ford. It cannot be Kant - for various reasons - and it does not grasp its transcendence as a total possibility, it cannot be Kierkegaard - for even

more serious reasons - and it does not grasp its qualitative tragedy, fear and individual desperation in the face of overcoming. More fuss to keep at a distance from Sartre, equivalence of all possibilities - but where did the authenticity go? -, from Heidegger, equivalence of all possibilities except one, death, by Jaspers, impossibility of all possibilities for which there is no way to emerge from nothing to be something.

Against these positions Abbagnano proposes his: "With regard to this existentialism, which can be called negative, not because it denies beliefs, values or realities that are outside its range, but because it denies the very principle from which it moves, existence, - I propose a positive approach that justifies the recognition and maintenance of existence in its fundamental problematic nature, and leaves open the possibilities in which it constitutes itself. An existentialism that lives under the exclusive sign of Kierkegaard, the philosopher of impossible possibility, must be contrasted with an existentialism that brings Kierkegaard back to Kant and to how many other philosophers have worked to guarantee man the legitimate possession of his own limits ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 35-36). From negative to positive. But it is only an apparent opposition, tightened to the wall by force but not convincing. Once again a missed opportunity. All these philosophers had posed the problem of the incompleteness of the world, Abbagnano clears it and moves on. He considers it a nuisance, a dip in the rigid safeguarding of positivity. He wants all obstacles to the guarantee to be cleared from their first appearance, he wants to avoid disturbances and disturbances to doing, this is basically the philosopher's task, to put peace in the hearts of men and to take over the ancient task of the magician and the priest. , so that the slaughter continues undisturbed.

Again on the "transcendental possibility". Where to find a particularity in what circulates in the object market of doing? It is difficult to think about this eventuality excluding the overrun. The existence of the forced world is an unconfessable intertwining that repeats itself without interruptions or novelties. Appearance is the impudence of the reflection that mimics the chaos of being, which is absolutely inimitable. In the unbreathable air of the prison that everyone administers by overheating only the fantasy of escape - an exacerbated form of the same production of appearance - what can be done out of the overpopulated accumulation of the objects produced? Instead Abbagnano reiterates: «An existential possibility can have the most diverse characters, but its own and fundamental character is undoubtedly what makes it an authentic possibility. A possibility that presents itself with the most dazzling colors, but that, once decided and made its own by a man, dissolves or overturns in his hands, stealing or denying him exactly what he promised him, is not an authentic possibility, because it is a impossibility. On the other hand, a possibility that once chosen and decided is consolidated into its being of possibility, so that it makes its own choice and decision possible again and always, is an authentic possibility, a real possibility. A similar possibility presents itself immediately in front of those who have chosen it with a character of normativity that makes the choice mandatory. The possibility of possibility is the criterion and the norm of every possibility. The possibility of possibility can be indicated by the name of transcendental possibility; the transcendental possibility is then what justifies and founds every concrete human attitude, every choice and decision ». (*Ib.* , P. 37). Again the fundamental words of metaphysics give here the illusion of holding everything, "authentic", first of all, it indicates a characteristic presence of possibility. The word "normativity" follows which transforms the possible choice into an obligatory choice. The usual dialectical game is repeated. The problem of the annihilation of choice is apparently solved here by resorting to coexistence. A background of ghosts, in fact, can well testify to appearance. These movements

continually overturn. Choice is never possible, as we have seen, except by committing oneself to life and death. The philosopher avoids this clarification, for him it is enough to leave home to go to the University, and this is the greatest risk he can imagine. Being does not concern him, he is hidden behind the screen of appearing and that is enough for him. The vain fury of the world sees it pass under its window and does not understand the reason but the soul. For him everything is fine, even if the murdered continue to squash on the ground of the cave of massacres. His crooked legs always bring him into the proximity of defensive bulwarks which he calls "duty" or, at times, even "freedom". Basically, the function of the philosopher is precisely this. Subaltern among the subordinates, he says under the illusion of saying what others cannot say - ancient chatter of philosophy - and in the end here he is the spokesperson for everyone, for the codified platitudes that everyone loves to hear repeated. Everyone has his own compressed life and is silent, the philosopher has his own compressed life like everyone else, and he speaks. His voice comes out almost strangled by the effort of stopping on the threshold of the cave where a continuous flow of theories feeds the lake of blood, but he goes out and fulfills his duty to the end. His faith is, once again, dignity and respectability. He has only a vague sense of the possible qualitative upheaval and the profound awareness of not being able to control it, so he keeps away from it.

Freedom, according to Abbagnano, emerges from possibility. He writes: «Existential possibilities are never offered to man in their indifference. Among those that, in fact, he can choose, only one is the authentic, that is, the one that does not resolve itself into impossibility. This he must choose, because this alone guarantees him the possibility of choice. And this alone is freedom. Freedom is therefore connected to the possibility value of the chosen possibility, that is, to the transcendental possibility. And it is evident that not every choice is free, but only the one that includes the guarantee of one's own possibility. If I have decided freely, what I have decided I can ceaselessly continue to decide, because my decision guarantees itself ». (*Ib.*, P. 40). But how can I decide freely in a world immersed in the dust of objects that makes everything uniform and indistinct? They are objects without destiny, with their future marked by time, death awaits them at the gate, peeling off the mold that covers them you will find more mold. How can we speak of freedom, the rarest and most extreme quality, far more complex and difficult than beauty or truth, in an etheric world, submerged, frowning in its own inability to look at the sky? Isn't there a kind of inadequacy in this world that makes freedom impossible, while in its place other and multiple freedoms are traded that have nothing to do with it? The shamelessness of the philosophers is the daughter of fear and the mother of massacres. There is no way to regain possession of a theoretical validity except by subjecting it to the fire of the overrun.

Problematic existence means "temporality". Abbagnano writes: «The philosophy of existence starts from the explicit recognition of the reality of the time. And with it it recognizes that of all its characteristics and aspects: birth and death, conservation and destruction, immobility and change, development and decay. These antagonistic aspects of time can hardly be understood and interpreted on the basis of any concept of time. Since if time is order, continuity and permanence, according to the concept that is the foundation of almost all its philosophical interpretations, its destructive and nullifying power cannot be explained. And if, on the other hand, it is disorder, impermanence and destruction, according to the religious or tendentially religious interpretations of it, it is not possible to explain the possibility of man to steal from him, even in pieces and tatters, what is dear to him and to make it the heritage of the its past, its tradition or its history. In reality, only the existential category of possibility allows us to understand time in all aspects of its temporality, because it allows us to

recognize this temporality in the possibility that is always both positive and negative, and always implies the alternative of order and disorder, conservation and destruction, etc. The temporality of time is nothing but the fundamental instability of existential possibility ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 42-43). There is no suspicion of the difference that exists by questioning time on the basis of doing, that is, how to happen, or on the basis of qualitative remembrance, that is, as destiny. These concepts are replaced by an apparent difference between philosophical interpretation and religious interpretation of the time. Functional replacement to maintain demand in the context of forced action. The rigid quantitative scanning of time is not taken seriously into consideration, its cruel succession of moments is considered only a bridge between past and future, in fact future. The impossibility of questioning time as the future, of speaking to it, is not even imagined, as if the rind of the object product mocked this possible opening, visible instead, but not for Abbagnano, in the future considered as destiny. The context is poor and cautious, and it is a testing ground for any philosophy that stands before us. Only by acting can we turn to destiny and ask him for the impossible answer. Whether this comes in a form that is not immediately comprehensible depends on the depth of the remembrance. If you think of the time of making as full and luxuriant with finished products, ready to enter the market, you cannot understand the word that addresses destiny and you close your eyes at every remembered image. If you wait, everything changes. Destiny responds and realizes the unimaginable. What I am describing is the condition of Abbagnano's sunset, restricted between his cautions, unable to question destiny, time has surprised him by throwing an unexpected guest at him. His conception of history seals this sunset. «History is rooted in this alternative of existential temporality. Which is a research that commits the future to discovering the truth of the past, and is therefore a struggle to subtract from the destructive and nullifying power of time what is valid and worthy of preservation or memory ». (*Ib.* , P. 45). Still a where for man. From the charred rubble of an effectively concrete life, a memory emerges - not a reminder - that is, once again an object that will become charred rubble. No one has been able to divert him from his path, nor have I been able to drag him into some dubious qualitative adventure. His itinerary was always the same. It is Abbagnano that I am talking about. Then, suddenly, a heap of ruins before his tired eyes. Among these ruins, as I am doing now, while I find myself locked up at the age of seventy-three in a Greek prison, I discover some object submerged in dust. I take it in hand, I clean it, I observe it and this ruin takes me back to the years of my youth, of my efforts, of my fallacious impressions. Then I place it, once again, in the dust, without the object having sent a sign, even a tiny sign of life and quality. I realize that that object was already dead before it fell into disrepair and was covered in the dust of time.

Problematic existence and reason

If the secret "spring" of philosophy is given by the fact that everything one is interested in becomes infinite, the search for the finite is impossible. Abbagnano writes: "Philosophical consideration is always rational or thinking consideration: it can only result in the discovery or recognition of the universal and permanent substance for its objects, that is, of the infinite principle that makes them be or appear". (*Philosophy, Religion, Science* , 1st edition, Taylor Torino publisher, 1947, p. 11). Indeed, this spring belongs to metaphysics, but that is not the point. Abbagnano wants to move forward and not stop at what could be considered a kind of condemnation. This fading takes us far, and instead it is good to stay nearby, that is to avoid giving too much space to a hypothesis that in the world of doing, of which philosophy is part, is now a currency out of circulation.

Indeed, if philosophy is realized above human doing, it closes its eyes to that appearance that constitutes it but does not necessarily open them to being. Become a judge of ghosts, puppets and fantasies roam inside and spread a slight thrill among the rubble. That's all. Abbagnano is rightly not part of this philosophy without problems. In fact, he writes, referring to a similar philosophical approach: "Yet in this philosophy which rejects out of its sphere the same problems it encounters and refuses to consider problematicity as such, a fundamental problem ceaselessly arises: that of itself". (*Ib .*, P. 14). And a little further on: «The finite constitutes the content from which it draws its concrete problems; but the presence of this content introduces in it an irreparable split and an unsolved contrast. The need to solve the finite in the infinite constitutes a problem whose possibility is not justified by this need itself ". (*Ibid*). Here is a critique of Hegel being developed, including Minerva's bird, using the same dialectical method. The problem of the resolution of the finite in the infinite becomes a problem solved but not eliminated, therefore it makes philosophy problematic. In the end, «... when philosophy comes to become aware of its own problem, it immediately poses itself as a possibility of the problem itself, that is, as a problematic consideration of the world. The category of necessity in which it settled until it deluded itself that it could immediately get out of the problematic condition deemed apparent and provisional, then breaks down and falls like a fictitious envelope that prevents it from reaching full self-awareness of its task ". (*Ib .*, Pp. 15-16). Here we wander into a false problem, specular but not exactly antithetical to that of Hegel, a problem that suggests future complications concerning the foundation of the finite, which must have as its basis a necessary compulsory action. In this way the finite is not founded, it sinks into a soft fog, into an equivocal slime that heralds its opening into the cavern of massacres. Everything is hastily summarized, and this, in the face of Hegel's sumptuousness, rings false in his own attempt to fix things once and for all.

Abbagnano writes: «The passage from the thinking consideration based on the category of necessity to the thinking consideration based on the category of problematicity implies this radical change: reality is problematic, indeed problematicity itself is real. Thus the infinite ceases to be the necessary term or result of philosophy. The object (whatever it may be), remaining essentially characterized by the problem that concerns it, refuses any necessary determination because it reveals itself as the simple possibility of any possible determination ». (*Ib .*, P. 16). And, a little further on: «The possibility is not an abstract potential that waits to become real in the act, but precisely the act of a concrete problem that is resolved and freely chosen. In the act of this concrete problematic nature, object and subject of philosophy are one ". (*Ibid*). But that's not enough. The problem is an uncertain look to the future, uncertain and mute. The door of the future does not open with this key. The reduction of the finite could even at this point seem almost a methodological fallback, not a disposition of reality. The light that Abbagnano turns on is that of a small candle, it shines little in front of the dazzling Hegel. It can, for bad readers, be considered a losing endeavor. Instead the damage is not here. But what is to be understood by finite that does not want to be resolved into infinity? Any object? The being of Parmenides? Aristotle's universe? The Kantian categories? No. Abbagnano considers finite in the sense of finitude. It is the world we live in which has finitude as its characteristic. In fact, the problematic nature would rather suggest the incompleteness of the world and therefore raise the problem of quality. But on this point Abbagnano is categorical. «A problematic consideration is finite in the sense of finitude, since its limit is intrinsically inherent in its problematic nature. In fact, the problematic is such only by virtue of the negative possibility that is inherent in it, that

is, of the non-being possible of what it is problematic of. A problematic situation is constitutive instability and the possible nullity of the way of being that is proper to it. This possible nullity, this negative possibility, is the intrinsic limit of problematicity as such ». (*Ib.* , P. 17). Here we start from existence which is problem and instability, a fairly faithful mirror of forced action, but still in the sense of a working hypothesis left open. Now, this instability is constitutive in the sense of a working hypothesis left open. Now, this instability is constitutive of doing, so the other solution, the Hegelian one, speaks of another type of appearance. Or is it the same appearance seen from two different points? It seems that the latter hypothesis is the most reliable. Everything revolves around the distance between being and appearing, but being cannot be grasped by philosophical knowledge. Although the act is sober and precise, it has a mysterious undertone due to its incompleteness, to the orientation suffered due to the separation from quality. This lack, which suggests an opening somewhere, is buffered by Abbagnano with the concept of problematicity.

He explains as follows: «A problematic thinking consideration, inasmuch as it is finite, is an existential consideration; and the condition or mode of being that it defines and expresses is existence. By existence we must in fact understand the condition or the way of being of man; and man is the only finite thinking being. Existence, essentially characterized by problematic knowledge, is itself a problematic condition or way of being. Man does not have a determined and decisive nature: it is the very problem of his nature ». (*Ib.* , P. 18). It is in doing that these ambivalences are placed. But in doing there is more order than necessary, reducing everything to appearance. Here, on the other hand, we are looking for a validity for existence which, even if it is a problem in itself, should attain being, or at least try, not always remain an appearance. Instead Abbagnano, on this point, does not decide. Existence is not a "necessary possession". Quite right. So you have to defend it. Wrong. The intensity of the imagination always magnifies defensive strongholds. Thus a machine is set in motion that strengthens the production machine, all a matter of pulleys. Everything is registered because it could become a problem if it gets lost in the overstepping, of which there are symptoms, nothing specific. The identification cards exist for this and were invented thanks to the philosophical concept of "signature". Here is Abbagnano: «It is because of its constitutive problematic nature that existence is always the existence of a single ego that lives in time and in the relationship with other selves. In fact, time is the very dimension of problematicity, which is rooted in the past to reach out towards the future from which consolidation or the loss of its possibilities may occur. The others are there for the ego only insofar as it recognizes itself as finite, and therefore linked to them by birth and death and by all the possibilities that are its own. The inner life of the self as consciousness and its associated life as an individual are closely connected to the problematic relationship of existence with itself. And the other fundamental aspect of existence, its connection with the world, is inextricably linked to the same relationship. Inasmuch as it is not self-sufficient enjoyment and possession, existence knows that it is not everything but that it is somehow connected to the whole and depends on it. The relationship with the world is essential to the individual self, just as the relationship with oneself and with others is essential to him ». (*Ib.* , P. 20). Here the essential term is "reach out", not speak. And then, rightly, the future does not accept speeches. It is encapsulated as a consequence of this factual and is forced in the same way. Life teaches the strangeness of the future because this certainty derives from the teaching of the past. There is no intimacy with the future because the making machine produces appearances and the future it produces is an appearance. You cannot have true speaking with an appearance, quality is lacking. There is something incongruous in this desire to enclose the problematic nature of

existence in the asphyxiated dimension of doing. It is no coincidence, in fact, that Abbagnano states: "The entire domain of science understood as research with which man is rooted in the world to know the order of his things, that is, the possible project of their use, finds its foundation in the problematic constitution of existence. A problematic consideration must therefore assume an attitude of positive evaluation towards science and certainly recognize the validity to which it intrinsically aspires ». (*Ib.*, P. 21). It is the order of things that man wants to observe in his own existence and it is this that he perceives of forced action, an incoming possession, to be held back at any cost. There is not even the hypothesis of a possible different completeness. The iron wire that wraps the machinery of making is kept intact, there are no smudges. In this way we only get the result of extolling existence as incompleteness and not seeing it is covering our eyes, as philosophers usually do.

Abbagnano writes: "The entire domain of science understood as research with which man is rooted in the world to know the order of his things, that is, the possible project of their use, finds its foundation in the problematic constitution of existence . A problematic consideration must therefore assume an attitude of positive evaluation towards science and certainly recognize the validity to which it intrinsically aspires ». (*Ibid.*). If this possibility were truly such - as Abbagnano affirms - one could easily put aside doing and the forced world that it produces. But is not so. Overcoming - which Abbagnano does not even discuss - is not a simple putting aside but it is involving oneself in extreme danger, to life or death. No, the possibility does not open the door of doing, on the contrary it seals it more. No one is inside the secrets of the compulsion to repeat if he is not willing to reject it. To probe and expose them, one must be willing to risk involvement. The productive cycle and the control cycle reproduce each other, the priesthood of doing prepares the new generation of working prostitution, each one maintains his own role and, in this way, dreams of possessing himself. Everyone hates the mechanism, even its most careful architects, none or few really question it, postpone their completeness to a greater accumulation clog, then panic when they realize they are in sight of the unexpected guest, arrived for them always before due. Almost everyone dreams of escape, as prisoners dream of having wings to fly beyond the prison walls, where it seems you can breathe a less suffocating and dense air.

Abbagnano continues: «But the single self is not for itself a thought or a subject in general, nor a generic unity; it is a concrete unity that is expressed in a thought, in a will, or, in a word, in a specific life. And this life is for the ego itself a complex of possibilities that are rooted in the past and extend towards the future, a possibility that the ego tries to gather in the unity of a task or a dominant thought, and here it is precisely the fundamental possibility that is offered to the ego: that of being truly an ego, that is a unity that does not get lost in insignificant manifestations, or of getting lost and lost in such manifestations that tend to diminish or break up its unity. This negative possibility is always present also to the ego which has more firmly recognized and affirmed itself and which therefore remains a possible; but to its extreme limit it can lead to madness, the human disease par excellence, which strikes what man has most of his own, the concrete unity of his self ". (*Ib.*, Pp. 23-24). The central theme here is "the unity of the self", which presents itself as a possibility that can be lost, lost in madness or authenticated in conservation. In fact, what is madness if not the loss of self-control? And because this control is achieved only in forced action, while free action is considered madness. Even imagining an escape from the productive mechanism is regular behavior, it is not madness at all, it is part of the production itself, the appearance deceives itself to better appear and to reintegrate the control force. Every slave dreams of freedom but then pays attention to the

maintenance of the chain. The dream is part of appearance while the road to being is a project and a courageous determination, not a simple decision between essentially equivalent alternatives. Once experienced, quality may not allow a return to doing. But apart from this crossing of the point of no return, doing is always the ultimate goal of the same different experience, and this is seen in remembrance. A mixed and indecipherable feeling is what animates the remembrance in its claims to clarify their meaning to the shadows that stir in the impassable wall of the cavern of massacres. Of course it is a different experience, therefore unacceptable to the appearances that dance in the dim light that illuminates the cave, whoever becomes the bearer of this experience is an outcast and should remain silent, but his word has a great weight and upsets lives. Never again will this outcast resume his place exactly as he left it to set out for the crossing.

But even the problematic needs order. Abbagnano is here attacking the donkey. The walk outside the possibility was exactly like the prisoners' free time, it ends at the ringing of the jailer's bell. He writes: «We have seen how problematic consideration resolves every reality into possibility. Now it is evident that the very domain of possibility must contain a criterion of distinction and choice; for there are undoubtedly true and authentic possibilities, and inauthentic, deceptive and illusory possibilities. An authentic possibility is that which is its own guarantee. The possibility of possibility (or, as it can also be said, transcendental possibility) is the criterion of every possibility. Among the possible relationships that the ego can have with others, he must choose those that guarantee the possibility of such relationships, excluding those that deny it or reduce it to nothing. Such in fact is the simple foundation of every moral attitude. The same Kantian categorical imperative is expressed, as everyone knows, in terms of possibility and prescribes the choice of a maxim (of a possible attitude) that can be valid for everyone, that is, as the very possibility of human relationships. This possibility is therefore the only criterion for evaluating and choosing human relationships, of the determined possibilities that are offered to the ego in relation to others ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 24-25). The secret would consist, among the many possibilities, in choosing the one that makes these possibilities possible. This alone is the "authentic possibility". Now there is no doubt that identifying this particular possibility is a choice, and the choice is not possible except with basically equivalent results, in qualitative terms, because whatever the choice is, one remains always in the ambit of quantity. Here, choosing is empty to produce, torment in itself meaningless, which makes one feel even more deeply the bitterness of the forced condition. But it is true that one chooses, that is, one continues to produce without rebelling, with a simple shrug of the shoulders one subscribes to the massacre, as if to say, what can I do? Everything is as if the appearance that is produced was not an overwhelm but a rite guaranteed and protected by the monotonous snoring of the effective pulleys. Do the killers regret their murders? Maybe. And with this? Change something? In the authenticity we are talking about there is something metaphorically cumbersome and ineluctable, which well reflects the process of making and the possession that derives from it. There are no authentic choices.

But Abbagnano insists: «... for the problematic reason what it is, is in any case a concrete possibility: and a possibility, when it is authentic, is having to be of itself. In this case the strength and power of having to be is the greater the richer and more concrete is the possibility in which being is resolved. A fictitious possibility is devoid of normativity: it dissolves at the first test due to the inability to maintain and guarantee itself in what it is, in its being a possibility. But an authentic possibility is such because it recognizes its own possibility as its own duty to be; and yet the more

it recognizes and realizes itself in its authenticity, the more it recognizes the power of its own duty to be. An ego that has chosen its authentic possibility and has recognized its task, recognizes for this very reason the maximum normative value of this task ". (*Ib .*, P. 27). The guiding word here is "normativity". The ego closes itself in having to be an authentic choice, this is its norm and its prison. He does not want to free himself in these conditions, he revolves around himself, visits the prison cells and, if he can, he chooses one that suits his tastes. This is administered freedom. It is necessary to realize how the coercion works, how it reaches far within us, how it delves deeply into the immediate consciousness, creating postponements and justifications. This continual penetration produces addiction and the production of this addiction is for the most part apparently produced by philosophy. What about the excruciating thought of the overcoming, it falls asleep, lulled by the wise hands of the philosopher.

What is a problematic reality? Abbagnano replies: «The problematic real is a structure that incessantly brings every concrete possibility back to its problematic foundation and makes this foundation the norm and the duty to be of the possibility itself. It can then be said that having to be is the substance of being. In fact, substance is the intrinsic principle that makes being such; and normativity is substance in the sense of being the problematic foundation to which every authentic possibility must incessantly refer and on which it must build. The foundation of any problematic reality (and every reality is problematic) consists in justifying and guaranteeing its problematic nature; which appears in this act as the substance that constitutes it, the norm that brings it into being ». (*Ib .*, P. 28). Again a dialectical exchange that overturns on itself making problematicity become the norm, therefore duty, therefore substance. Many, not really towards Abbagnano, have responded with contemptuous sarcasm to similar twists, it does not seem the case. Reluctance to these claims of appearance is a must for any reasonable person, certainly not for a fire seeker. The same creator of rules has difficulty in accepting these paralogical processes that precisely because they are untouchable. To suggest a "substance" is an ontological expedient which, in order to exist, must be passed off as existence itself beyond any limitation. Making, for example, being incomplete by definition, cannot be considered such a substance. It follows that appearance is not a substance, because it is not problematic, but neither is being. Entrusting the problematic hypothesis to metaphysics is bad business, not doing so makes the justification mechanism impossible. The proof of this is in history.

Here is Abbagnano: «... for the problematic reason the construction of a historical world is a problem that itself poses itself in the dimension of historicity. A historical problem undoubtedly concerns the past as such; but it is at the same time the beginning of a search that stretches towards the future. The very formulation of any historical problem commits the future to the past; and it turns to the future with confidence and the expectation that it can and should reveal the truth of the past. The material of history (traditions, documents, monuments) has no other reality than that of a possibility of re-enactment or reconstruction; and every possibility is an opening towards the future. From this point of view, history is essentially problematic. It is resolved in its problems, which are re-proposed by their own solution: since the solution of a historical problem immediately opens the problem of its own confirmation or refutation, on the basis of new sources or through a re-evaluation of the material already known. A historical problem is thus always the connection between the past and the future and it is indeed the very problematic nature of this connection. The critical conscience of historicity consists in this problematic nature, a conscience that must accompany the entire course of historical research, just as

doubt must accompany the entire course of philosophical research ». (*Ib .*, P. 30). Production that revolves around the relationship of the past with the future. The use of the latter term is indicative. The past is documented to feed the production machine itself, a circle that closes in the evil circularity that makes the immediate conscience evil. Nothing can be objected to the affirmation of a similar circularity. A connection between the past and the future is problematic and, precisely for this reason, it becomes necessary, that is, it turns upside down in the critical consciousness of historicity. To refute in this way is to overturn the problem as there is no hint of quality, which is not only a different face of doing but also a different consciousness of those who abandon doing in order to act. Necessary and objective, thanks to the high problematic nature of its own norm, history is now a finished product and can enter the mechanism of making without residues or interference. Abbagnano devotes himself fervently to this objective foundation. Here is a remarkable example of the recovery of every contradiction. «The mockery of an investigation that claimed to be based on necessary reason has often turned against the objectivity of history. But the objectivity of history is the same problematic level raised according to the norm of historical research. There is no doubt that the historian cannot move to understand and interpret a historical fact except on the basis of the convictions, principles and doctrines that are proper to him; but it is also evident that the critical character of a historical investigation derives from it solely from the experimentation and testing of the same convictions, principles and doctrines that constitute the direction of the investigation. When beliefs, principles, etc. they are simply presupposed and put out of the question, so that historical evaluations are subordinated to them without involving them, one does not properly have historical investigation and one remains on the level of tradition. A historical problem is always essentially the problem of research that proposes it to itself: it brings into play and makes problematic the principles that this research accepts and that it intends to found for the future. Therefore historiographic objectivity implies not the absence of guiding principles, but the problematization of these principles in the formulation of the historical problem ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 31-32). The reverse is used here to ground the initial hypothesis. As a result of the abandonment of linear logic, an immediate rejection leads to an apparent rejection of necessity, rediscovered under the normative aspect. There is no way to open the secret casket of doing that mockingly continues to produce. It is not the metaphysical squiggles that can disturb him. Philosophy - not only the one in need but also the problematic one - looks after it, takes care of its mechanisms, does not allow attacks on its incompleteness. These, if they do happen, take shape under a different horizon.

What is the task of history? Abbagnano specifies: «A historical research that accepts and recognizes problematicity as its norm, is rooted in temporality and moves from time. Temporality is the possibility of dispersion, cancellation and death, connected to every possibility as such. Historical research is the effort to subtract the annihilating work of time, and to preserve and guarantee the truth of the past for the future. It is thus both conditioned and stimulated by time. Time circumscribes its limits on all sides, but it also offers it the incentive and the motive. Without time there would be no historical research; and there would be no historical research if time were reduced to the absolute contemporaneity of a single and total vision ». (*Ib .*, P. 32). The past cannot and must not be lost. History keeps it ready for the future. The circle closes in the factual process. The fact that problematic history recognizes the possible loss of the past only reinforces the need to save it. Except that in this necessity there is the renunciation of the throw-in, for which the past is produced as an object and subjected to the objective productive rules, that is, it loses its reality and is ready to

appear. The all-understanding of doing is reflected in the ordered multiplicity of the world without reducing it to unity - which would be a completing force -, it descends on individual objects and gives them the sign of the irreducible paucity of quantity.

Abbagnano reiterates: «The problematic reason does not undergo the need proper to the necessary reason of an illusory suppression of time with its reduction to contemporaneity. Instead, it recognizes the essential temporality of reality as it sees in it a problematic structure that reconnects the future to the past. This connection is properly historicity; but in so far as it is problematic, it does not cancel the threat of time which can weaken or nullify it. Problematic reason therefore recognizes the reality, (the possibility) of the accidental, the contingent, the insignificant; since this possibility is always connected to the possibility of what is valid and significant and therefore properly historical. This is not equivalent to the denial of the historical order, but only to that of its necessity; so that it implies that every order is problematic and, due to this problematic nature, normative, therefore such that its recognition is equivalent to a commitment to industrious realization ». (*Ib.* , P. 33). Far from opening or denying the order. The theorist's pace is that of the production process itself, it does not have electrifying jolts, such as those that cause restlessness in the consciousness that recognizes itself as incomplete. The historical order, which first differs from historical necessity, becomes old and wrinkled, it discovers in itself the worm of a blind future and a meaningless death. He begins to limp, the theorist must refine his tools if he wants to continue in his profession. As soon as the need for production comes back to support him, the historical order resumes its unstoppable march. New projects, similar to the old ones and different from the old ones. Isn't this the productive secret?

According to Abbagnano, existential philosophy must be able to differentiate itself from the necessitating philosophy, that is, it must be problematic. Here is how he affirms: «The existential consideration is proper to reason insofar as it does not postulate its identity with reality but places itself in a problematic relationship with reality itself and with itself; and explicitly face a problem of that relationship. A problematic reason understood in this way does not eliminate the finite but establishes it; since it reconnects it to the substance that supports it, that is, to its normative structure. It therefore refuses to resolve the need to be in being (that is, in presence and recognizes the greater the authenticity and solidity of the manifestations that constitute it to the need to be of the substance the greater the authenticity and solidity of the manifestations that constitute it). (*Ib.* , P. 35). Condensed illuminant. Key words here are "foundation", "substance", "normative structure", "force and effectiveness". These philosophical, or rather metaphysical, shoots are the basis of every foundational recovery, a tangle of snakes that is twisted more and more, a primordially arthritic method, unable to untangle the doing, indeed directed specifically to plaster it more, in other words, a civilized method that reaffirms the methodological closure of doing. This false problematicity is limp flesh, aged before living. On which one should swear with closed eyes with the guarantee of the single word, which I have never accepted. From another point of view, this continuous, apparently good-natured dribbling is the privileged supplier of the cavern of massacres. It is enough to read these few lines: «The problematic reason therefore moves from time to history trying to strengthen and found the possibility of the order in which history consists». (*Ib.* , P. 36). Order is history, and vice versa. A project like this suffocates me, I find it irresponsible and limited, exactly as I found it more than fifty years ago. A project that is basically childish from a theoretical point of view, but no less annoying and that reveals the greatest suspicion, the superintendency of the lake of blood.

Value as a problem

The problematic of value is affirmed as dependent on doing itself. The choices of existence have a value, every attitude has it. Abbagnano specifies: «The search for value is strictly connected to every human attitude or behavior. But the search for value is the very problem of value: because it is the search for what, in a multiplicity of possible acts or objects, is worth or is worth more. The uncertainty about what is worth or about the value to choose or prefer is thus rooted in all attitudes, both in those that qualify as thought and in those that qualify as action. Neither thought nor action nor any other way or aspect of existence can take shape or affirm itself except in view of a value explicitly recognized and made to emerge with an act of choice from a complex of insignificant or less significant possibilities ". (*Philosophy , Religion , Science , op. Cit .* , Pp. 38-39). But the value in appearance is only a reflection of the oriented quality, that is, of what has been separated and reduced to the incomplete state of forced doing. This reflection, in the immediate world, is a residue, it does not have the horizon that Abbagnano supposes at all, it remains imprisoned in consciousness and never transforms itself into a real quality except in the overcoming. In doing, the horizon is not occupied by the value qualitatively seen by the object, never was the antithesis more radical until the residue, which remembrance can speak of, fades and becomes an object itself. Here there is an irremediable extraneousness between value and residue. The latter remembers the quality and loses this memory when the remembrance fails its task and then becomes an object-value, produced according to the rules. The residue disturbs the doing, the value gives it an additional quantitative charge. There is nothing problematic in this, just as there is nothing reckless in the productive mechanism. Considering a value "authentic" is a tautology, like defining an object as an object. It follows that a value as an object is never objective. The doing knows the annoyance and even the eventual torment of the residues, it knows how to respond, but for this it needs the philosophy that helps it, that prevents the residues from wandering freely in the production structures.

Even the residue, although of a qualitative nature, cannot be perceived except as a reminder in the world of doing, therefore tolerated and sometimes mocked, while intrigues and traps are woven around it to force it into harmlessness. It is therefore not a question of words. The value is a residue reproduced as an object. Abbagnano continues: «... from the threat of this irreparable fall in the dispersion of time, precisely from the danger of a definitive loss of the unity of the ego and of the order of the world, man is saved through the problem of value. This problem urges him towards the search for what is substantial and eternal in time and in the events of the world, towards the unity of the ego which makes him capable of evaluating circumstances and dominating them. Therefore, only through the explicit and clear position of the problem of value does the initial certainty of the reality itself of value, of its transcendent substantiality, acquire efficacy for man and become operative ". (*Ib .* , P. 41). In the face of value, there can therefore be no problematic "recognition", because there is no other object in front of it. Faced with the residue, this recognition is not necessary because the recovery takes place through a filter constituted by remembrance, a filter which due to its particular predisposition is subjected to uncertainties and setbacks, but which sooner or later allows the production of the object. The productive mechanism is getting stronger. There is a basic misunderstanding here, and it is always that of considering a different way to the process of forced action accessible. Once again Abbagnano brings the possibility of value back from its initial problematic instance to "having to be". In fact, he writes: "The problem of value therefore really concerns more than thought, action or feeling

or any other classification scheme or group of attitudes, the totality of these attitudes is therefore, properly speaking, the very being of man. The problem of value is the problem of what man must be. This problem can take on different forms or aspects, forms or aspects that can be distinguished and classified, so that we speak with sufficient legitimacy of different values that appear to be the ends of different behaviors: cognitive values, moral values, economic values, etc. But in reality the philosophical elaboration of the problem of value must bring this problem back to its original simplicity and consider it connected with the being of man. The value that man seeks in his concrete attitude is a condition, a state or a way of being to which he directs himself with a preferential choice. The movement directed towards the search and determination of value is actually the movement directed towards the research and determination of what man must be ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 42-43). Simplifying the problem of value means bringing it back to its "originality" which connects it to being. What does this statement mean? That value is part of being and not of appearance? Abbagnano is consequent, he is only interested in doing and when he speaks of "acting" it is a terminological confusion. There is nothing in his way of reasoning about the problem of value that presents itself as a particularity, as a history marked differently in itself, provided with an even imperceptible difference in level. Value is an object. The residue problem is my problem, not Abbagnano's, a problem he never knew about. A problem that at the time, in lost notes, I defined as "being-life", and which aroused not only his hilarity but certainly his indifference.

Abbagnano specifies: «The transcendence of man's being with respect to man is the first and fundamental condition of the problem of value. To nullify or deny this transcendence means to nullify or deny the problem and with it the very possibility of value. If being were all immanent in man (or in man's thought or action) the search for value would be useless and the relative problem would vanish into nothing. Man would entirely possess his being, his being would be entirely and firmly given to him; the uncertainty of the value and the possibility of fall and error would be eliminated. But the very fact that a problem of value exists and cannot be eliminated proves that man does not entirely possess the being that is truly worth, that this being is not given to him and that therefore being as value transcends man. Value as having to be is being in its transcendence ». (*Ib.* , P. 44). Metaphysics and its usual tools. Be careful not to confuse "transcendence" with transcendence. The lack is in the man enclosed in his fictitious possession of doing, not elsewhere. The different consciousness can fill this gap by looking for quality and this process can be understood in many ways, physically experienced, for example by feeling the desert wind on one's face, but not in the metaphysical empyrean. Joining this philosophical reversal - perfectly known in all respects - is to turn the appearance on the other side, to find oneself once again in the ecstatic dream that does not see the lake of blood but only free and clean horizons. On this line, there is no understanding of many things. Note the aforementioned technique in this sentence: «The value in its transcendence thus appears as a must being which is essential to the being of man. This essentiality is constitutive of value: which would not be sought by man and would not be the final term of all his struggles, aspirations or conquests if it were not and did not appear necessarily connected with man ». (*Ib.* , P. 45). It is a great example. Value is a must to be essential for man and this essentiality of his (of having to be) is constituted by value. The snake eats its tail. Here there is the usual air of family, the usual fears that lead to the usual metaphysical justifications, to the usual search for a secure basis on which to base one's stay.

But value, for Abbagnano, is something more, metaphysically more grounded and foundational, it is "substance". "If by substance we mean being in itself, the being that

is beyond what man immediately controls or possesses, value is substance. The transcendent substance is man's duty to be, the norm of his constitution. The substantiality of value, its being in itself, its unconditional and absolute validity, necessarily imply the relationship with man ». (*Ib.* , P. 46). To reduce being to the substance itself is to go back thousands of years. I understand that philosophy considers theories as a kind of Venetian rondo, but everything has its limit, if only in decency. This way of speaking of substance is not just a metaphysical leap in the dark, it is a recklessness. Here it seems to me that there is a veiled confusion between being and human existence. The two philosophical concepts are not synonymous. The turn of phrase is always that, "norm", "must be", "value". But by now we know him well. Is it useful to torment the doing in this way? Not really, the mechanism doesn't need it, but the philosopher doesn't know it, and it acts as a coach fly. Consciously or not, here the substance is presupposed as the "normativity" of being. That being is the absolutely other, remote from all metaphysical determinations, this is another matter. Reduced into captivity, being is pathetic and helpless, it becomes the norm for something, man for example. But the imperiousness of doing, which invests man with the apparent massacring power, is anything but something similar to being, it is as remote as that. Man is authentically appearance, only when he abandons this compulsory condition does he attain qualitative completeness, that is, he lives a different experience, in other words he lives his life in a complete way, certainly not forever, as beyond the point of no return there is only madness, therefore absolute disintegration much like death, but in remembrance. Abbagnano, on the other hand, affirms: «... value, precisely in its transcendent substance, is like having to be, closely linked to the being of man. If it is what man ought to be, it is also what he truly and authentically is ». (*Ib.* , P. 48). Exactly the opposite. He reaffirms his metaphysical sleep, only "having to be" "is" and is "authentically". We cannot affirm this and then fall back, that all this deployment of productive forces is only a possibility and not a fact. Abbagnano has a certain repugnance to go to the bottom of his theory, justifying and not eliminating its dialectical premises. This presumably derives from a non-sharing of Hegelian dogmas, but this was always one of his most serious problems, and it is still seen today, unsolved. These theses, presented as "problematic", are instead a tangible sign of the resigned acquiescence of the philosopher who complains about the evils of the world but is unable to move, indeed he does everything to continue to complain about the possibility that it might not be realized or nothing at all. .

Abbagnano still insists: «If this being as value and normativity is the final term of the relationship whose possibility constitutes existence, its definition leads once again to this possibility and to the existence that is constituted for it. The characters of the transcendent being must all be traced back to the possibility, constitutive of existence, of being in relationship with it. They can and must be identified, not by the relationship, but by the possibility of the relationship. If we define this possibility as transcendental, we will be able to express the nature of our research by saying that we must trace the characteristics of the transcendent in the transcendental ». (*Ib.* , P. 50). Once again metaphysics shows its limits, building aerial superfetations that accumulate without any support. The making takes possession of the finished product and modifies it in object, nothing more. The mechanism can do this and much more, it does not enter the dialectical process - as Hegel claimed - it merely packs it quantitatively. This invincible inclination is the one that guarantees the solidity of forced action and the correspondences of the world that work despite their obvious incompleteness. But Abbagnano is not satisfied, he wants to unearth the ontological determination of value and bring it back to its existential nature. Thus he writes: «But

the ontological consideration, although founded on the existential possibility, which is the condition of the relationship, does not explicitly assume this possibility as its foundation and therefore does not start from its preliminary recognition. Two ways open up to it. On the one hand, it can characterize value by bringing it back to elements or conditions that are proper to man and making man the measure of value. On the other hand, it can tend to purify value from any immediate or indirect reference to man, making value the measure of man. The first way reaches an anthropomorphic determination of value and, by leading it back to the being that is proper to the finitude of man, denies it in its validity that it must be and as a rule. The second way recognizes value as an absolute must be and normativity and yet as transcendence; but it does not come to understand and justify its original connection with man; connection without which, as we have seen, it could not be valid for man as having to be or norm ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 51-52). Unsuitable ways, he affirms, because they ignore the "need to be" and the "transcendence" of value. In short, here the correct dialectical positions are criticized, those that any metaphysician could set up and maintain for a long time without the ambasses and embarrassments that can be seen in Abbagnano. If nothing else, these rejected positions, even if not acceptable, have the pride of their own statute, something that Abbagnano lacks due to ambiguity. Hence the bad impression of an adjustment that one has when reading the reflections of the latter. After all, it is always the family air that one breathes here, the air of the productive mechanism at work. These dialectical circles - realm of appearance - tighten in the void and mark the drama of incompleteness that grips doing. But the philosopher cannot speak without hesitation, his purpose is underground and he himself knows it only up to a certain point. In fact, this is how the introductory part on value concludes: «The authentic determinations of value can also be reached by bringing the ontological determinations back to transcendental possibility and recognizing them in their existential root. Here I propose to follow this path ". (*Ib.* , P. 53). That here, in this condensed program, there are logical leaps, it doesn't interest him at all.

But how can the universality of value be founded? Abbagnano writes: «Now this ontological character of universality is, as such, negative and generic. Negative, in that it is reduced to the negation of the particularity of meaning, (that is, the insignificance) of individual human attitudes. Generic, as it includes the need for such individual attitudes to be identified in a common recognition or in an identity of judgment. The negativity and the vagueness of that character can only be removed by bringing them back to the transcendental possibility, which is their foundation ». (*Ib.* , P. 54). Once again the tail justifies the head and vice versa. The problem is, at the same time, assimilated and expelled, circumscribed and condemned to the compulsion to repeat. The impression you get here is that of understanding immediately, but then you realize that you are forced to start over. Something as if one were involved in a too well known mechanism - the dialectical one and, conversely, that of doing - which at the same time restrains and urges us to move forward, but does not provide concrete help. Here then is the forced conclusion, predictable to those who have followed us so far. «The universality of value, brought back to its transcendental possibility, therefore expresses the aspect by which the existential structure carries the single existence beyond itself towards the other existence. The transcendental foundation of the universality of value is the coexistential nature of the existential structure ». (*Ib.* , P. 55). Coexistence and universality. Existence and transcendence. The mechanism does not sharpen, it simply repeats itself, even if at times the philosopher is capable of an exasperated subtlety, however easily unravelable. But we immediately notice that this ability is

only a profession, there is no painful compromise, no concrete adventure in perspective, no involvement. The extreme quantity, indispensable for grasping the restlessness that forces, almost obliges, to go beyond, recklessness and courage, are not the stuff of philosophers. And Abbagnano is produced here in a good piece of democratic philosophy by writing: «The universality of value expresses the normativity of coexistence in the negative and generic form of ontological consideration. From its very intrinsic nature, from its constitutive structure, existence is called to recognize and realize itself in the form of coexistence. This form is that of solidarity and inter-human understanding: solidarity and understanding for which man is no longer a thing, object or instrument for the other man but a person in the proper meaning of the word, a person endowed with the same constitution and validity that everyone recognizes himself. Inasmuch as value is rooted in the coexistential structure of man, it is the foundation of the absolute dignity that the individual can and must recognize for himself and for others. All that is valid consolidates the coexistential bond between men, strengthening their original possibility of connection. All that is valid has its root in this original possibility which is the very foundation of the existential structure. All that is valid leads the individual man to relate to the community and to live, even in its singularity, in it and for it. If universality understood ontologically seems to deny the concreteness of the individual, brought back to its transcendental foundation and recognized as a possibility of coexistence, it strengthens the individual by multiplying and guaranteeing relationships with others ". (*Ib .* , Pp. 55-56). These statements caused me at the time of my first reading, and still continue to cause me, an intolerance that I have never hidden, although perhaps in the very early days I kept it for myself, in the end I almost felt a sense of disgust, too honeyed and it all seemed cloying to me in the face of the evils of the world that others were stripping before my thirsty attention.

These positions must be traversed to the end, and then get rid of them. Coming to terms with Abbagnano is not an easy thing for me, in a certain sense it is like coming to terms with myself, with a more aggressive myself and more war machine. No more metaphysics. This yes. The crossing has taught me to move in the desolate and, at times, swampy territory of quality, I have acquired an animalistic agility in grasping when it is time to go back, when the big work on the word begins.

The relationship between the unity of the self and the unity of value is astonishing. Abbagnano writes: «The second ontological character of value, unity, brings us back to the individual. All that is worth has the form and nature of unity. Among the many things that arise in a given circumstance, only one is that which is valid and which must be chosen. Among the many possible attitudes in a given situation, only one is the one that is valid and that must be assumed. The search for value is therefore fundamentally the search for unity. And unity as an ontological character must be rooted in some fundamental aspect of transcendental possibility ». (*Ib .* , Pp. 56-57). Behind these statements lies the metaphysical hypothesis of "authenticity" and the negative consideration of "dispersion". This bold certainty is based neither on quantity nor on its opposite. Doing is not unitary but codified in a multiple way, albeit attributable to multiple, ordered and corresponding processes. Even the ego is not unitary. If it were it would be complete. Instead he is divided between appearing and being, between quantity that conditions him and quality that disorients him. This impudence regarding the ego is softened by the usual dialectical mechanism. The "possibility of unity" is the unity of which the ego talks, and here too the razor of appearance cuts radically. What could be more mellifluous than those who speak of unity within a codified multiple? It would be like denying the rising of the sun or the falling of night. Here are the unspecific clarifications: «Value as unity therefore brings

us back to man's original possibility of realizing himself as unity. The transcendental foundation of the unity of value is the unity of the self. But the unity of the structure is always the possibility of unity, not a unity already given. It is a unity that must be realized and owned, not a reality and a possession. Consequently the unity of value is not a unity of fact: it is a unity that must be recognized and grasped among a multiplicity of disparate determinations ». (*Ib.* , P. 57). An inadmissible wandering. We cannot admit two conflicting conditions that justify each other, it would be an attempt to pass off doing for what it is not, acting. Once again a specious confusion between acting and transcending. Choosing value is a unitary way of living. Nothing gives a foundation to this affirmation which cannot be shared except for the catastrophic necessity of a professor of philosophy. The ontology of value would then be based on the existentiality of the ego. A seductive but absurd perspective if we do not forget the profound sense of the problematic and do not want to neutralize it.

Finally, the objectivity of value. Thus Abbagnano: «The value is such that man, only if he recognizes it as an objective reality, can work for its realization and conservation. The recognition of its objective reality and the commitment to achieve it objectively constitute one and the same act ". (*Ib.* , P. 60). The whole concept of objectivity is not acceptable in a world of objects produced by forced action. The incompleteness of these objects is obvious and is attributable to the lack of quality. This makes them objective not objective. There can be no metaphysical effort capable of changing this reality. Man cannot recognize in making an objective and emphasized reality in order to derive a stable foundation from it. Doing does not allow anything of the sort to be seen, if anything the opposite is true, it dismisses any possible completion with justifications that may often appear naïve but which are in reality the cover of the influx to the cave of massacres. Obsequious consent to non-existent objectivity is one of many metaphysical devices, a play on words. In fact, Abbagnano specifies: «Due to its objective reality, value presents itself to man as the true reality of the world. It is presented to him as a totality, an order or a system that conditions and includes him, continually urging him to go out of himself and to search outside himself for the ways and means to rejoin his duty to be. If value is transcendent objectivity, it is for man the reality that understands and conditions him. As a transcendent objectivity, value is the need to be of a totality of which man is a part and towards which he must move in order to fulfill himself. If value is objectivity, man must move in search of objectivity to realize himself in objectivity. Objectivity therefore refers to that character of value for which it is the term of human activity in the world, that is, of work. And since the world as a totality of which man is a part is an order of co-present parts defined by the impossibility of reciprocal penetration (i.e. of corporeality), the search for the objectivity of value is the search for the total order that guarantees the individual parts their reality ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 60-61). All the parts of Abbagnano's positive philosophy, which usually appear separate, are summed up here. Value is totality, order, system, conditioning, transcendence, reality, self-realization in work, a set of co-present parts and finally corporeality. Objectivity is all of these things together. Metaphysics takes little to become all-encompassing and this fictitious ability sniffs and pursues appearance, courts it and perfects it in its fantastic status. It is always this method that composes the most irreducible opposites that brings together the laceration and the recomposition, the absurd and illogical celebration and the ordering rationality, and this so that in the end sacrifice prevails.

Abbagnano's ideal is bourgeois and conservative, adorning his philosophy with problematic trinkets is a fashionable concession of the time and a way to present the recovery in an enticing way. But a garnet necklace doesn't make a queen. Abbagnano writes: "Man has no way of reconnecting to value, of recognizing it in its essential

characteristics and of working for it, if not by committing himself to be himself in a community of solidarity and to realize in the world, recognized as a systematic totality, the indispensable conditions of his being authentic. The value as having to be transcendent is the united coexistence of men, proper to the individual, the systematic order of the world ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 62-63). This is system and order, it is the sign of a pace that admits no alternatives, authoritarian under the clothes of the party, gloomy and closed under the open aspect of choice. The philosopher almost expects the reader's applause, he doesn't even think about a possible objection. Yet doing does not allow for alternatives other than radical and extreme, alternatives of involvement. The mechanism, with all the philosophical flourishes, is always cold, clear, firm in its object productions, it is useless to dress it in a more attractive way, it is not impressed by dialectics that pass by only touching it without disturbing it. The perturbations of doing, due to philosophical theories, are barely noticeable at the same modifying level, while they are more relevant at the level of the feeding of the lake of blood. Abbagnano continues: «Freedom and value are identified in the existential foundation. The possibility of commitment is the original freedom that only effective commitment can preserve and consolidate. For that possibility man can truly be an ego operating in the world in community solidarity with others: he can because he must. The very structure of existence pushes him to an effective commitment, and continually calls him beyond his limits towards that transcendent must which is his authentic being. Commitment, as a choice of value, is the effective return of man, of the whole man, to that original possibility. By opting for value, man anchors to it the totality of his being and constitutes his being freedom. By ignoring the value, man loses or weakens that possibility and lapses his existential freedom ». (*Ib.* , P. 63). Here the leading word is "anchor". It is here, in this safe harbor, that the philosopher wanted to arrive. His stormy sailing turned out to be crossing a puddle. Not for embarrassment or shyness, the problematic hypothesis was wasted for simple fear, for the vocation to safety, for the desire to remain on the side of confirmation and prudence, as if it wanted to eliminate any possibility of friction with the world. Abbagnano does not accept the rules of conservation, he is himself a founder of conservation rules, a master of protection and caution. Basically he does not know how to open a way towards quality and so he continually mixes the same metaphysical concepts, giving the impression of a compactness that is only appearance. But this is precisely his philosophical genius, being trivially capable of adhering to the productive project of doing, giving the impression of wanting it, I don't say upset, but only criticize. Impression, nothing more. Appearances are content with little.

Of course, even while working on conservation, Abbagnano himself realizes the limits of his metaphysical mechanisms, even if he absolutely does not want to change course but only to close some flaws. Thus he writes: «By transcending towards value, working for it, man tends to leave the frailty of his temporal life and reconnect to something permanent and eternal. Value appears to him as supra-temporal and timeless. And such it is ontologically-mind, as having to be, substance and objective reality in the face of man's insufficient and changeable being. But the act by which man escapes the dispersion and insignificance of the events of time does not lead man into the eternal and does not identify him with the eternal. Recognizing the threat that time represents for his authentic being and transcending beyond time towards the permanence of value, man overcomes the threat of time, but he does not conquer the definitive security of the eternal. For this commitment he enters history and is realized as historicity. He chooses to be what he ought to be: an ego in a community of solidarity and in an ordered world and with this he recognizes and makes his original possibility his own ». (*Ib.* , P. 65). Attention, it is not a step back but forward.

He does not want to accept the evidence, that is, the endemic incompleteness of doing, and closes his eyes to quality. There is something minute and frail about this construction which in many respects had struck me in its time, something stale which could not escape my keen youthful eye, and which perhaps did not escape. Who can say, given the time that has passed? I still see myself meditating on these old quotations from Abbagnano and I feel a sense of tenderness, but being here to close the accounts I cannot let myself go to the motions of the soul. In short, once again Abbagnano throws the concept of "choice" into the reader's feet, which should call into question "safety". But it is a question of appearance overlapping appearance, philosophical games, a simple frown, not real anger. There is nothing sensational about his double dance step, everything soon falls into the rule, doing never gets old because he was never really young. The order of the world first of all, even if paid for by the suffering of the cave of massacres. And this order can and must be eternal. Here is how Abbagnano reasons: «Freedom, as a commitment to value, is therefore the fundamental historicity of the existential structure. Historicity is the transcendental foundation of value. Ontologically, eternity is the pure and simple negation of time, of the insignificance and the lability of temporal life. But it could not be, as it is, the correction, the completion and, in a word, the need to be of this life, if it were not rooted in it and were not its constitutive possibility. Just like insignificance and lability, human life is an aspiration to get out of time and to reconnect with something permanent and eternal. But the permanent and the eternal must then be rooted in the same temporality and be its foundation. The foundation of temporality, by virtue of which temporality aspires to reconnect with the eternal, is historicity. Historicity is therefore the mode of being proper to the constitutive transcendental possibility of existence and is embodied in the existential commitment, for which man transcends towards value, that is towards the authentic meaning of coexistence, of himself and of the world. . Living for value is therefore necessarily historicity, precisely because it is an aspiration to the eternal. Moving from time to eternity, man realizes himself in his history. History expresses and realizes the meaning of value as having to be ». (*Ib .* , 66). By deciding for history, man confirms his problematic nature and "truly relates to the eternal". The circular conclusion takes up the initial point, the problematic nature. There is no way to come to the head of a similar movement that produces at the same time a signal of danger and a comfort for the dying. Critique, on the other hand, must correctly start from what is to go towards what is not there, from the manifesto to the unmanifest, it cannot continue to circulate around the manifesto with impunity, and Abbagnano has never had a critical conception of philosophy. The unconfessed point, always implied, is how to escape from danger, from what can suddenly become completely out of control, alien. The philosopher who feels this signal is about to realize the proximity of the lake of blood and then runs for cover to protect, and reaffirm, the safety rules.

Faith, philosophy, religion

Setting aside faith as a necessary moment of the universal Spirit, Abbagnano seeks not only the possibility of faith but the relative obligation. Once again the foundation and the guarantee. Here we need a strong problem reduction and Abbagnano is ready to make it happen. Faith is "something essentially human," he says, which could be a decisive starting point. Let's see. He writes: "The essential humanity of faith implies in the first place this: that it is an attitude of the total man and that therefore it cannot be referred to some partial aspect, however classified and distinct, of man. Faith cannot be defined as an intellectual act or as a feeling or as a practical activity; not because it is not each and all of these things, but precisely because, being each and all of these things, none of them really comes to characterize it in its total nature

». (*Philosophy , Religion , Science , op. Cit .* , P. 71). As an intellectual act, faith is belief, as feeling it is dependence, as a practical activity it is work. These school distinctions are indifferent. In fact, the conclusion is different: «The fundamental teaching that is derived from these alternatives is that faith is not a particular manifestation of man, attributable to a specific form of his activity; but it is a fundamental way of being in which all the manifestations of man can take root and from which all can deduce their own specific meaning ». (*Ib .* , Pp. 72-73). We are at the starting point. The initial drasticity seems abandoned, Abbagnano always enters the field with his stale philosophical paraphernalia. Here a bit of qualitative arrogance and courage would be needed, for example, affirming the absolute extraneousness between faith and doing, between faith and quantity. Instead he begins a backward, cautious and delicate process. Abbagnano is an expert philosopher and knows when the ground becomes slippery and threatens to uncover the cover mechanisms. And faith is too difficult a concept and could hide a dangerous hidden path directed towards the rejection of the imposing rules of doing. In any case, this is not a simple and crude concept and denounces a high problematic receptivity.

The first delicate point to be addressed is the relationship with doubt. He writes: "If faith were an infallible determination, if once acquired it could not be lost, if it definitively eliminated all uncertainty and all struggle from existence, it would not be faith: it would be an instinct, a necessitating impulse, an impending fatality, it would be the denial of freedom and responsibility in the face of existence. And in this case the peace and security that are connected to it would be paid too dearly: they would imply the loss on the part of man of his genuine prerogatives and would even take away the merit and responsibility of faith itself. But such a faith would not be faith; since a safe harbor is such for those who sail, not for those who have renounced navigation.

«Faith and doubt are therefore connected to such an extent that faith, while being a victory over doubt, and indeed precisely for this reason, necessarily includes the possibility of doubt. And by doubt we mean not only intellectual doubt. Doubt is any uncertainty, any indecision, any alternative, any possibility of loss; in the same way that by faith is meant not only belief, but also feeling and acting, and, in a word, a way of being of the total man ». (*Ib .* , Pp. 73-74). But doubt is here a possibility of choice and, as such, it is reduced to mere equivalence, as if doubting or not doubting were only points of view. We are not yet unmasking the intentions, but almost. And doubt is not a possibility as a choice but it is the most appropriate way to feed within oneself the anxiety about the world of doing that we all capture in its administered rules. If I consider this a choice I have not understood the difference between quality and quantity. And Abbagnano has never hinted at such an understanding. Doubt therefore does not accompany faith but life. Except that life and faith, here, for a philosophical hazard, are considered the same thing. Unfortunately this is not the case. Abbagnano does not address the problem of the desperation of a life imprisoned by the certainty of doing, therefore he does not grasp all the implications of doubt, which is not an outrage to the faith, far from it.

Where Abbagnano reveals his papers and tacit my illusions is in the equivalence between doubt and sin. But it is an ambiguous equivalence, which seeks to recover the doubt of the status of problematicity. He writes: «The uncertainty, the bewilderment, the dispersion between different and equivalent alternatives, making it impossible for man to have his interior unity and every true relationship with other men and with the world, constitute the fall of man into sin. But when in doubt, sin is

already recognized as such. As long as he remains immersed in dispersion and abandoned to bewilderment, man does not doubt. Due to doubt, he is already beyond dispersion and bewilderment and already tends to reconnect to something that has unity and being. Doubt is a tension between sinful abandonment and faith, a tension for which one is already out of abandonment, but is not yet in faith. What constitutes the preoccupation of doubt is knowing that sin is there that threatens and that it can cause the irreparable loss of our being. If this threat is not clearly recognized, if it is not accepted and its meaning is not realized, doubt is impossible and with it the first condition of faith is lacking. Through doubt, man throws the first probe into the foundation of his nature: he recognizes the possibility of sin as his own. Doubt is precisely this recognition that makes the aspiration to faith possible. Now sin as a loss of unity and being is due to the fact that man is a finite being. Man could not lose being and unity, if being and unity constituted his nature, if he were by his nature being and unity. Doubting, recognizing oneself subject to the threat of sin, means recognizing oneself as finite and accepting one's finitude. This acceptance is decisive so that the doubt is truly such and can truly open up to the possibility of faith". (*Ib.* , Pp. 75-76). Once again the metaphysical circle, doubt founds faith and faith the doubt. We are trapped. Yet the preparatory move was interesting and suggested something more than a simple exchange of services and silence. If I doubt the presumed and apparent completeness of doing, I give space to restlessness and this contrasts the faith in the productive mechanism by directing me towards a different conscience, not on the contrary towards a confirmation of doing as absolute completeness. Everything is to be understood on the words. If introjected doing is desperation, then the overstepping is the doubt that opens me up to quality. But Abbagnano does not say this, it seems that he suggests it but does not say it. The equivalence of doubt and sin proves it, equivalence implied but no less meaningful. And sin is equivalent to an expulsion from society, from coexistence, and an entry into the process that is aimed at quality. Then, emerging from equivalence, Abbagnano takes up doubt as a means of reconfirming the doing and its apparent completeness. These two dialectical movements intertwine together and metaphysically complement each other. It seems to me that it can be said, clearing the field of misunderstandings, that faith is directed to appearance not to being. Sin is a failing in faith and turning one's eyes elsewhere, towards quality. Abbagnano himself writes: «And the meaning of finitude is this, that man is not being, although he is or can be a relationship with being. If man were being and if he possessed by his nature the unity and stability that are proper to being, faith in being would be useless and impossible for him ». (*Ib.* , P. 77). A belief in being is certainly out of place. Quality doesn't need it, just look for courage and involvement. Reverse apostasy, that's what a belief in quality would be. There is no need for some sort of initiation to get out of the evil circle of doing but simply a refusal to cooperate. The "having to be" that Abbagnano talks about is basically a having to do or, better, a having to appear, that is, it covers and tries to hide - more or less consciously, but who will investigate the slums of immediacy? - the unmentionable amalgam of the cavern of massacres.

Yet Abbagnano wants to differentiate himself from "necessity". He affirms: «The possibility of man to get out of doubt and to reach faith is thus clarified as a recognition of transcendence. And thus the first positive determination of faith is reached: it is transcendence towards transcendence. This determination includes both the recognition of the finitude of man as the possibility of sin (doubt) and the recognition of the possibility of tracing the finitude back to the being that is truly such and thus achieving a genuine relationship with being. And this double recognition is a single and simple movement; the movement by which man moves

beyond his finite form accepted as such and leads it back to a being that is beyond it and that is defined precisely by this being beyond ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 78-79). Is necessity in transcendence? No, Abbagnano denies it, and it matters little to us to demonstrate a possible contradiction here, but even if not necessary in the classical metaphysical sense, transcendence guarantees the genuineness of the relationship with being. In other words, otherwise similar, it guarantees its authenticity. But of what? How can there be authenticity of doing if the transcendence of the object is another object equally produced and administered according to the rules? It would also be a serious confusion to think that Abbagnano here wanted to refer to the radical abandonment of doing, as if this could be entrusted to the crudely metaphysical concept of "transcendence". There is no such abrupt passage in the dialectic of his philosophizing. Using the contrast he comes forward threateningly, the contrary hypothesis intervenes to heal him and everything returns as before.

Abbagnano intends that man lacks something, precisely being, and that therefore his whole philosophy - and that of others, and more - is only appearance, in fact he writes: "Now, that man moves with faith in being and try to bind yourself to being implies that being is what man himself must be. If man can find in the consolidation of his relationship with being the victory over sin and if he can aspire to that consolidation with the well-founded hope of finding faith in it, it is evident that being as transcendence must contain what man lacks and lacks and must constitute the completion or correction of his finitude. Precisely because man cannot move towards transcendent being except by virtue of the recognition of his finitude, the transcendence of being is in some way connected with this finitude. Moving from finitude to transcendence, man seeks the meaning, the being, the value of his own finitude in transcendence. Because if transcendence meant total extraneousness of being to man, if the distance of being from man implied total rupture between being and man and the absence of any relationship of being with man, aspiration of man to being, the movement of the constitutive transcendence of faith would lack any foundation. How could man seek faith and peace in being or beside being, if being were alien to him and if by such extraneousness he had no connection with what man is in his finite nature? ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 80-81). Here one almost seems to see the intuition of the remote missing quality. But courage, if one does not have it, no one can give it to him, Don Abbondio complained. And it is the sad conclusion of Abbagnano. It is not a question of "strangeness", not of "rupture", but being is in man, otherwise how could he look for it? Strategic retreat, usual dialectical leap back. No unprecedented behavior, which would be the courageous leap in quality, no scandal. Everything goes smoothly, you can't do without the rules and, in the end, you also end up loving them. Here is the conclusion: «Faith is the recognition of transcendence as the true being of man. By virtue of this recognition, the very being of man is revealed to be transcendent, insofar as transcendence is his duty to be; and faith is linked to the value which is precisely the need to be transcendent, recognized as the original being of man ". (*Ib.* , P. 82). We always end up in the cave of massacres, where the logic of "must be" reigns. This logic requires full confidence in being "original". Once again the circle is closed. Yet I should have noticed even in remote times of the approximate way in which the dialectical technique of overturning is used. I did not. How could I not see the interest behind the metaphysical concept of faith as transcendence? Yet my methodological weapons of many years ago were no less sharp than those of today. On the contrary, the search for quality, the true and concrete doubt regarding the completeness of doing, the ensuing restlessness and the overstepping are movements that undermine order in the depths, question the world of doing as a whole. , the same irresistible attraction towards order and guarantee. Abbagnano

does not want this to happen but he is with his feet planted all the way in the philosophy of being, that is, the exact opposite of the philosophy of appearing. He does not want to admit his uncomfortable position as a philosopher with false papers. He is a prominent professor - I do not say famous, but well-known -, full of students and editorial reports, he works on a monumental *History of Philosophy*, he does not want to put all this into play. He associates with distinguished people and plans his students' professorial futures with foresight - not mine. His was a sure social ascent, safe and comfortable. What was the point of putting this contradiction in the middle? This is why he affirms: "By transcending with faith the possibilities proper to his finitude and moving towards the transcendent being which is the need to be and the value of his own finitude, man actually moves towards the transcendental possibility which constitutes him on his own and brings back to this unique possibility the manifold of possibilities in its possession. The movement towards transcendence brings man back to the transcendental of existence. We can express this third determination of faith by saying that it is the movement through which transcendence reveals itself as the transcendental of man ". (*Ib .*, P. 84). Here the keywords are still "must be" and "possession". The rest is a dialectical somersault. It is only necessary to keep away from one's ears the wild sound of being and the roar of chaos that overwhelms all experience in quality. He does not want to hear the trumpets that make the defensive walls collapse, he wants the party to continue, with its masks and its concordances, he does not want a simple false step to declare that the king is naked. Everything must remain as it is, indeed strengthen itself in doing because it is in doing that the appearance makes its ghosts move. This is why nothing happens in Abbagnano's philosophy, only dialectical movements, eminently apparent. Even a remote presence of residues retracts so that nothing happens, no news, no loss of grip, no variation in lift. Anything.

But is faith fidelity? Abbagnano responds by taking things away. He writes: "Faith does not therefore subtract man from his existence and his finitude: it subtracts him from his improper existence, from the dispersion of his finitude, and calls him back to that foundation in which his possibility of truly relating to the to be and to consolidate in this relationship. Therefore faith does not remove man from his human tasks. Indeed, it essentially commits him to his task, making him recognize it as his own, and as the only way to reach sincerity and peace with himself ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 84-85). Peace with oneself, a laudable aim, no doubt about it. Zeroing of anxiety. There is no more humiliating image for a man than that of seeking peace before quality, that is, to be satisfied with fiction, with appearances when he could go beyond. It is the laceration of the being that is consumed here and the realization of an existence perfectly suited to doing. There is no fault in this, I know, just lack of courage, and maybe it was my blindness that I was going to knock on the wrong door. To tighten the action closely is without result, it cannot produce quality because no quantitative administration would allow it. So I wandered around wondering - or rather comparing - something that invariably remained mute. The clashes of method - or what they seemed to me to be - of which I spoke in the *Introduction*, were part of this attempt to break down a non-existent door. I was systematically breaking my head against the wall. I could not achieve anything but a continuous, chaotic and annoying brooding. I did not want to be a faithful and I did not want to receive faith as a gift. On the contrary, I wanted to disperse myself in my possibilities, not properly authenticated by knowledge, and do it my way. For Abbagnano, having faith is being faithful. He writes: "Fidelity is the very existential concreteness of faith, since this can never be indeterminate and generic but is always individualized and single and indeed requires, as its condition, individuation and singularity. The recognition of the value of

the individual, which is proper to faith, is thus connected to the determination of faith as fidelity. For faith the individual (myself, the other) is irreplaceable and has an absolute value. In fact, faith is the very movement that calls the individual to this value, demanding that he relate to his transcendental possibility and recognize himself in this relationship. Only faith, subtracting the individual from dispersion, engaging him in a task that is proper to him and in which he is irreplaceable, realizes its unique meaning and guarantees its absolute value. Faith as fidelity is always fidelity to the singularity of the person ". (*Ib .* , P. 86). The interest shifts from faith to fidelity, from a dream, even if out of place because it is contained in doing, to adherence to an administered program. I am thus enclosed in fidelity as in a shell that contains a numbered repertoire of situations to which my adequate behavior must correspond. It is myself as an individual who is enclosed in fidelity, not an accidental part, a single contribution, what is required is always totalizing in the partial logic of doing. If I am faithful I am a marked, marked man, a recognizable object that cannot be removed from the game of the correspondences of use in the productive mechanism, even from the most instinctive precepts, those that do not even emerge at the object level. If I sculpt this rule looking for quality, I am pursued by all means in a ferocious way and without possible second thoughts. The remembrance itself either follows certain rules, where the desert wind is reduced to a light breeze, or it is raving.

Here the concept of fidelity extends to coexistence. Abbagnano writes: «The realization of oneself as a person and the recognition of the other person are therefore founded on the one and indivisible act of existential transcendence. The faith that leads man to realize himself as an existential singularity leads him at the same time to respect a different but equally absolute singularity in the other man. And this respect cannot be negative and generic, but must be positive and operative. It must express itself in concrete ways of solidarity, sympathy, friendship, love and constitute the possibility of bonds in which fidelity to the person is determined in the very form of the person's singularity. A generic and ineffective recognition has nothing to do with that fidelity, precisely because it ignores the singularity on which it hinges. Effective fidelity is single, of the very singularity of the person, and determines a living community constituted by the solidary intertwining of individual relationships ". (*Ib .* , Pp. 87-88). Indiscriminate devotion, without distinction of affinity. Society (Abbagnano insists, for his own reasons, on speaking of "community") is this intersection of solidarity. What an angelic vision was in store for me at the time. Next to me, who got up at five in the morning to start work at six, there were young people from middle-class Turin who got up at ten and didn't work, they just studied under the hen's wings. I couldn't be sympathetic to them. That's why, even now, after more than half a century, I don't really know which "community" Abbagnano was referring to. Anyway, whatever it was, I wasn't a part of it. The maximum of absurdity is reached in the affirmation that "the unity of this community is destiny". There is no sort of almost filial devotion involved here, but simply a misunderstanding. Often in Abbagnano the casual use of philosophical concepts leads to confusion. It would have been more appropriate to talk about the future. Instead he writes: «Destiny is the existential connection of the community, as it is founded on fidelity to the person. Faith, as fidelity, is the recognition of a common destiny to which the community of solidarity is called. Living for a common destiny is the ultimate determination of faith. It implies a solidarity that recognizes itself as such and a fidelity that safeguards the singularity of the person at all costs. Faith is essentially a relating and connecting of individuals, relating and connecting by virtue of which only individuals are valid as such. In the unity of destiny, the individual finds

himself inasmuch as he finds the other ». (*Ib .*, P. 88). As the reader realizes, there was no need to bother with the concept of "destiny". A philosophy that hinges on the positive evaluation of doing as transcendence has no words that destiny is able to understand. Destiny affects life only on condition that it is actually lived also qualitatively, albeit within the limits in which this different experience is possible. Remembrance speaks to destiny and destiny responds. Otherwise it is a contradiction of misunderstandings that chase each other. Fate is silent in front of the unassailable wall of the cavern of massacres. The future in it always makes the same spectacle of shadows move. But, as I said, for Abbagnano, destiny is simply a future in another word.

Now the central problem is faith and the relationship with transcendence. This last concept finally takes its final form. He says: «... faith is substantially a relationship with transcendence which is susceptible of a double consideration. In the first place it can be described as a transcending of man towards transcendence; secondly, as the revealing of transcendence to man. For the first interpretation, it is a movement that goes from man to transcendent being; for the second interpretation, it is a movement that goes from transcendent being to man. The first is the existential interpretation, the second is the ontological interpretation ». (*Ib .*, P. 91). The first interpretation is the philosophy of existence that elaborates it, the second is religion. Here is marked the limit and the inglorious end - if you want the spiritualist and ontological subjection - of Abbagnano's philosophy. Let's see why. The "transcendence" has the sovereign metaphysical peculiarity of appropriating everything that comes into contact with it, or that is spontaneously submitted to it for the sake of order or guarantee, in other words to escape the terrible and humiliating contingency of doing. Thus transcendence removes content from the positivity of existence, in the same terms hypothesized by Abbagnano, and overturns its meaning in the most absolute de-responsibility. He did not realize it as a good metaphysician, others did, but they did not say it with due force. Paci, for example. Tending towards transcendence means giving it one's own positive consistency, if one wishes to give this term a proper and coherent meaning. It is out of place to justify this metaphysical passage as Abbagnano does: "For the existential interpretation, man does not move towards transcendence except to recognize it as his own transcendental possibility, so that this interpretation avoids the stiffening of the transcendent being in its extraneousness to man and recognizes this being in the unity that must be proper to man, of coexistence and of the world, so that their value is guaranteed ". (*Ibid*). This is a one way trip. There are no specious or insinuating interpretations. There are no initiations that would then truly be a sign of the finished product, therefore of doing, perhaps the only well-founded interpretation, but which Abbagnano keeps away from. The religious interpretation should be rejected because man - again according to Abbagnano - is only a receptive element in it, but once again, with an unjustified logical leap, he recovers by writing: "However, these determinations are immediately enforced by religion at the beyond their strictly ontological meaning and regain their existential meaning ". (*Ib .*, P. 92). No comment. Religion, after all, is an instrument of the first magnitude and could not be set aside for a trivial ontological quarrel. The separation and joining within the concept of "transcendence" is one of the weakest points of all positive existentialism. Indeed, for me, at the time, it was the culmination of my drive to reject. Nothing could and could convince me less than Abbagnano's reasoning on the trinity. As far as concerns and interests I might have for existentialism in general, this point managed to block me beyond measure. I didn't want to be faithful at any cost, even jeopardizing what I thought my future might be. I wanted to remain whole in my model of approaching knowledge and I refused to

accept what I saw accepted - in a more or less critical way - by those around me. There was a rocky resolution in me that brought me here, in this Greek prison, at the end of my life, a refractoriness of which I am proud, which never wanted to get entangled in the political mud, even if it was disguised as culture. It is my - often unconscious - way of staying in front of quality. I have found myself many times reflecting on those ancient choices of mine, contemplating the devastation. I'm fine with that.

If philosophy is based on man's "decision" regarding his life, religion goes the other way, emphasizing the action of grace on man who thus succeeds in not sinning. Abbagnano makes a curious mixture and writes: «However, the religious character of grace lies in the fact that it does not constitute an extrinsic and superimposed gift, but operates in the human will itself calling it and raising it to freedom; thus grace is not opposed to freedom but founds it. It constitutes the initial possibility that with the binding decision man recognizes and makes his own. Once again the divergence of the two paths, accentuated and carried out to the end, determines the return to the unity of their origin ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 93-94). Which is truly unacceptable. A "common origin" is a wrong concept for the destination desired by Abbagnano in expressing it but, as often happens, the blind hen is able to peck the grain of wheat before the others. Philosophy and religion, which I considered at the time - and in some respects even now - antithetical expressions of knowledge, are both tireless stewards of the cavern of massacres, and so, strangely and unwittingly, Abbagnano ends up being right. But it is a being right that he would never have shared and that would have embarrassed him if he ever knew about it. In his clumsy attempt to recover the Trinitarian religion, dialectically more palatable to him, he does nothing but distance his positive existentialism further from some semblance of comprehensibility.

If philosophy appeals to historicity, religion appeals to tradition. Society receives the elements of the first and the second differently. Abbagnano does not care, he tries in every way to summarize these distant conditions so that they can work together with the stability of the human future. Thus he writes, referring to religion: «Evidently this problem does not arise in the sphere of religion as long as it remains founded on tradition. Tradition lives for the preventive acceptance that the individual has made of the community, an acceptance to which the community itself is committed for him. However, this acceptance is generic. It has been done once and for all, without the possibility of considering what the individual is and will be and what are or will be the concrete conditions, obstacles and struggles that he will have to face. But when man, in order to keep faith with that acceptance, will have to face the uncertainty of the struggle and the danger of dispersion, doubt will present itself to him in all its strength and he will have to propose anew the specific problem of his commitment and his own singularity. Tradition will still represent for him a solicitation and a call but he, no longer remaining fused with it, will distinguish what belongs to tradition and what belongs to himself; what it demands of him and what he can correspond to it; what it commits itself to for him and the commitment that he himself can and must make towards it. By virtue of its development and deepening, the religious attitude thus passes from tradition to historicity ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 96-97). In the end, historicity prevails over tradition, religion, having fulfilled its generic and delimiting task, gives way to philosophy, the heir and sister best suited to manage the world of forced action. It is not a failure, but a division of roles. It must not be forgotten that historicity is based on fidelity. What is important to Abbagnano is that religion fulfill its specific task of positive singularization of existence. It must not be a question of a dubious and dangerous exaltation but of a concrete regulating force, capable of bringing to a successful conclusion any treatment of appropriation. In an attempt to

justify first and then use religion, Abbagnano finds himself uneasy, he touches the bottom of his inability to build a true positive philosophy of existence, albeit linked to doing and its productive rules. In other words, he accepts to eat in two cribs.

The long critical tirade with which religion is accused of "generic objectivity or objective genericity" is also a justifying and prudent tirade, like all the distances made by Abbagnano. He writes: «Religion speaks and acts in the name of a universal community in which all men participate in fact and in line of law; and for it what makes the individual valuable is precisely this participation to which, therefore, it continually calls and commits him. Certainly its call is all the more passionate and intense the more the individual moves away or tends to distance himself from the community in the name of which he speaks. But in the individual it never sees anything other than the member of this community; what is in it and can be unique, exceptional, falls outside its consideration or is explicitly denied. Religion affirms a rule, which refuses the exception. The objective character of the ontological interpretation on which it is based excludes the consideration of the exception. A single path is offered to all and all must equally follow it. Everyone is recognized the opportunity to follow it; and for this possibility every man as such possesses the dignity and value of the person ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 98-99). Society - community was good only for religion, as we have seen - proceeds in the opposite way, starting from the individual. This problem poses a real but wasted distinction. Abbagnano does not wait long to throw out the window what he had managed to say good. In the end, religion too is brought back under the philosophical hat of singularity, speaking specifically of the meaning of "election" to which the religious man feels called. Once again the dialectical circle closes but it gives the impression that this game of parts could go on indefinitely. They are the usual techniques of philosophy with which man continues to torment himself without being able to break the bad game that is imposed on him by the productive mechanism. His is a declared research of synthesis. This syncretism eliminates, in my opinion, whatever may be the slightest interest in positive existentialism. I myself have advanced in the past - in my lost notes - the doubt of a certain ironic talk, but rereading the texts I realize that I was wrong. Abbagnano is very serious here, as always, by the way. On the contrary, there is here a desperate attempt to enlist religion under the umbrella of existentialism, which in France had been done more or less by Blondel and Marcel, albeit from different perspectives. Here is how this commitment specifies: «Faith is in fact singularity, transcendence, value, fidelity; and each of these determinations is a bond by which philosophy and religion must seek and find each other. But they cannot seek and find each other except in the sphere of existence concretely lived and realized. Their synthesis is neither objective nor rational, nor is it universally subjective. It cannot be given once and for all in any one doctrine; it must be realized by the single man who finds himself in his faith, whatever the path that led him to faith. It is a continuous discovery and a continuous search: the search and the discovery that existence makes of itself, reconnecting itself to the authentic being of its singularity and its true community ». (*Ib.* , P. 102). Recovery deludes him of gaining more persuasion, but it is an illusion. Philosophy uses religion but it is used in turn, the history of theology proves it. In reforming the lake of blood, you never know which of the two is the most effective. On me, a young man, this observation, albeit nebulously intuited, made a great impression. It is a bad sign that a philosophical theory is too concerned with religion, not so much with the existence of God, but with religion as faith, exactly as Abbagnano does. Faith is connected to fidelity and this to guarantee and security. The circle is quick to close. These are not encrypted signals but clear words.

Time and sin

After an exposition of the theories of time, divided between the concept of becoming and that of conscience, theories that it is not worth mentioning here, Abbagnano brings back the interpretation of necessity as "permanence" to possibility as "temporality". He writes: «... if necessity is linked to permanence, that is, to being as such, the possible is linked to instability, that is, only to the relationship with being. The proper domain of time and its interpretation is therefore existence. Temporality expresses the instability of the relationship with being, that is, the possibility of its resolution. The relationship with being, as a possibility, is also essentially the possibility of a non-relationship: as such, it is temporality ». (*Philosophy , Religion , Science , op. Cit .* , P. 111). Escape from the present is the purpose of this fallacious problematic to escape into the future. But, as we are now used to seeing, this future cannot be different from the present in a world governed by doing. Necessity cannot be escaped in this way, indeed it is sought as a safe place to anchor, a word that often recurs, the latter, in the philosophy of positive existentialism. The negativity of time, a harbinger of death, is thus extinguished in the positivity of the present, where death does not exist. What does it matter that the mechanism of doing is a kind of living death, it guarantees, therefore it is necessary, thus keeping us safe from the dangers of qualitative impairment. Here it is the misinterpretation of the future that prevents us from grasping the reality of time. We see that the philosopher is on the defensive, as time is transformed into an object by doing and if this vicious circle is not broken, it risks going unnoticed. Yet time is precisely the same problem on which Abbagnano's themes insist so much.

He writes: «The interpretation of time gives rise to an alternative: either to disregard and ignore time and with it the finitude of existence or to recognize and accept time and finitude. The first alternative brings about sin. Failure to recognize temporality as a possibility of the non-possible is the assumption of instability as stability, that is, stabilizing in an instability considered definitive. Every element of this instability, every attitude, every act, appears firm, definitive and significant, so that one renounces to seek and realize its meaning and value beyond it, in the transcendence towards being and in the establishment of a relationship. authentic with being. It is believed to possess being and to be in a certain way the being in the instability and provisional nature of an evanescent relationship with being; and by ignoring or disavowing this relationship, the only possibility of consolidating it and making it authentic is lost. The world then appears open to us as a show or theater in which we can intervene at will, but which we can also attend; and thus it loses its consistency and its reality. Other men appear to us as folding instruments of our particular needs and purposes because we do not try to find in them the being that is beyond the casual and provisional relationships that are established between them and us. Our ego itself is dispersed in a variety of attitudes each of which is assumed as definitive and therefore closed in its insignificance ». (*Ib .* , Pp. 112-113). Words that sound dead for Abbagnano's own philosophy if read with the right logical scan. He solidifies himself in the need for defense, and this is a closing in on time, that is, he does exactly the opposite of what he says. The essence of the problem continues to elude him. And the fact of calling this disavowal "sin" is a request for testimony to affirm the contrary, but this testimony is not enough. But what is sin? Abbagnano immediately replies: «That facts, people, attitudes replace each other so well in the succession of time is the clear sign of their insignificance, their inconsistency and their poverty of value. And thus living in time, seeing a succession in it and abandoning oneself to the course of succession, mean the same thing: living in sin, renouncing the being of one's self, of the world and of others. Sin is the loss or at least potential rupture of the relationship with being; it is renunciation of transcendence and loss of transcendence.

Loss of transcendence means: loss of the authentic possibility of a relationship with being in the triple form that is proper to this: the unity of the self, the reality of the world, solidarity with others. The potential weakening or rupture of that relationship takes away from being its nature of having to be, that is, its character of value. Living in succession and in conformity with the temporal succession means attributing to each event that happens to the other the same value as the other; to each person who succeeds the other with the same value as the other; to every attitude that happens to the other the same value as the other. The consideration of time as a succession therefore carries within itself the threat of the laceration of the existential structure, of the loss of unity, of transcendence and of value ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 114-115). But this is exactly what was stated before, that is, the disavowal of time as the presence of temporality, that is, as a consciousness that does not accept the limitation of doing and its rules. Time accesses destiny through quality by breaking its own pattern, the latter crumbling as a result of the overcoming. In quality there is no time as a succession, freedom is something else, chaos not ordered scanning more or less disguised as problematic. The mighty wave of diversity upsets the necessary order of doing and throws the different consciousness into uncertainty - this time truly uncertain - from where it can then speak to destiny. Abbagnano does not suggest such an alternative, he seriously thinks that the connection with being, his "transcendental relationship" guarantees him an exit from the world of appearances. But it is the free thought of a philosopher, a seasoned thought that has had its day. From the cavern of massacres, only shadows cast on the impassable wall can be observed. Philosophical theories are inherent in the power of doing, where they penetrate deeply impregnating them, they cannot access the experience of quality, their author keeps them firmly on a leash. Doing is the very essence of power, its infallible eye evaluates and weighs theories on the basis of the contribution they can make to the productive mechanism, often uses some of them - and this is the case of Abbagnano - to reduce the damage of others. , perhaps more reluctant to be regimented, although never completely unavailable. This sorting and checking operation is always lurking.

Imagining himself immune from this enlistment Abbagnano writes: «The other alternative that time presents to man, that is the recognition and acceptance of the temporality of existence, is as tiring and difficult as the first is easy and obvious. It consists first of all in opening one's eyes to the dispersive and nullifying character of temporality as such. It requires man to courageously realize, overcoming all enticements, of the existential illusion, that time holds for him a latent threat that can render nothing and disperse his best conquests. That is, it requires an attitude of incessant vigilance, which excludes abandoning oneself to the succession of events and living at the mercy of this succession. This preliminary recognition, this incessant vigilance implies that man is committed to gathering and concentrating on a fundamental unity. Among the attitudes that he can assume, only one is for him the authentic, the one by virtue of which he can realize himself as unity and me. Among the relationships that it is possible for him to maintain or establish between himself and men, there is only one that allows him to live in solidarity with them and therefore build a true community with them ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 116-117). The key word here is "fundamental". As can be seen, there is always the search for a foundation, a good, ancient, expensive, distinct foundation of guarantee. And it must be suitable for protecting what has been achieved with the authentically chosen possibility. But this discourse is, once again, contradictory. It badly recovers what it begins to affirm, and recovers it with the usual dialectical movement. The strangeness of this behavior lies in the fact that Abbagnano is seriously convinced, once the relationship with the being has been established, that he can establish and guarantee it. In the deep closet

of logical lacerations there are tools of various kinds, one more obscure than the other, Abbagnano is the satrap of their use. In fact, he states: "Among the situations in which he finds himself or may come to find himself in the world, there is only one that allows him to recognize and evaluate the order and reality of the world. If he has truly decided to gather himself in the unity of his own existential structure (that is, he has decided to decide, because his decision can only have this meaning), time no longer appears to him as a succession of replaceable or substituted terms, but as the possibility of transcending the threat implicit in it and of gathering, conserving and guaranteeing the essential unity that it tends to disperse ». (*Ib .*, P. 117). Thus he saves the past in history and the future in the task imposed by doing. Its progress therefore aims at a sure foundation. He is not a philosopher of uncertainty but from uncertainty he is a philosopher who moves towards certainty. His aim is to recover the ever-possible subversion towards quality, which he considered the kingdom of nothingness, being that, with all likelihood, he is convinced that being and appearing totally coincide in doing, in the world of doing. His passages forced to the problematic reveal a poor and hesitant background, not of the arcana imperii as I had once suspected. In the realm of recovery there is always something very malicious, the counterpart denounces all the misery of the agreement.

The denial of the temporal succession should have entailed an unsolvable conflict with doing, which is a succession of produced objects. In fact Abbagnano rightly notes: "The succession does not imply any fundamental continuity, no internal welding in the constitution of man because it is simply substitution: and substitution requires substitutability, that is, the equivalence of value of the terms which, in succession, substitute each other". (*Ib .*, P. 119). And here the way to quality should have been opened. But the aspiration to a different conscience has failed, the philosopher acts as a maintenance man, he works in the back of the shop, he doesn't even have the courage to collaborate. Throw the stone and withdraw your hand. He is satisfied with a piece of bread thrown at him by the power that feeds himself fully and without pretending to be forced to act. While not pulling out the Templar vestments, the philosopher fights his crusade in defense of the right to massacre, not himself personally, not this one, but through an intermediary. Hence the problematic affirmation and the correlative wandering, the desperation of bewilderment - only imagined - and the immediate reintegration into the massive administered complex of doing. Here he falls: «Only by transcending succession, that is, by accepting and realizing temporality as the possibility of loss, man limits himself and defines himself, moving in search of what he was and committing himself to fidelity to the past. This act of fidelity, constitutive of the authentic present, is the unity of the person and is the act by which the person truly acquires his own dignity and his irreplaceable value. Personality in fact means irreplaceable and it is not possible to realize the personality in a process whose substitutability is the law ". (*Ibid*). Tiny relics of consent, the leading word, "irreplaceable". Empty of meaning but full of dialectical devotion. Now the philosopher is the guardian of the orthodoxy of recovery, fidelity and value are the ancient words of the guarantee. The essence of quality, never so palpable, accentuates the need for safety, inviolable space in which to move, recovery techniques capable of keeping enemies away, the prompts of an existing incompleteness that generates restlessness.

But Abbagnano feels the need to reaffirm the vague "irreplaceable" with the more concrete "historicity". The negation of the temporal succession is therefore raised to a power. Here it is: «In the non-acceptance of temporality, which is implicit in succession, man is a slave to the succession itself and to the story of substitutions in which it is expressed. He is not free to keep himself, to guarantee himself, to

consolidate himself in his essential purchases, because the succession presses him and snatches from him, without his realizing it, what he believes he holds firmly. In historicity, on the other hand, the risk of loss is clearly accepted; but resolute fidelity removes the threat of dispersion from this risk and reduces it to a fundamental alternative of success or failure. In this case, man is free because he belongs to himself and because he realizes the conditions that make him available for his task.

«The future is configured for him as a coming into being of unity and of having to be. The unity of his ego, of the world and of the community, is revealed to him, in the act of freedom, as the effective term of his transcendence and constitutes it in a relationship founded with himself. Its possibilities still remain possibilities, involving the possibility and the risk of loss; but, having gathered and founded on transcendental possibility, they secured themselves against the vicissitudes of succession and made themselves dependent on the strength and decision of existential commitment ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 120-121). The leading words are all gathered here. Some we know, others resonate with old contents, for example, "preserve", "secure", "consolidate". The theme is always the same. A solemn, massive, self-confident affirmation, the bearer of a gravitas that eliminates any problematic residue. The air that we breathe more and more in positive existentialism is dense and repetitive, and is inherited from the innumerable generations of philosophers who have strived to produce it. There is now something watchful in these dialectical movements of recomposition that gives a sense of panic, we see the concern to keep separate the possible critical outlet of problematicity, an outlet that could only lead to a re-questioning of the accumulative mechanism of doing. . The sacrosanct productive mechanism must be kept away from chaos, from the shapeless and dangerous adventure of quality, from any desire for completion.

Yet, despite the evident ontological reference, Abbagnano writes: "If the guarantee, which historicity implies, in favor of being and of man is interpreted ontologically and fixed in an objective term extraneous to man's existential commitment, the man faces eternity. Eternity is the simple generic negation of the temporal succession. It is being objectively considered in its permanence and therefore opposed to the instability of existence that takes place according to the temporal succession. As such, it remains extraneous to existence and for this extraneousness it can encourage man to abandon himself to the temporal succession, distracting him from transcendence ». (*Ib.* , P. 121). Suddenly you go back. It may seem like a question of detail, but it is important. Abbagnano wants to close the double-throw door, he wants to prevent the smallest grain of sand from damaging the gear. He knows that time is an ugly beast in philosophy, and he also knows that his supposed third way does not exist. What he pursues is the defense of his function with regard to the interpretation of time and he does not realize that this defense is in contrast with the very essence of doing. Therefore, the critical conditions of any consideration are, on the one hand, the negation of fragmentation, on the other, the acceptance of security in the transcendental foundation. But doing would have appreciated better the fragmented solution, more in keeping with its nature. Instead the philosopher gives him the exact opposite, and he gives it systematically. But what does it matter? What matters is not what it supplies but how it supplies it. And since it provides it as an object, everything returns to its place. Function is basically what the philosopher wants to defend, everything converges to this end. This is why he can conclude: "In this sense, historicity is the transcendental foundation of time; but it is a foundation which is not but must be, and whose being is identified with that of the authentic existence of man ». (*Ib.* , P. 123). Everything is at the service of "having to be", this is what must be protected. The various massacres are those who protect the mechanism of the

massacre. Like all metaphysicians Abbagnano thinks that the place of good is in doing. With this he fails to locate the place of evil in acting. If he talks about sin he happens to get confused and to suggest a possible place of quality from which to escape as soon as possible, but it is a false deduction of malevolent critics. For him good and evil coexist in doing and here they die together. Quality is not present. It does not matter. The philosopher shows his appearance under a quantitative species in motion and his dialectical ability makes it unrecognizable in the brute form of the object.

Man and science

By advocating a collaboration between science and philosophy, Abbagnano wonders on which side his result should lean, on the side of science or that of philosophy? Gnoseology or epistemology? He writes: «Science presents itself as the eminent and typical degree of knowledge: it can therefore be taken as revealing the foundation of knowledge as such. By embodying the maximum validity that knowledge can achieve, it allows, better than any other manifestation of this, to identify and recognize the intrinsic constitution of knowledge and its existential foundation. Science is true knowledge; the condition of truth can and must be derived from the consideration of science. An investigation of this kind can be called gnoseological ». (*Philosophy, Religion, Science, op. Cit.*, P. 129). At least a scientist claim, questionable and dated. Unless Abbagnano does not want to reserve a higher knowledge for philosophy. But this should go towards quality, an address excluded from the start. Let's see. Here it seems more like a sort of sacralization of scientific objectivity, as opposed to philosophical problematicity. A kind of place of certainty, above everything as such, without explanation. Is this the neo-enlightenment? What about the benefits and evil that we all receive from science? The very concept of collaboration, born of the 1950s, today I cannot share. Regarding the epistemological aspect Abbagnano writes: "Evidently this epistemological research, if it can and must lead to determining the character of science as such and the orientation that is proper and constitutive of it, must stop where the real investigation begins. scientific, limiting itself to proposing its general orientation. Epistemological inquiry is not a substitute for scientific inquiry; it is the clarity about its nature and its fundamental modalities, clarity reached through the consideration of its ultimate possibility and therefore of its validity ". (*Ib.*, P. 130). But what does this investigation that philosophy elaborates for science consist of? Today the answer is much clearer, but not as much as one might wish. How could science fix its own methodological orthodoxy for itself? Many answers are available today. Abbagnano either did not have them at hand or was ignorant of them. In any case, for him, entrusting philosophy with the task of guardian of orthodoxy suited him perfectly. It is not a question of prevalence over the choices of method but only a question of the shop. Like Hegel in his time, Abbagnano here too ends up talking by hearsay about things he knows second-hand and badly. Here a morbid defense of existentialist and positive positions is taking place in a terrain that by its nature turns out to be very brittle. Science, originally measure and order, was by now, even at the time, anything but measured and ordered, it was crowded around new concepts, the theory of indetermination in the first place. Abbagnano wants a return to order for the mother - according to him - of all knowledge, that the disordered get in line, that the hypotheses are held within decent and acceptable paradigms, so that the many requests of man can be satisfied and guaranteed. The Enlightenment was one thing, the Neo-Enlightenment another, quite different.

Abbagnano thus poses the problem of epistemological investigation: «There is no

doubt that science must ensure man's dominion over nature and must provide him with the indispensable tools for its realization in the world. Due to the state of indigence which is proper to the human condition, man's relationship with the world is defined by need. Man is not enough for himself: he needs the things of the world to make himself instruments and means, not only to live, but for his own proper human or spiritual realization. And, the more his life is enriched and rises above the purely biological plane, the more its realization becomes purely human or spiritual, the more his bonds of dependence on the world multiply because the greater the contribution of instruments becomes. and the means that nature must provide. Now man has no other way of procuring the means and instruments indispensable for its realization than science ». (*Ib.* , P. 131). Here the leading word is "enslavement". Nature must be subdued. The past fifty years have shown up to the slime what these words mean. The misery and the extent of exploitation have expanded dramatically. Man is an evil creature, unable to stop this process. The mechanism of doing has been strengthened without ever stopping and science is willing to reform the cave of massacres even when it works - at least on the surface - to improve human life. Abbagnano pushes back all objections, even those of free movement in his day, he does not care much about the senseless use of resources. What he fears is that science will not be besieged by the demand for utilitarian jobs and save its theoretical soul. Thus he affirms: «To limit scientific research to tasks that appear to be of evident or mediated utility would mean precluding all those ways which, while not leading at first sight to results of evident utility, could ultimately prove to be much more fruitful than such results. Science cannot reach practically usable results except through the path of theoretical discovery; and yet it seems that the only way to achieve those results is to push pure research as far as possible in all directions ». (*Ib.* , P. 132). Which is a philosophical banality, in fact the theory and the technological application are always the science in its modification of the forced factual production. There is no way to save science, on the one hand, and doing, on the other, are two sides of the same coin, indeed they are the same thing. Abbagnano does not realize that a scientific - or philosophical - theory is an object that is sold in supermarkets today. Science is based on the object. The rest can be traced back to forced action without residues. And if the proposal of new problems inaccessible to quantitative analysis could loom on the horizon as a new danger, it must be stopped. Dangerous ideas must be thrown away, where they cannot damage the orderly mechanisms of scientific research, so essential to production.

The object governs the world and its fundamental law, ordinability. Abbagnano writes: «But the object of science has orderability as its fundamental and predominant character. The passage from common knowledge, which does not include a sufficient guarantee of its validity, to scientific knowledge, which includes this guarantee, is determined by the introduction of rigorous methods of systematic ordering. In science, order is the control of the reality of the object and is therefore the intrinsic guarantee it possesses of its own truth value. Where it is not possible to use an exact method of ordering, science limits itself to describing according to the procedure of common knowledge, but does not reach the systematic constitution and therefore the value of authentic science; and correspondingly its object does not reach its value of authentic objectivity, that is, of rigorously controllable reality. The possibility that science truly organizes itself as a system of knowledge, based on an objective reality, is therefore the same possibility of the systematic order ». (*Ib.* , P. 133). This sentence is an archaeological monument that shows all the signs of time like no other. Making a list of the leading words is impossible. It is the perfect picture of a science of domination which, in order to maintain its power, has had to profoundly change. Many

aspects of scientific research have now been refined and escape the simple classification of the measure, even if they always remain prisoners of the objective and factual hypothesis. The eccentricity of certain theories does not move from the quantity, but Abbagnano would not have noticed this even today, his interests were elsewhere.

This is where the dialectical leap is placed, the desperate metaphysical attempt to bring problematicity back into the sign of scientific orderability. The problem could have been insoluble because precisely that type of orderly corporeal impenetrability is what is needed for forced action, so there was not even a need for so much effort. But Abbagnano wants to get there differently. There is something urgent in his metaphysical effort, to save his positive existentialism, and this happens by making order disappear and making it reappear unchanged but under another guise. To be different not even talking about it.

Following the dialectical rhythm, the object of science must first become alien to man and then return under a different appearance, as we have said. He writes: «Now a world reduced to a pure system of space-time determinations appears totally extraneous to the needs and requirements of man. It is a world that no longer implies any immediate reference to the constitution of man as such, which has become completely dehumanized and reduced to the most rigorous and pure objectivity. And yet it is precisely a world made in this way, a world which has revealed itself in its constitution totally alien to man and his needs, must include in itself the guarantee of meeting these needs and lending itself to the realization of man as such. Here is the paradoxical aspect of the problem. Until the world appeared to man endowed with a constitution similar to him, until it appeared to him permeated and woven of anthropomorphic elements and entirely subordinate to human ends, until science took possession of it to reveal its space-time objectivity, it has lent itself much less to meet the needs of man and to provide the suitable tools for its realization. But as soon as science has highlighted its space-time objectivity and to the extent that it proceeds to reduce it more and more rigorously to this objectivity, removing it from any direct or indirect reference to man, it begins to lend itself and lends itself more and more to be used. What is the solution to this paradox? ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 136-137). But where is the paradox? Does not exist. We know the answer well by now. The problem is posed in such a way as to be constantly irritated to the maximum in its components and then recovered. No restlessness is tolerated, no criticism of objectivity can be thought of. Everything must correspond perfectly to the premises. Abbagnano's philosophy does not survive his metaphorical method, it is all here, in these spectacular, and at the same time laughable, hen jumps. Once started he must complete his chisel work. For which he concludes: «The key to the solution is in the attitude of man. To discover the authentic objectivity of the world, man must not think of the world as a part of himself, but must feel himself as part of the world ». (*Ib.* , P. 137). Once again it is the choice to take root in the world that fictitiously solves the problem. But we know how this choice is more an exhortation to choose than a real choice. The appeal to the will always reminds us of that terrible network of doing. It is no coincidence that here the leading term is "rooted", which corresponds to the foundation that Abbagnano is looking for in his metaphysics. Life is this continuous attempt at stabilization, an attempt persistently frustrated by object incompleteness. We cannot detach ourselves from the mechanism. If this factual chain is not broken - which science as a measure cannot do - one lives only in appearance. Here is such a great obstacle that Abbagnano cannot get around it with his usual dialectical techniques. You must first acknowledge it. He does not feel like insisting on a utilitarian relationship of cause and effect between science and man. So he takes it away. Thus he writes: «Scientific

research has its goal or its end in itself. Taking its origin from the recognition and acceptance of the objectivity of the world, it moves towards the orderable determinations of this objectivity. No utilitarian concern can enter research without limiting its scope or diverting it from its own procedure. It cannot have utilitarian purposes; however it cannot fail to follow. By reducing the world to pure orderable objectivity, it reduces it to pure instrumentality. Orderable objectivity is nothing other than the plan of the possible use of the things of the world ». (*Ib.* , P. 140). Something has agglutinated around the ideal concept of purity of research. The fifties are those of the postwar period and Abbagnano had seen science at work in the war apparatus of the massacres on various fronts, without distinction of who was in the wrong or in the right. But this experience, traumatic for everyone, for him translates into an attempt to recover with a small home jump. There is something dark and incessant in this childishness, I had warned it at the time and I feel it now. He affirms: «The misunderstanding of the alleged utilitarian character of science arises from surreptitiously transferring to science the instrumental character of its object. The being, the reality of this object is its usability; but science is the disinterested and pure ascertainment of that reality ". (*Ib.* , P. 141). Incessant return to the same tracks as before. Abbagnano does not miss a beat, does not even leave a crack. One of the characteristics of metaphysics is inflexibility. Not deflecting gives the sense of a completeness that is a ghost to itself before entering the apparent arsenal of doing. I cannot evaluate the intellectual effort, at the time it seemed considerable to me, even as a logical exercise, today it seems like a kind of school walk and a shiver runs down my spine. I am not - as I thought - in front of a precision work, albeit questionable, but of something cheap, made to practice the trade, without commitment and without talent. Behind, the repetitive object obsessiveness, persevering, relentless. Nothing has to deviate from the general line of conduct. From problematicity to transcendence and from this to the stable foundation of possession. So the conclusion presents the usual reversal of an acrobat. «Science does not need to propose any pragmatic goal nor does it need to restrict itself to the search for results of evident and direct usability. The space-time order of things in the world that it tends to determine is already in itself the instrumental order and the project of the usability of things. The key feature of science is right here; that it cannot be useful to man if not on condition that it disregards utility and constitutes itself as a disinterested search for natural objectivity ". (*Ib.* , P. 142). The main word is "order". Any deviation is inconceivable. But science is something else, it cannot be reduced to a reservoir of tools that can be used for doing things. This is what happens in the activity of didactic and police interviews and interrogations, its cognitive power lies elsewhere and can provide tools to break the encirclement of doing. The problem is not in the contrast between pure theoreticality and use for man - always, or almost always, addressed to the cave of massacres - but it is in the cognitive content. My old controversy still echoes in my ears. My scheme was childish and self-centered, but what was the alternative? This game of cups, an ordering and schematic game, cloying and functional to the common address of every philosophical theory? A veil of doubt thus falls on the whole theoretical consistency of Abbagnano's positive existentialism that lies behind the problematic existence highlighted? I could answer, the appearance of doing. And all the worries about closing the circles and dialectical leaps? Obsolete techniques to stay away from the rocks of nothingness, always emerging in the chaotic sea of being.

I overlook the problem of mathematics and logic which, in Abbagnano's treatment, has no relevance. It is a series of outdated claims and tails that would say little to the critical attention of today's reader. At the end, however, it is good to read the conclusion of the science-philosophy relationship. Here it is: «The truth of philosophy

is not the truth of science, the universality of philosophy is not the universality of science; and reciprocally. The truth of science is determined by the reality of the object, the truth of philosophy is determined by the authenticity of the commitment. The universality of science consists in the pure and simple agreement on concepts and methods and in the controllability of the results: the universality of philosophy consists in its ability to help man understand himself in his true relationship with himself, with others and with the world. In the search for the objectivity of nature, the scientist places himself as a pure universal subjectivity that makes use of methods and procedures common to all; in philosophical research man poses himself as a single individuality who must find the way for himself to consolidate and be founded in the totality of his concrete relationships. On no point, therefore, can science and philosophy clash as rivals. But philosophy cannot ignore the science that realizes man's authentic attitude towards the world; and science cannot ignore the philosophy from which it can only draw the awareness of its essential humanity and the clarity around its fundamental orientations ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 154-155). These contrasts now live only on this tired page, placed here to demonstrate the paucity of the metaphysician when dealing with things that he should leave aside. The whole tirade on reciprocal tasks is a frantic and ineffective sequence of efforts to prove the difference in method between science and philosophy, but mainly has the purpose of assigning the staff of command to philosophy, if only in the search for the foundation.

It could be concluded that Abbagnano's many attempts to give positive space to the problem of existence, at least as regards science and its usable potential, have failed. It's not true. The philosophical method never promises any clarity that can demonstrate its own emptiness. There is always in it a reserve of expedients that seemingly save the results, albeit with a riotous attitude of defense. But, after all, weren't these alleged results directed at the productive appearance of doing? So they are ultimately perfectly related to the expectations of the philosopher and of the forced mechanism itself. There are no contrasts or disappointments, everything flows slowly and peacefully like in a novel with a happy ending. Philosophy often has trivial and irrelevant analyzes, never irresponsible or disrespectful theoretical behaviors with regard to its role as fueler of the cavern of massacres. It always knows what it is saying, even when it seems to go off the cuff, inventing ingenious twists or unlikely reversals.

The philosophical problem of science

After an analysis of the differences between classical and contemporary science, which are not very interesting here, Abbagnano asks himself what is the relationship between man and these more recent scientific developments. "In one respect, no part or element of man escapes the investigation of science. But under another aspect, the whole man escapes this investigation: inasmuch as he himself is the problem of this investigation. No limits can be fixed to science in the extension of its means of investigation and measurement to man: all the problems of science concern man as any other thing or object. But they have another mode of concern with man, much more intimate and close than that which they have with any of their possible objects: because they are man. This mode of concern is particularly evident in the scientist himself, who lives off his problems to such an extent as to make them the fundamental interest of his life, its success or failure. But it can reveal itself equally in all men. We can indicate it with the name of subjectivity: but only provided that subjectivity is not understood as a mysterious way of being or in any case characterized independently of the preceding observations, but it is understood only that man is the problem of problems that concern him ". (*Philosophy , Religion , Science , op. Cit.* , Pp. 167-168).

The good starting disposition - due in part to Abbagnano's well-known theory of indeterminacy - is here wasted in a dialectical involution. The latter concerns the relationship between problematicity and the scientific way of considering knowledge, including man. This hypothesis is fearful because it eliminates any critical possibility regarding the object produced by doing. This is not a philosophical skirmish but a concrete problem that will explode into the question, what is the world? There are certainly secondary elements, derisively marginal, more or less equivalent, seen from today's perspective, to a tortuous parlor conversation, but the consequences are still deadly. Science conditions man and binds him more closely to the course of forced action, but at the same time it provides him with tools - objects themselves - that can be used to disturb productive tranquility. Heisenberg and Gödel are two physicists who build dangerous instruments of this kind. Abbagnano knows this and tries to recover. Obviously he cannot enter into the crucial points of their thesis limiting the powers of forecasting and control, but he affirms that scientific investigation must include man as man "is the problem of this investigation". Metaphysical banality that could have been spared us. This statement personalizes a problem that didn't need to be problematized in this way. Hilbert's dream of seamless mathematics is gone forever. The axiomatization of science is no longer sought, without thereby missing one's contribution to the cavern of massacres. Except that forced action is a very flexible mechanism, and is capable of adapting quickly to the modification of contributions. Abbagnano, however, is not satisfied. He fears that these changes - described in the pages I have avoided examining because I assume they relate to matters known to all - could have dangerous influences on the quantification of the world. The punishment, in this case, would be a proliferation of different consciences and qualitative experiences that are not easily recoverable. In short, a possibility that what never happened will happen. Here, in the end, is the reason why Abbagnano considers science as the only authentic knowledge.

And here is the answer to the previous question, what is the world? «If we call the world that mode of concern for scientific problems for which man is one of the terms of the problems themselves, we can say that man is in the world. This expression means that man is or can be the subject of any type or form of scientific investigation. But it also means that man recognizes himself as part or element of a totality that encompasses him. Since this totality is essentially characterized by the fact that man is its part or element, that is, by that mode of concern by which man is the possible object of a scientific investigation, this same totality can be called the world. The world is then the totality of which man is a part ». (*Ib.*, P. 169). The leading term here is "totality". A bad totality, because it is obtained only through forced action, a partial and dimidiated object, from which quality is far from. Reducing this totality to portions and assigning the study to individual scientific specialties - it is no coincidence that physics and psychology are chosen as examples - is mortifying. Abbagnano does not want this uncertain condition of science to go beyond philosophy, where it would destroy the dialectical method, but he wants philosophy to be able to continue to control its own problems by setting them in such a way as to guarantee an accommodating and safe response. Think about what might happen in the case of an extension of Gödel's theorem to the dialectical mechanism. Think about what happened - with my small contribution - with the extension of Heisenberg's theorem to philosophy and logic. For Abbagnano the formula, "all knowledge to science", aims to hand over to philosophy the monopoly of a different knowledge. But what would this diversity consist of? Certainly not in a search for quality. The eternal play of words continues indefinitely. We will see in due time. For the moment it is important to stress that this allocation of competences is a limitation not an enlargement. By

implication it also means that knowledge - scientific, at this point, should be put in parentheses - is not the goal of man but that this goal remains life. Nice discovery. However done without consequences for the integrity of the productive mechanism. Here it is only apparent life and knowledge that lies in the accumulation and from here sadly it is channeled - with the methodological supervision of philosophy, this yes - towards the cave of massacres. Here is the sanctuary that Abbagnano wants to guarantee from undue interference, in particular he wants to forbid the recollections of the quality that unconscious and courageous pilgrims of the unknown can bring to the fruitful womb of doing, where they could find a shocking resonance. The monotony of certain conclusions of Abbagnano is all here, he is the crusader of the shining armor who fights the infidels in the name of an appearance that he wants to sell at all costs as being.

And this is how his immortal mechanism moves: «For a man who refused to recognize himself in the world as part of it, there would certainly be no knowledge or science; but there would be no other form of knowledge, activity or research either. In fact, every knowledge, activity or research arises from doubt, from restlessness, from uncertainty, from indecision: all names that express a single fundamental reality, which is the problem. Man essentially lives as a problem, the problem is his fundamental way of being, his specific existence: he is continually a problem to himself. None of its manifestations escapes this original problematic nature: neither religion which is the problem of salvation, nor art, nor any other of its specific activities. But a problem, hardly recognized and formulated by man, immediately includes man as one of his terms: it includes him in the world ». (*Ib.* , P. 173). Here is the “original problematicity”, the main concept of this page. Obligation to accept the world, otherwise, man's rejection of himself. Here is hinted at true knowledge, here it is an obstacle to the other, the scientific one, which was also considered the only possible one. But these are marginal contradictions. The ghosts of metaphysics appear in the sunlight. Who said they belonged to dreams? A lawyer. We are facing a great manifestation of expertise regarding survival. The demons of object bias are always at work. They support the limited puerility of doing and bring it to the threshold of the illusion of completeness. But the object produced cannot get out of its fictitious puppet dimension. It is his appearance that rules the world and it is he who excites the supporters of the mechanism. They are fantasies that give excellent fruit not only as an accumulation of knowledge but also as a possibility of exploitation. Nothing can stop this mechanism forever but its total destruction and the construction of a new world. Defeating the demons of objectivity in a partial way is not possible, they are themselves partiality and it is they who dictate the terms of the battle in their favor. For philosophers - making a list of those with a different conscience is shameful - the overcoming of quality is going to the devil's lap. Indeed, reducing the problem to the bone, for them any criticism of knowledge that questions the foundations of doing is a raging harbinger of bad conclusions.

But Abbagnano increases the dose. “These considerations shed light on another aspect of the human character of science. Science is, as has been said, disinterested knowledge, since man has no right to any privilege in it. As a consideration of the world, it encompasses man as any of the objects of his investigation. But at the same time, science serves man: it contributes to the ever better and safer satisfaction of his needs, and can indefinitely increase their power through technology. This hidden correspondence between science and human needs, which technology clearly reveals, is not a miracle. It has its root and its justification in the human attitude that gives rise to science, in the attitude by which man recognizes himself and is rooted in the world as part of it. This attitude which subordinates man to the world and makes him

dependent and subject to the world, that is, needy, is also the one for which that disinterested knowledge of the world which is science is possible ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 173-174). Science at the service of man. Indeed - here is the logical leap - the more it becomes dehumanized, the more it becomes human. The more critical it is, the more it is capable of enriching man and his possessions which, from problematics, become concrete in order to be defended. Abbagnano thinks that this reversal is the inevitable effect of the rooting of science in the world of man, and he is right. Only he does not ask himself how the craziest and bloodiest perspectives come precisely from this rootedness, always in the name of reason. This question should have been asked, if only out of a sense of responsibility. But then he would have ceased to enjoy the status of a philosopher and would have descended to the level of a seeker of fire, an image that most of all - I am sure - frightened him. Better to refuel the cave of massacres accompanied by a life of modest interest. Professional utility comes before quality, that is, before being. To face the clash with doing we need that audacity of conscience that Abbagnano lacked entirely. This is why - peeling off the metaphysical dialectic - his defense of doing is often sloppy and clumsy.

Abbagnano also focuses on the experimental nature of science to insist on the rooting of man in the world. He writes: "There is no science without observation. The critical direction of contemporary science excludes the legitimacy of any statement that does not formulate the result of an observation, not only executable, but actually performed. Now observation is the act of man's insertion into the world, his taking root in the world, and realizing himself as part of it. To observe any physical reality, man must himself be part of the physical reality and become an instrument of observation. But by penetrating this act into physical reality as part of it, he alters reality itself. This is the origin of the uncertainty relation characteristic of today's physics ». (*Ib.* , P. 175). Again the key word is "take root" in the world. Unfortunately nothing is said about this world except that it is considered as "totality". But the totality of the facts is not the complete world, it is the incompleteness that tries without succeeding to complete itself. Here it is common sense that Abbagnano gives an account, a point around which a large part of the positive existentialist problematic revolves. Not even the shadow of the loneliness that generates quality or, at least, the restlessness of quality. Of the existence of other experiences, not even talking about them. Of the remembrance that speaks to destiny in terms of happiness or death, only silence. Doing alone, only for doing has words, only for doing Abbagnano is a philosopher and has notable dialectical connections. Of the irresistible appeal to knowledge as a qualitative adventure - as I suspected it - he understood only the accounting aspect of a cost-benefit calculation. Indeed, he was convinced that it paved the way for certain ruin. Yet he passed, and continued to pass, for a problematic philosopher, for a risk taker, for one who considered existence as exposure to this risk. Nothing more wrong. This statement is supported by the page devoted to the language of science, mathematics. He writes: «This ultimate foundation of science also justifies the choice of its language, mathematics. Each language is a specific type of rationality which implies a specific ordering of the elements of the world. Common language constitutes an order of this kind or, if you like, a set of orders that outline the project of uses, behaviors and immediate reactions. Common language means more often than not things whose reality is the immediate possibility of use. Mathematical language is not a specific type of rationality and does not imply a specific ordering of its elements. Rather, it is the very possibility of every type of rationality and of every possible order, and as such it carries within itself the possibility of measure. Expressing itself in mathematical language, science frees itself from the suggestions and limitations of common

language, becomes capable of ordering the results of its observations in every possible form and therefore in the most appropriate form, and of being able to extend the possibility of measurement indefinitely. Within the limits of common language, science should necessarily express the results of observation in an image of the world which would limit the possibilities of observation, and therefore of measurement and prediction, to the terms of this image. In mathematical language, science encounters no limits in the ordering of the results of its observations, and therefore guarantees itself the widest possibility of measurement and prediction ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 176-177). This exaltation of mathematical omnipotence has some questionable implications for those who have a minimum of preparation in this regard. I didn't have it at the time and was skeptical but cautious. I had no way of arguing. Now I feel like I'm breaking down an open door. The myth of metalanguages has long since vanished. Men have always dreamed of a language capable of overcoming the drawbacks of genericity and conflictuality of common languages, but this dream has been shattered in the silence of formulas. A superstition like any other. To bring down the metalinguistic crest was the same technical arrogance that went off the tangent, without worrying about saving, if nothing else, its ancillary role. Abbagnano does not persevere in the dream - not his, by the way - he finds himself at first in error, that's all. He does not understand that it is precisely his linguistic extremism, his notation technique, that kills the function that mathematics performs for the making and for the essentialization of knowledge. After all, doing would suffer a great deal from the reduction of language to a role of simple support of scientific research, but it would not make me melt in tears. Do not take into account that the search for quality, while being absolutely other, always starts from doing, that is, from knowledge, it is one of the biggest obstacles to overcoming, as well as making remembrance practically unintelligible.

The role that philosophy must cover is therefore the one mentioned above, and here Abbagnano reaffirms it, confirming science as the totality of knowledge. «The affirmation that science is knowledge only means that all the possible problems concerning the world fall within its sphere: by world the totality of which man is a part in the same way as the other considerable objects. The nature of knowledge or science is therefore characterized and defined solely by the manner of concern that its problems have with man: man enters into these problems as one of their terms alongside the others.

«Now every problem has with man (as we have seen) a second way of relating much more intimate and narrow. Somehow man is the problem (not one of its terms); indeed, it is the essential, irreplaceable, unavoidable problematic nature of the problem. Philosophy must, if possible, find a way of accessing this problematic nature: a way of approaching it which must clarify this problematicity in order to guarantee its specific way of being.

“This approach is not knowledge. A cognitive problem is a problem of which man is only one of the terms with no privilege whatsoever over the others. But the problematic nature of a problem is man himself, and insofar as this problematic nature is man is not a term of the problem ". (*Ib .*, Pp. 178-179). Return to problematicity as the essence of man himself. No disinterest between philosophy and man, while this is the rule between science and man. Questionable distinction. Abbagnano starts from the assumption that man lies in silence within the philosophical protection that grasps him in the moment of possible risk and accompanies him to the possible foundation of himself. This is all nonsense. Or it makes sense in superabundance, a common sense that puts in place the objects

produced by the making, avoiding any dispersion. These philosophical operations - eminently technical - have the task of giving the appearance of human problems to be traceable to the most intimate nature of reality. It is not so. Being remains unmanifested in the face of philosophy, tied to the qualitative network from which it cannot be separated for the simple metaphysical game. The philosophical doer may be raving about realizing his own powerlessness in the face of the incompleteness of doing, but his claimed conquests are there to testify to his own inconsistency. Sometimes the philosophical theory gives the impression of being ready to denounce the cheating of doing, of knowing how to deal with a power that manages to manage itself in the most absolute oppression. But it is only an impression.

Abbagnano clarifies his conservative thinking even better. «Philosophy is a commitment of man to himself. The problematic nature of which it tends to clarify the meaning is not present to it as an object of investigation, as an objective being, but always and only as a must, a norm that incessantly calls to decision and choice. Clarifying the constitutive problematic nature of man means not making its objective meanings explicit, but deciding on its authentic meaning and assuming the resulting attitude. The problematic nature itself becomes, in every attempt to clarify it, its own measure and its own norm, and its analysis, typical of philosophy, has no other task than to keep them and guarantee them always open and alive in the future ». (*Ib.*, Pp. 179-180). Once more a "must be", a "norm", comforting words but which have nothing to do with being. Once again Abbagnano shows philosophy as he understands it, as a protective shield against any adventurous interference of quality. Only the fictitious version of being, that is, the factual appearing forced, is connected with the philosophical consequences that all lead to the cave of massacres. Philosophical complicity is evident - actually not only with regard to positive existentialism - as soon as the mystifying veil that surrounds and covers the hegemony of doing is lifted. This is why there is always a particular benevolence of this apparently risky philosophy towards guaranteed possessive accommodation. Basically it is a simple metaphysical modification of the forced factual mechanism. The spider web of this collaborative metaphysics could be shaken easily, and we have tried it several times, but it is not worth it to pursue this possibility to the end, to rage on it to the bitter end. After so many years, I realized that Abbagnano has elaborated his positive existentialism, this apparently feverish and convulsive creature, to respond to the historical needs of the moment - the 1940s-1950s - and to be able to withdraw in complete safety and breathe after the short bric-à-brac with fascism. Others, at the same time, allowed themselves to be consumed with other theories and this did not happen to them with impunity, even without wanting to affirm that by taking more concrete risks they realized where to connect quality. I do not believe. I am referring to philosophers like Gentile, Rensi, Paci, certainly not to philosophers like Aliotta and Croce, lined up on opposite horizons. But perhaps the reference is out of place. As far as I know Abbagnano has never boasted of a conservative contribution, on the contrary he has always thought of giving a push towards the problematic nature and the risk of existence. Well, in that he was wrong.

Regarding the language of philosophy - that of science, it has been said, is mathematics - Abbagnano is even more accommodating. He tries to reject the technicality of a philosophical metalanguage, borrowed from mathematics, like the difficulties of many languages used by philosophers, who also derive them from the so-called language of common sense. And here he writes: "As every authentic philosophy, despite its diversity from the others, is always philosophy, so the philosophical language must have a fundamental intersubjectivity, which is always more or less explicitly expressed in the premises of philosophy, but it always goes

beyond beyond them and can act and occur even when it does not act and does not occur according to its express intentions. Now the only protagonist of philosophy is, as we have seen, man, insofar as he is a living problematic or living problem to himself. So that the tacit or expressed way of the intersubjectivity of philosophical language is the possibility of language to promote clarity about himself and his attitudes in man ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 183-184). The leading word here is "clarity", persuasive clarity. In short, the basis for any doing that does not want to fall into confusion. But how can one capture the world, the same world of forced action, in the skimpy alveolus of clarity? How to tear the many tangles that make it, after all, an unknown world? Is it possible that Abbagnano did not notice the smallness of this project? Will he have thought that it is much better to keep than to risk? Maybe. Much more likely he did not think that, but quite the opposite. The illusions of philosophy are endless. His task was quite clear to him, only it wasn't exactly what he thought he saw in front of him. The phantoms of appearance are pernicious and hard to snatch away, especially when every effort made rekindles them in their task of making appearance appear grounded and solid. It would be necessary to act with courage and wisdom, two qualities not possessed by the philosopher, of any philosopher, at least with a few exceptions. The way of overcoming cannot accept the ghosts of appearing, it must critically question them. To do this, he needs knowledge. Abbagnano's philosophical-scientific diatribe on this point is a ridiculous attempt to confuse the waters. But this knowledge cannot be used in the qualitative adventure, at least it cannot be imposed with the absolute air of objectivity. Any such attempt, however courageous, is bound to come back. Remembrance itself is unable to understand why. Quality is freedom from ghosts and it is also freedom from knowledge, access to wisdom, quantitative emptying. Otherwise you are disfigured. There is a movement of the soul that cannot be translated into metaphysical devices, it is a direct relationship - once the overcoming of doing has been carried out - with quality. We are faced with a forcing of our physiological defenses, against which it is not always easy to go. The simplest deep breath can become something reckless and the greatest guarantee a burden from which you want to free yourself at all costs.

The paradox of the technique

After having highlighted the failures caused by the insane development of technology, in his time not even comparable to what we have under our eyes today, Abbagnano tackles the problem by placing it in the relationship between man and the world. He affirms: «... one must immediately face the misunderstanding into which one inevitably falls when conceiving the development of science and human work, of the regnum hominis, as a progressive detachment of man from the natural world. Man, of course, is not a slave to things or to the forces of nature when he comes to use them; but his independence from the world does not mean breaking his relationship with the world, but the strengthening and deepening of that relationship. Which means that the technique, among other miracles, cannot do that of isolating man from the world and giving him that kind of independence that allows him to completely ignore the surrounding world and to live as if it were not there. On the contrary, it infinitely multiplies the determinations of the fundamental relationship between man and the world and thus multiplies and strengthens the threads that on all sides hold man to the natural totality of which he belongs. Therefore the technique multiplies the needs in the very act which gives the means to satisfy them. The independence it confers on man does not consist in an impossible self-sufficiency, which would make useless the use of any instrument, whether simple or complex, but only in the increasingly guaranteed possibility of a relationship with the world that is not resolved with the defeat or renunciation of man in front of it ». (*Philosophy , Religion , Science , op. Cit*

., Pp. 189-190). Here, too, the leading word is better "guaranteed" possibility. Here's what the technique does. It strengthens the relationship with the world and authentically roots man in his choice. We know this statement is at least dubious. Basing this relationship on the greatest possible advantage to be obtained is precisely an affirmation that is based on the logic of accumulation. The more you do, the better. Perhaps Abbagnano would have changed his views if he had seen the breakdowns that were not foreseeable in the 1950s, perhaps not. But even then, on calm and not obtuse reflection, the danger of a senseless use of resources, an economic problem of which the philosopher ignores the essential bases, leapt to the eye. In fact, he merely keeps a certain distance from this problem. For him the forces of technology are in the hands of man, he uses them and controls them. It does not occur to him that unforeseen disastrous results could occur due to the consequences of an unbridled delirium. The apparitions of nuclear ghosts do not disturb him, he looks at the use for humans and he does it with relief. After all, isn't man the lord and master of the world? It is enough to follow the technique in its productions and its modifications to enjoy its benefits and live happily in the face of massacres. An honest philosopher cannot ask for more. This is the hidden substance of his teaching and it is also his model of quantitative freedom.

Here is the answer-solution. Destructive power, artfully confused with constructive power, is sucked into the same medium. Here he is as he continues: «Now this relationship is not resolved to the advantage of man if man abandons the attitude that gives rise to technology. If man neglects the search for the instrumentality of things and the work aimed at reshaping them for the purposes of their usability, he does not therefore terminate his relationship with the world but ignores it and becomes its slave because he becomes unable to provide for his simplest needs. Therefore the only real alternative that lies ahead is that of accepting and fully realizing the relationship with the world is to courageously push forward, as far as possible, scientific research and the technical organization of one's work. It may well be that all the complained evils derive, not from technique, but from insufficient or timid acceptance of it, and that therefore the only effective remedy consists in the explicit and radical acceptance of all that it is and must be.

"In that case, the correction of the technique could only be the technique itself. Its anti-humanity derives only from the fact that it is not yet sufficiently technical, that it is not yet realized as such. And in turn, this lack of realization would depend on man's shyness and flight from it, on the fear with which man himself is sometimes taken in front of it ". (*Ib.* , Pp. 190-191). Once again the solution is indicated in strengthening the road that is being traveled. I believe the highest level of conservatism is reached at this precise point. Basically this attitude towards the world is not only blind faith in the forces of doing, which govern the productive structure and make objects intelligible, but it is also fear of the different. Now, as we know, this fear hides another, more serious and greater, the fear of death. All positive existentialism is an escape from the danger of uncertainty that comes dangerously close to death. A hint of the problematic nature of life that could get lost in death - even now, the unexpected guest could suddenly arrive - is okay, as long as it is a hint immediately brought back, through the usual dialectical leaps, to the order and rhythm of measure. The fear of death is, considering the problem in all its aspects, the presence of the gods who solicit completing perfection precisely what cannot be completed, in the world of doing, except with death. How to get out of this circle of fears that is getting closer and closer? By letting things go as they always have, you avoid attracting the attention of death. No one should disturb the sacred stillness of doing and the philosopher is the priest of this rite which changes only to remain the same.

The core of conservatism lies right here. Stay at home or invade someone else's home, only when you are sure you can make it your own with little risk. Conservatives are the 3% capitalists, they are not bandits or raiders.

Here's how you should correct technique with technique. Abbagnano borders on the incredible in this decidedly out of time page: «As the technique develops, that is, it becomes truly technical, the tasks of the work become more complicated and difficult. A complicated machine requires an active spirit of vigilance, control and initiative. The number of technicians and skilled workers multiplies in the technically equipped workshops. Manpower does not disappear, but in a certain way it is outside the technique, which requires a specific ability or talent for each task. The technique promotes and highlights individual talents, making their use possible; and thereby allows each one to do the work for which he is suitable and promotes the differentiation of tasks as well as of men. And it also determines the formation of a hierarchy of tasks and functions in which the direction naturally belongs to intelligence and good will. It is true that it requires a rigorous discipline without which the whole organization gets jammed or damaged, but this discipline has nothing arbitrary because it represents the order of an intrinsic device of which each element has its own reason for to be". (*Ib .*, P. 192). Supporting words are once again "hierarchy" and "discipline". An immense effort to secure the development of the technique, to silence the evil gods that hide in it. No longer the conjurations of the old days, but philosophy. The fact is that the conservative never feels safe, so he multiplies his precautions and his prudence ends up becoming an obsession. As a philosopher, he narrows his field of observation, so as to more easily find comforting evidence. What he lacks is a solid place to rest his feet to develop his chains of comforting reasoning. Doing is certainly a solid but not complete point, so it recalls arbitrariness and uncertainty and, therefore, once again, the fear of death. In the darkness of incompleteness, dark forces seem to hinder the quantitative mechanisms and the philosopher warns them at work, he feels that the danger is so serious that the whole world could collapse and that coexistence with the world also becomes uncertain. That's why he wants to remedy it. But his theories and, worse still, his dialectical squiggles, are only a babble.

So the technique is humanized by man and does not dehumanize him. Abbagnano writes: «... the technique is not the machine, but the creation and conscious use of increasingly complex machines, requiring functions in which the part of the individual initiative and the solidarity of tasks becomes ever greater. Technique includes the machine in the totality of a properly human organization, which cannot stand and develop except on the basis of a specifically human, and therefore spiritual, attitude. The technique includes as a first and fundamental condition of oneself the understanding of the technique; and the understanding of the technique is the man in his fundamental attitude ». (*Ib .*, Pp. 193-194). Here there is an absolute rejection of the danger that man falls prisoner of the effective mechanism, of which technology is the apotheosis of the capacity for exploitation. These are not sincere words, it does not seem possible that Abbagnano really believed in this conservative extremism. Basically - if you want for convenience or ignorance, economic science was not his strong point - as a metaphysician he had to know that no dialectical mechanism is capable of including itself in the justification to which it is called. In doing there are dark forces, impossible to fully clarify them, and this is what leads philosophy to the cave of massacres. The unleashing of these forces - indispensable for forced production - produces visible shady effects of which little or nothing is known because those who could investigate them prefer not to take risks and not find themselves at the mercy of restlessness. Is there a different way of making philosophical theories? I

do not know. The sadness seems to me generalized. When one of Croce's collaborators, Antonio Bruno, in the moral philosophy exam told me not to talk to him about the usual philosophical chatter but about my experiences in prison, I think he got a little closer to this problem. Just a matter of millimeters, nothing more. Abbagnano would not have been able to, even though he was immeasurably deeper than Bruno in philosophical knowledge. From which it appears that it is not a question of knowledge. This problem does not grant me respite, it has never granted it to me, even now, in the terrible nights of the Greek prison where I am writing this book at the age of seventy-three. The vanity of all this should seem clear to me, yet here my ghosts come to visit me wrapped in the usual haze that revolves around my remembrance experiences. And the desire for knowledge takes over, and I retrace with my mind and heart the many initiated and unfinished paths, the many readings, the systems that would have guaranteed me an infinite multiplicity of learning, the memorization techniques, when the end of all this? When is emptying? When is wisdom? I am not afraid of death, even if my current physical weakness favors thoughts about it. I am not afraid of the unexpected guest because I know how to speak to fate, at least I think.

But back to Abbagnano, his position on technique is completely wrong. Dialectical skill itself cannot hide it. Unfortunately for the philosophers, when they talk about concrete things they are forced to raise their paw, and then you can see the tail. He writes this lapidary sentence: «Now the technique for the very intrinsic necessity of its realization, excludes that man mechanize himself or lose his properly human abilities because this would immediately amount to his arrest and his dissolution». (*Ib.*, P. 195). Instead, the technique is just the opposite, however perfected its achievements may be. If the philosopher does not act - and how could he if his ideal is only the philosophical object - he remains entangled in the power of the cavern of massacres. He sits comfortably to systematize his beautiful theory, observes that this theory takes shape and that it channels itself towards its underground dwelling, but he cannot and does not want to intervene, he looks away, after all he is only a philosopher because to insist by telling him something more? What else can he do but develop his theory? And if someone like me points out the blood, down there, in the underground guarded and remote in the eyes of all, this someone remains unheard. The philosopher is deaf by profession. Philosophy is an argument against quality, it reconfirms and preserves only the dominant reason, the quantity produced by doing. It cannot go further. How did it happen that it weakened to such an extent? I do not know. I wonder if there has ever been a time when it was different, stronger, able to go beyond. Perhaps the intuitions of the first philosophers? I do not know.

Here is how these statements by Abbagnano on technique find their nature, their way of placing themselves in the exact point where the world needed, and perhaps needs them. This world based on slime, of course. Abbagnano's last words on this problem of technology are a tombstone on his philosophy. «With man's recognition of his relationship with the world as essential and constitutive of himself, the first condition of the autohumanization of technique, that is, of its realization as a technique, is guaranteed. The second condition is the limitation of the man in a certain work task and to commit himself to this task. Commitment supposes the free choice of the task and the ability to carry it out. Technique requires not only that everyone do the work for which they are suitable, but that this work be chosen freely and that the choice be made as a commitment. An automatic selection of attitudes is contrary to the principle of technique, because it supposes that this is based on the automatism of work while instead it is founded on the freedom and capacity for initiative of individuals in the context of a common solidarity.

«Technique is an order, in which everyone performs the work or function for which he is suitable and which he himself recognizes as his own. This implies that in the determination of the work task of each one only the consideration of the capacity, of his initiative and of his choice enters, and instead every extraneous consideration is excluded, that is not inferred from the intrinsic necessity of the technical organization. Technique requires that no privileges or prejudices of any kind enter into that determination and that everyone has the place that is due to him in relation to his aptitudes and his capacity for initiative and commitment ». (*Ib.* , Pp. 195-196). What Abbagnano lets slip out of his mouth here is exactly the opposite of what the technique achieves. One could rewrite this page by turning it upside down and at the end be faced with an acceptable analysis. Note that here - a sign of exasperation or fatigue? - the metaphysical mental leap of the dialectic is completely missing. His words are a hymn to conservation but a hymn in which the usual tone and skill are far out of date. I have reported them because they belong to his way of seeing the world but also because they are a rare example of how modest a philosopher's contribution can be to matters of a practical nature. He has a vision of productive doing that does not even touch reality. He observes the technique like a ghost and predicts ghostly movements. The appearance of doing is violently concrete, it does not have the inconsistency of an ectoplasm. His products, objects - therefore also the reflections of philosophers - travel far in the company of other objects, and play an essential role of correspondence and coordination. That we cannot be very pleased with this situation which is destined to worsen is a reflection that many other philosophers made at the time. Abbagnano, however, pursued his own positive program - what later became the neo-Enlightenment - to which he wanted to be faithful to the last. But, after all, the task of philosophy - particularly of its metaphysical appearance - is it not that of being intimately coherent, that is, of not betraying its premises? And this was basically his understanding and that of his meager school, which crumbled in the short space of time. Research always weakens in conservation and the test bed of the technique is to be considered a real donkey bridge. Abbagnano failed to go beyond a justification of doing, which might sound strange for a problematic philosopher, but this uncertainty was only in the intellectual tension of the relationship with possibility, an only apparent tension, the ancient corpse of the object lay beside to its logical and dialectical leaps, inanimate.

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Philosophy cannot be resolved either in the self-observation of conscience, nor in the construction of the ever present conscience in general, nor in historical knowledge. Consciousness is a limit. Even when it is the object of consideration, it evades any objective consideration. The thesis according to which, in philosophizing, we start from conscience, is false if it claims to already consider as a philosophical thought the universal analyzes carried out in a logical, psychological and historical context by that conscience which is available to all at all times, is true if it refers to those clarifications that have existential consciousness as their starting point and area of realization. Being has remained suspended due to the incomprehensibility of being-in-itself. It appeared as a limit in the analysis of being there. But while being-in-itself remains completely inaccessible to me because, as an absolute otherness, it is almost nothing for thought, I am in turn that I who is placed as a limit to the analysis of being-there. In the search for being there, this is the further step that must be taken. Being-I as an empirical being, as consciousness in general, as a possible existence. If I ask myself

what I mean when I say "I", the first answer arises from that process of objectification that occurs when I reflect on myself, and for which I am this body as I am this individual, with an indeterminate self-awareness that reflects what I am worth in that sphere of things and people that surround me: I am as an empirical being there. Secondly, I am an "I" essentially identical to any other self: I am replaceable. This substitutability does not refer to the identity of the average qualities of empirical individuals, but to the being-I in general which expresses subjectivity as a condition of the whole being-object: I am as consciousness in general. Thirdly, I experiment in the possibility for unconditionality. I don't want to know only what is there for reasons and counter-reasons, but I want to know starting from the abyssality of an origin; and in acting I have moments in which I am sure that what I now want and do, I want it authentically. I want to be so that this wanting to know and this acting belong to me. In the way I want to know and act my essence comes into action, of which I am certain even if I do not yet know it. For this possibility, which is freedom to know and act, I am "possible existence". The ego is therefore not univocally determined, but has many meanings. As consciousness in general I am the subjectivity for which objects exist as objective and universally valid realities. Every real consciousness participates in this consciousness in general insofar as it grasps the being that becomes an object as it is for everyone. I am empirical individuality as an objectified subjectivity. As such, I re-enter the indefinite multiplicity of individuals as a particular individual who presents himself only once. For consciousness in general I am this individuality as an empirical being, and as such I become the object of psychology, an object that is truly inexhaustible. In this way I can observe and investigate myself, but I cannot recognize myself as a totality. Ultimately, as a possible existence, I am a being that refers and relates to its possibility, and as such is not the object of any consciousness in general. With the understanding of the meaning of possible existence, the circle of all modes of objective and subjective being is broken. Philosophy refers to the modes of being-I in the sense that it admits their existence and avoids resolving them into a generic identity. Each of these modes possesses, from a certain point of view, a primacy that in philosophizing is conditioned to the absolute primacy of possible existence. The primacy of the empirical ego is recognized to that ego that is subjected to the conditions dictated by the necessity of being there, it is a relative ego that does not exist by itself. The primacy of consciousness in general consists in being for my subjectivity the condition of every being. It is a matter of a formal primacy that dominates every subjectivity and every objectivity and that can be clarified by these two orders of considerations. I don't just be there like life, but I know I am there. I think I might as well not be there. If, however, I try to think of myself as non-existent in general, then I cannot help but notice that with the world I involuntarily allow myself to exist too, in the form of a precise consciousness in general for which this world would be. I also think there may be nothing in general. But even this thought I can only express and not really realize, because it is always and still "I" who think it, and therefore I cannot avoid assuming my existence even if I deny that of the world. The being of the interrogator always remains as his conscience in general, so it seems that I

can really continue to think about the whole other being. The being of the thinker therefore requires his specific primacy as consciousness in general, if only in that limited sense that foresees the impossibility of not thinking of him, at least temporarily, as the last being without which nothing else is given. The ego as a possible existence holds the decisive primacy for philosophizing, because it bursts into the circle of being formed by being-object and being-me. Possible existence is that moving on being in itself which in this circle is present only negatively as a limit. Perhaps it opens up in the world of objects that path which is closed to consciousness in general. This philosophizing, which for empirical being there is nothing, and which for consciousness in general is an unfounded imagination, for possible existence is the way that leads to itself and to being authentic. Existence is what never becomes an object, it is the origin starting from which I think and act, it is what I speak of in that succession of thoughts that do not reach any knowledge; existence is that which relates to itself, and in this, to its transcendence. Can there exist what cannot be realized as an object among objects? Evidently, the "I am" cannot be an object, which is accessible only if it is conceived as an empirical being and as consciousness in general. The problem now is to establish whether with the understanding of being in all its objectivity and subjectivity I have completed my task, or whether I can make myself present as myself in another way as well. With this we have reached the point around which the sense of philosophizing moves for us. It is not possible to define the being of existence with a concept that should suppose a reference to a specific being-object. First of all, the word is one of those that only mean to be. From an obscure beginning this reality entered history, but in philosophical thought it was only a presentiment to which, later, Kierkegaard gave expression with this word with a content that is historically conditioned for us. To be means to decide originally. For me they are as they are now and for just once, even if, as an individual, I am a case of the universal, subjected to the causal law and obedient to the legitimate demands of what is objectively imposed as a duty. But where I originate from myself, not everything has yet been fully decided and according to universal laws. I not only do not know, due to the indefinite number of conditions, how something will have to be decided, but, on another completely different plane, I am also the one who decides for himself what it is. This thought, which cannot be objectified, is the freedom-consciousness of possible existence. On the basis of it, I cannot think that ultimately everything follows its path, and that there is nothing left for me to do but what I like best, justifying everything with general arguments that are always available, because, regardless of everything the dependence and the determination of my being there, in the end I realize that something depends only on me. What I can grasp or leave behind, what I place first and only, what is still I keep within the scope of possibility and what I realize does not result from universal rules capable of guaranteeing the correctness of my behavior, nor from psychological laws that condition me, but it springs, in the restlessness of my being there, from the certainty of being-himself by virtue of freedom. Where I no longer consider myself psychologically conditioned and therefore no longer act naively under the pressure of the unconscious, but, starting from the positivity of my momentum, in the clarity of a

certainty which, while not offering me any knowledge, founds my own being, there I decide what I am. I know a call to which I respond internally with the realization of my being. I sense who I am, but not as an isolated individual. Instead of the randomness of my empirical being closed in its obstinacy, I catch myself in communication. In fact, I am never so sure of my identity as when I put myself at the complete disposal of the other and, in this revealing opposition, I come to be myself because the other also arrives at his identity. Starting from the possible existence, I grasp the historicity of my being that, from the multiplicity of knowable realities, reaches the depth of existence. What is outwardly determination and limit is inwardly a manifestation of authentic being. Those who love only humanity, love no one, instead love those who turn to a determined man. Those who are rationally consistent and keep faith in pacts are not yet faithful, but those who accept as their own and recognize themselves in what they have done and in the places they have loved are faithful. Whoever wants the exact and definitive organization of the world wants absolutely nothing, but whoever, in his historical situation, grasps the possible as his own, wants something. If I am rooted in historicity, temporal existence has no meaning in and of itself, but only if it is decided in time for eternity. Time, in fact, as the future is possibility, as the past is fidelity, as the present is decision. Time, therefore, is not a simple passing, but a manifestation of existence which, in it, is realized through its decisions. To the extent that this sense is recognized in temporality and is aware of it, it is immediately overcome not in favor of an abstract timelessness, but in the sense that, in time, I am beyond time and not out of time. As the consciousness of a life dominated by vital impulses and by its finite yearning for happiness, I want the persistence of time as if the solution of the anguish of being there were in blind duration. As a living consciousness I cannot cancel this will, just as I cannot eliminate the pain of transience. Both belong to the nature of my being there. But if over time I act and live unconditionally, over time it is eternity. My intellect is not able to understand this truth that lights up only in a few moments and then in some uncertain memory. For my part, I cannot attain it as one attains an external possession. The difference that constitutes it says nothing to the intellect as consciousness in general, but it is an appeal for possible existence. In all known objectivity, the real being loses its reality in temporal duration, in natural determinism, or in the nullity of what is only passing; existence, on the other hand, is realized by making choices in temporal historicity where it has the possibility of projecting itself, despite the dissolution of objectivity, towards the completeness of time. Eternity is neither timelessness nor temporal duration, but the depth of time as a historical phenomenon of existence. Existence meets the other existence in the situation as in the world, without becoming knowable as a being-of-the-world. What is in the world I grasp as I am consciousness in general: of existence, on the other hand, I am not sure if not in the transcending of possible existence. The being that is bindingly recognizable is there in front of me as a thing. I can grasp it directly, and with it I can do something on the technical level if it is about things, or on the logical level if it is about arguments between me and another consciousness. In it there is the resistance proper to a given, whether it is the material resistance of

empirical reality, or whether it is the logic that accompanies what is necessary or impossible for thought. In any case it is an objective being, either as an original object, or as something that is adequately objectified as in the models and types used as instruments of investigation. Existence, which itself does not exist on the empirical level, appears as being there for possible existence. Obviously the leap that exists between the world and existence, between what can be known and what can only be clarified, between the being-object and the being-free of existence, cannot be eliminated in thinking. But both these ways of being are in fact so intimately connected that separating them, for a consciousness that is at the same time possible existence, is an infinite task, in the fulfillment of which the knowledge of the being of the world and the clarification of existence they are produced together. Only in the abstract is it possible to express in formulas the split between objective being and existence as a being of freedom. Objective being is given as a mechanism, life and consciousness; while as existence, I am origin, obviously not origin of being in general, but origin for me in being there. For the being of things there is no freedom, for freedom the being of things is not an authentic being. Being as substance and being as freedom do not constitute a juxtaposition of two ways of being that can be coordinated. Despite being in a reciprocal relationship, they are absolutely incomparable to each other. Being in the sense of being-object and being in the sense of being-free are excluded. One passes from time to timelessness or endless duration, the other from time to eternity. What is or is valid in every time is objectivity, what, while disappearing in the instant, is eternal, is existence. The one exists only for a subject who thinks it, the other, although never without an object, really exists only for existence in communication. From the point of view of the world, every manifestation of existence is pure objectivity, therefore consciousness, I, but not existence; from here one can never understand what one thinks of existence. From the point of view of existence its true being is only a manifestation in being-there, and being-there, which is not a manifestation of existence, nor authentic being-itself, is only a fall. It is as if originally all being were to be existence, and what is only there in it should be understood as an emptying, a misrepresentation, a loss of existence. There is therefore no indication capable of guiding from the objective being to the other being, if not, indirectly, the split and the opening of this being. Yet existence, penetrating the forms of objective being, understands them as means for its realization and as a possibility for its manifestation. Situated on the border between world and existence, possible existence sees all being there not only as being there. From the most remote point of view, from the mechanism, the being, so to speak, becomes closer in life and in consciousness, in order to find itself authentic in existence. Or, from this limit, one thinks, with consciousness in general, of being there as pure and simple being there; but each being has the possibility of being relevant to existence as its impulse or its means. If existence exists only with and by virtue of other existences, from the objective point of view it makes no sense to speak of a multiplicity of existences. Since their being is always historical and is realized in that communication between existence and existence that makes each of them, in the darkness of the being of the world, a being for each other, this being of

theirs, which it does not allow other ways of being than that of mutual reference, it has no value for a conscience in general which can only judge from the outside. Being invisible from the outside, existences cannot be considered as a multiplicity. On the one hand, the being of the world is offered to the possible existence, articulated in the ways of being foreseen by consciousness in general, on the other existences are. Nowhere is there a being closed in on itself, neither objectively as it could be the constitution of the only being-of-the-world, nor existentially as it could be the constitution of the only world of existences as the only sphere of thought and possible considerations. When I think of a being, it is always a determined being, not a being. When I ascertain the possible existence, I do not consider existence as an object, nor do I ascertain an existence in general, but only of myself and the existence that communicates with me. We are from time to time absolutely irreplaceable, and not cases of a conceptual kind such as that of "existence". At this point existence becomes the sign to indicate the direction of the self-assessment of a being that cannot be thought objectively, nor in terms of universal validity; it is the being that nobody knows and that nobody can affirm in the fullness of its meaning, neither referring to itself, nor referring to anything else. The opening question: "What is being?" did not find a single answer. The answer to this question satisfies only those who, by asking it, recognize their own being in it. But the very question it asks of being is not univocal, because it depends on who asks it. In order to exist as consciousness in general, the question has no original meaning, because this consciousness is dispersed in the multiplicity of the determined being. Only from the possible existence does the passion arise which causes the being in itself to be questioned beyond all being-there and all being-object, but the definitive answer does not come to it from a determined knowledge. What there is is appearing not being, and not even nothing. In this proposition the meaning of the term "appearing" has its categorical origin in the particular and objective relationship that is established between how a thing appears from a point of view and how it is in itself regardless of this point of view. In the sense of objectively, therefore, appearing is the aspect of something that is thought of as an objective background, something which, although not in itself the objective, is only thought as an object, because, in principle, it could be known to me. as such (for example atoms). In the category of appearing, transcending with it that determined and objectifying relationship that is established between what lies at the bottom and what appears, the whole being is thought when one seeks to be. But now in the temporal being, the being that appears remains in an insuperable duplicity that foresees the inaccessibility of the being-in-itself of transcendence, which is unthinkable as an objective basis, and the being present to itself of existence. which is not empirical consciousness. Existence and transcendence are heterogeneous, but related to each other. This relationship also manifests itself in being there. As being there is the object of investigation, it is the appearance of something that theoretically arises as a background. Neither existence nor transcendence are accessible to inquiry ».

(K. Jaspers, *Philosophy*, tr. It., Turin 1978, pp. 123-132).

Brief conclusion

After all, these do not add up. Wasted effort? Not exactly. It was advised to me not by remembrance but by remembrance. Poor thing, could I - and should I - add, an added vanity, a senile weakness, remember the good old days? No it does not. It wasn't a good time and it's not quite gone yet. This is not about nostalgia, but about strengthening the ancient force field. Ridiculous consolation, some might add, perhaps with a thread of reason, but only a thread. There was in my ancient claim to impose an unacceptable model for the great master, a youthful impudence and an ignorant obtuseness, of course there were these aspects, but there was also a blind desire to go further, not the desire to forget about myself in a comfortable and safe place. There was a sense of the deep, visceral, intimate union between me and knowledge, without explanatory intermediaries, without justifying incisions, without lightening splits. I didn't listen, I didn't read, I didn't select, I just lived and my life was knowing in any way, my raw material was knowledge, not only philosophical but of any kind. Memorization techniques allowed me to hoard - and forget - incredible inflows of knowledge. What went into circulation in the force field was perhaps a minimum residue - always in the quantitative sense - but it provided unthinkable diffusion and reverberations, completely incomprehensible to a professionally conditioned mind. A war machine of this kind arouses around it an aura of distrust and fascination, two opposing and strident tendencies, towards which I did absolutely nothing. I was a scapegoat and spiritual guide, I created the void around me and I procured unexpected friendships between cheaters and jugglers. I couldn't be otherwise.

Otherwise it was Abbagnano. His analyzes are constantly aimed at bringing the problematic nature of life back to the authenticity of certainty, where the ridiculous conservative conscience rests. He could not do otherwise, everything in him converged towards this ideal of guarantee and safety. Leaving the problematic nature of life to itself would have been for him an outrage to the secular sanctity of philosophy, to the mission with which he felt invested. On asking him to withdraw a little from the daily truth of his poor interests, he would have replied that there was no second aim in this attitude, a purely personal purpose, but what governed everything was the obvious and natural connection of his own theoretical presuppositions. I am a philosopher, he might have said, and I cannot be anything else.

In my analysis I have repeatedly spoken of forced action. This is one of the crucial points of my vision of life, it is not Abbagnano's terminology. Yet it is for doing as appearing and against acting as being that his whole philosophy is organized. It is linked to objectivity - attention, not objectivity - with a short chain, and he would not have liked these analyzes of mine precisely because they question not its chain but at least its length.

The different elements of positive existentialism, problematicity, authenticity, rootedness, guarantee, choice, risk, etc., - I quote at random - are only symbols, or rather, images bearing a particular sign that recalls their semantic meaning but is not completely identified with it. The use of these symbols is always connected with a dialectical recovery that brings back the extreme hypothesis that the symbol could contain in the image, to a reduced and domesticated condition, I would say housewife, full of common sense and positive optimism. This is not a game, although it may seem so. These images are real and Abbagnano derives them from the society of his time - the war and the postwar period - but from the same society he also derives the need to arrange things better, even sacrificing on them not only the legitimate conclusions

but the logic itself. He lives these symbols constructed in this way, pushed to their innate consequences, and then recovered in a dialectical rescue. The wound that the choice should impose in the individual and in the social body is not there, there is only the emblem, the sign of a wound. Not that this wound has disappeared or healed, a tampon and a simple disinfectant has been placed on it. The gangrene is left underneath to simmer, so that its result can safely be directed towards the cave of slaughter. For their part, the metaphorical movements of dialectics are also symbols that can be summed up in emblems.

In themselves, these pages of positive existentialism could be considered as trivial university exercises, but in my opinion they are something more. They are the sign of persistence in not wanting to see the conditions of reality, of not taking into consideration the cruelty of the mechanism that supports and justifies it. And this not seeing is not necessarily taken on, cowardly partisanship, it is also the inability of not being able to bear the collapse of a world, irremediably compromised by an active involvement in quality. The philosopher surrenders, lays down the critical burden and limits himself to hinting at conservation as the only possible outlet. Perhaps there is also a miserable entanglement in some workshop interest, and this I have only mentioned here and there, but it is not the main pivot of my critical attitude. In some applications of his dialectic there are correspondence losses. The one concerning the technique is sensational. As if between the lines the philosopher erroneously wanted to pass a difference in level, an exchange that was not well accepted, something metaphysically acephalous. My consideration is not pitiful, but a critical supposition, nothing personal. I'm not writing a conviction, I'm not a judge. I am not going around concrete obstacles, these are there and I have never tried to mitigate them. But it would seem to me to give birth to a mouse, affecting more deeply the technical aspects that are sometimes clearly inadequate.

Being does not allow us to identify a structure within it. Quality is an experience that prevents any stiffening, it is faced in the storm and in danger, then it can also be remembered, but it could be talking to the solid and impenetrable wall of the cave. Abbagnano never gave a nod to being, every time his philosophy spoke of it it was its opposite, to appear, as we know it daily in doing. The "rooting" he talks about suggests a dispersed life that anchors itself somewhere in being in order to save itself, but what could this anchorage be in something that does not allow pauses or allows itself to be grasped in a structure, even if destined to profound modifications?

Being is a sudden wind that upsets the preordained structure of our fears and generates confused profiles. Immersed in doing we do not even notice its existence. Abbagnano, abusing the term, has often spoken of existence that transcends itself into being. Bubbles as a metaphysician, the last resistance of a fearful person in the face of danger. Everything that is not comprehensible to the logic of doing, codified in the administration of little by little, denounces the approach of the wind of being, involuntary gestures, fearful and remote metaphors, delayed reflexes, unfulfilled obligations, secrets hatched for years that come to light like ghosts from graves. The desert wind has no mercy for anyone.

The recovery tool of the dialectic can comfort weak hearts, for the strong it is only a logical metaphor, a passage from one side of the same affirmation to the other. The opposite verse, a fictitious negation, takes the place of the right verse, a fictitious affirmation. Everything is played out in a process marked by movements that do not exist if not projected into the wall of the cave of the lake of blood. The being rests far from human wounds and sufferings, desired and imposed by a wickedness that pursues the achievement of appearing and for this reason opens the flesh and makes

it murder and slaughter. But it is not the being that kills, only its metaphor lived as life, where death had long since taken up residence and was waiting for nothing but a small push to greet its presence with an object disarticulation. Life lived in this way dies without realizing itself, that is, the being that it could have drawn on if it had not been afraid of dying. Abbagnano often overturns these plans without realizing it and the exchange is continuous as well as unnoticed for the uncritical reader. The dialectic has in him the task of undermining the object from the role assigned to it by doing and presenting it with tension or relationship or project or transcendence towards being. Impossible thing. The object is adjacent to quantity and here it lives and changes, here it is made dense and deaf, devoid of the yearning that it could feel towards quality if a courageous different consciousness - therefore objectively no longer immersed in objectivity - dragged it into overrun. This risky movement is not a kind of doubling, but it is like the breath of quality that we all feel and that few ask themselves what does it mean, what does it want to tell us?

Philosophers and non-philosophers, faced with doing, we are all little men afflicted by malignant fears. Everyone defends himself as he can, with the means at hand. And if someone wants to rebel against this normalizing law, the others look at him as if he were attacked by evil spirits. Attacking the apparatus of doing, declaring war on the reduction to an object of everything that surrounds us, that is, to appearance, is considered a sign of chronic neurasthenia by many psychologists. Possessing oneself reduced to an object is indicated as a model of healing, of rediscovered health, of being rooted - Abbagnano would say. But which being? It is once again embracing and holding a shadow as the being moves further and further away. The search for being is a sort of uprooting, in practice exactly a reverse movement to that predicted by Abbagnano. Every defense moves away from being, every attack on the Teutonic castle of doing brings us closer. Of course it takes some discernment in taking into consideration the knowledge packaged by doing, but that's not quite what we find in Abbagnano. Yet he was not lacking in technical means and not even a certain irony, more in speech than in writing. But all this crumbles in front of the task he evidently felt invested in. Recovering was its historical necessity, making existentialism a positive philosophy without glancing at where this effort of reorganization ended up.

The addresses considered nullistic of existentialism were not only contrary philosophies, theories different from their own, but they were dangers for being, considering the latter as a transcendence that can be reached in which to root or stabilize the problematic nature of everyday life based on doing. Here the metaphysical technique is a tool to fight at the frontier against the corsairs of nothingness, the adventurers of the impossible. That these philosophers - Sartre, Heidegger and Jaspers - were equally far from quality is another problem. Their distance was something that could not allow any roots, no positivity. Indeed, he threw chaos precisely in doing, he did not only glimpse it, as I have done in detail in these pages and as I confusedly did at the time defending my very personal way of knowing and managing knowledge. Abbagnano reacted to these perspectives which wreaked havoc on his very orderly problematic world. He revealed, to those who wanted to listen to him, the secret dangers of those other metaphysics, far from his, at least so he thought. But he didn't realize he was waging a fratricidal struggle. Basically, all versions of existentialism join hands in making every effort to remain tied only to appearance. There is not an overwhelming part on the others, perhaps on the technical level there are differences but on the theoretical proposals these vanish in the equivalences and contortions of metaphysics. Seeing in Sartre a nullism exasperated by his strong representations of the equivalences of choices is nothing more than a partial approach, basically the same comings and goings of his positions

suggests that he too wants to recover but in a different way. Being is nothing. If it intends to refer to making as appearing of being, to the object passed off as the only reality, the expression is unexceptionable. But this is not the case. Not going to being or not coming out of nothing are equivalent as movement, they are expressions of very acute tensions but only in appearance. There are no real collapses or real recoveries, everything is simply represented on the wall of the cave of massacres.

Abbagnano does not accept this negative representation because he wants to stage his positive representation. It is always about puppeteers. Puppets who lullaby to people, who do not want to wake them up, who on the contrary want to advise them on how to bear life, more precisely a production sequence administered with the apparent appearance of life. How to evaluate this role of puppeteer? The simplest way would be to let it go, to abandon the pages of these recuperators, Abbagnano in the first place, to oblivion. It didn't seem like the best solution. And then, I had a personal matter to close the accounts with Abbagnano, as if I wanted to close the accounts with an important part of my youth. Instead, I wanted to link the many elements in a logical series, contrasting each time what had been set aside, that is, quality. So I went back to the archetype of "authenticity rooted in being", an absurd formula, given that being remains uncontaminated and remote, unmanifest. None of these dialectical measures is original, but neither is it a copy of the many modulations that from Aristotle to Hegel fill the history of philosophy. There is an innovative aspect and there is a performative aspect. Each dialectical leap that Abbagnano makes in an attempt to recover the problematicity by inserting it in the heart of his concern, is a hybrid between archetype and application, at times running the risk of losing the same ability to persuade that from these operations it is legitimate to expect. Each leap is thus projected towards recovery, at times laborious, that it is interested in justifying logically, on the basis of the known rules of dialectics. Each time the archaicity of the archetype makes the provided reader jump - it is not possible that these obsolete paraphernalia are still used - and each time it is the aim that prevails, covering with a patina of necessary contemporaneity what generated the sense of detachment. There is a sort of mixture between diachrony and synchrony, never fully clarified. What moved in this puppet kingdom is the ghost of recovery. In fact, no danger is looming on the horizon but the philosopher is trained to fight with the shadows, and he feels at a distance the possibility, however remote it may be, of a danger. The individual possibilities are an image of danger, the problematic nature of an existence linked to doing as dangerous as crossing a road. Abbagnano does not care and does not accept comfort for the dying.

Authenticity, which he talks about so much, is the appearance and movement of objects, compulsively administered in appearance. It is just a concept made by reversing dispersion and loss. In itself it could be but it is not, that is, it is not placed in being, it is not a quality, but on the contrary it is an object produced by doing, in the technical field of metaphysics, it is an active experience, therefore incomplete, therefore - strictly speaking rigor of the term - inauthentic. The different experience tends to be completed in quality, this is never even hinted at by Abbagnano, who, on the contrary, takes care to root this fictitious experience in the fictitious possession of a fictitious transcendence. What should lay the groundwork for a transition to a non-systematic form of life experience is encapsulated in a strictly systematic appearance, captured in the world of making and thus obliged to keep in relationship with other objects produced far from quality.

Appearance has many similarities, objects basically have something in common, be they philosophical theories or guillotines. Only the being that has escaped them would

differentiate them from each other, no longer objects but qualitative experiences, recollections in which the object relives alongside a different illumination, coming from the quality experienced in the passing. Life is no longer an infinite separation and an infinite defense against the dangers of partiality, magnified by fear. It becomes complete - albeit for the duration of acting - and then enlivened by the remembrance that manages to speak to destiny. Now there is a connection that was missing before, in making, there is no longer the restlessness and the worry of possession with all the consequent necessary guarantees. In the extreme factual condensation, objectification produces the identical, or almost identical, the differences are never objective. In qualitative experience, completeness produces a real and objective difference. In remembrance, the balance between being and appearing - not their fusion, which produces nothingness - eliminates any necessary object identification, any compulsively administered concern. Appearance is a continuous change, being is a continuous completion. That is why the image that immediately comes to mind about being is chaos. Only chaos can for a moment - or forever, if we go beyond the point of no return - give completeness, that is, quality. In quality there is a different experience, not a rootedness. There is no longer even the fictitious problematic nature of doing, there is no accumulative knowledge either. The traces that are found in remembrance are residues of a different experience they are not the quality, they help to upset the compulsive structure of doing and to consider the future as destiny in a different way, but they are only traces, the original movement of overcoming has already been left behind as the unknown being who has been lived, albeit chaotically, and by which the life of diversity as self-awareness is transformed. Although it can indicate a sort of logic of everything and immediately, this is always *sui generis*, it cannot be considered a continuation of the logic of little by little. It is of another universe that we are talking about, not fully knowable, where indeed knowledge, as one advances, becomes a ballast from which it is necessary to free oneself. This whole experience never crosses over into a law or something like a law.

Abbagnano is satisfied with doing and pitches his tents in the entrenched camp of coercion. Here he starts from a problematic appearance, object production like any other. Now there can be no real problematicity in doing because there is nothing true in doing except in the dimidiated form of tautological mirroring. Few know that Stalin was a theorist and a staunch defender of this form of truth. Now, since there are no problems in making, there is no need to make choices because these are essentially impossible. Not being able to choose, one chooses only in appearance while remaining tied to a mechanism that decides in our place. Continuing on this inclined plane, everything is fictitious. The recovery itself is apparent, in other words Abbagnano defends himself from a danger that in fact does not exist, it is only a shadow cast in the cavern of the massacres.

Many might ask, but are these massacres only apparent? Of course, even the death of millions of men is an appearance if the life of millions of men, those same massacred millions, was only an appearance. This does not detract from the consistency of pain and exploitation, from the physicality of the body reduced to an object and produced in series. This does not mean that suffering is less, indeed, on the contrary, it is doubled by restlessness and fear and, ultimately, by the immediate awareness that nebulously perceives that it is wasting its own life.

Abbagnano disseminates his work as points of reference for anchoring his concerns. These remain constant tools, as if every single rootedness did not satisfy him, as if he were looking for a connection of roots, a network of dialectical reversals where, individually, each risk is advanced and then withdrawn in the calming of the reduction

to an object. There is a constant worry that re-emerges and does not want to disappear, can problematicity reach being? The answer is negative, despite the positive labels of Abbagnano's existentialism. Why do we say this? Because otherwise the continuous search for rooting would not be explained, a sort of archè that should provide stability but does not provide it. The same dialectical gimmicks are neither conclusive nor demonstrative, they only serve to overturn the various problems, indeed the various fears of getting lost in inauthenticity. Which would be like saying to get lost in appearance. But if nothing has ever really come out of the appearance, how can one get lost in it? Fear creates ghosts and then also creates antidotes against them.

The set of dialectical movements created by Abbagnano is not a single whole, presupposed to its applications, it is instead immanent in these, so that every time we start all over again with methodologically dubious but philosophically calming results. The historicity of this reward does not exist, Abbagnano proposes it every time but, whatever the recovery module used, in the end it escapes so it is more a sign than a real appearance in the object sense. The object that comes out of it is thus captured in continuous, relentless movements whose original purpose is to reassure but which do not achieve this purpose by only making themselves understandable, movements of ghosts inserted in the general context of appearing active. This makes the present of the seeker more intelligible than that of the thing sought. It is precisely the philosopher who reassures himself who, disregarding the evidence, denies it and replaces it with his dialectical opposite. Here I am not discussing his ability to understand the reality of his time - nor do I contrast it with mine, for evident unripe and presumptuous reasons - I only say that this was not the object he wanted to produce, but a Chinese wall that defended against the risk of annihilation. the reality that he should first understand and then defend. In the end, the need to defend, fueled by ghosts of perhaps non-existent danger, hid the ability to understand.

Abbagnano is too much a professor of philosophy to imagine himself in the icy waters of life. He prefers to stand on the shore and watch, making hypotheses and turning them into their opposite. This was its limit. It couldn't be otherwise. Thus, for him, the problematic nature is only an accident in life, a sign of a probable defect, due to the fact that man is not being, but only aspires to it. There is in life the traceable sign of an original instability, due to the nature of man and his inability to choose the authentic possibility. Therefore, he thinks, we philosophers must support him in this choice so that he identifies the sign of the problem, follows its trail and reaches a root that eliminates the possibility of loss. Appearance, with which the world of doing is impregnated, is like a surface on which traces of paths are indicated to reach being that is not in appearance but in something transcendent. The psychopomp of this itinerary is the philosopher. He delves into the object and descends into its meaning and identifies its dangers for being. Against these dangers the philosopher struggles.

What Abbagnano does not want to see is that the storm passes over his head. The world of doing has problems that do not affect the appearance that remains, only that some of these problems, for example murder, mark the mechanism that produces them in a particularly pernicious way. To produce these problems is the life and nature of being, his being a wolf for other men rather than an angel or simply a man. This mixture appears intricate and inextricable in being forced. The original bestiality joins the impulses of goodness, the rules are overturned in whims, the novelty in cloying convenience. All this is a conflict of objects without qualities, a painful conflict unable to question destiny. The philosopher lingers in arranging things, reducing the dangers, conserving the patrimony of knowledge, thus supplying the lake of blood

where murder is rampant.

Apart from personal reasons, of which I have tried to take into account as little as possible in this essay, what pushed me the most in this undertaking, which I hope is not in vain, was the belief that if Abbagnano's philosophy at the time I he had said something, even today he could have told me the same, or perhaps more. I must admit that this attempt has yielded grim results. Retracing his itineraries I realized that what the impression they made on me was at the time, in the long run they did not leave any sensible traces. This conservative obstinacy, which raises so much dust in him, has slipped over me like fresh water. It was certainly not the completeness that the philosopher taught, it was not the completeness that he pursued. I never followed the indicated route, it was too suffocating for me and for the war machine I had built in my head. I was too self-conscious to accept a suggestion of caution, a detail of defensive fortifications. What Abbagnano could not accept - or perhaps understand - was the tension towards quality, which in me at the time was concretized in the search for knowledge as a fight and fire test, not as a simple collection of tools in view of a goal to be achieved. . This tension made me, and makes me, unpredictable, even when I seem distant from myself.

It is courage that suggests the way to give reality its full dimension, without enclosing it in the object to be defended and without raising the appearance to being that it is not. Failing everything, it wrinkles in the defensive, unfolding it widens in the overtaking. But these two antithetical movements are not without consequences on those who carry them out. By enclosing oneself in doing, one encloses oneself in one's own misery and carries within oneself the signs and marks of compulsion, the traces of the chain. Going beyond, quality drags with it on an unknown adventure, drags into being, marking the itinerary in the forest with the chaotic signs of freedom. Abbagnano does not go out of appearance and tries to mimic the problem and the risk of quality while remaining in the quantitative area. Appearance is the choice he proposes, appearance all the rest. You cannot defend something that can never be in any danger. Thus he invents the condition of possible danger, stages the loss, achieves recovery and defense. These in a few words are his metaphysical moves, suitably arranged in a dialectical way.

In custody of this recitation of the appearance Abbagnano places the specific signs of recovery. They are symbolic words and carry a particularly strong signature. From time to time we have highlighted the most recurrent and the most charged with conservative significance. In "possession", for example, there is not only the capture of an object but, moreover, there is mutual belonging. The owner and the possession mark each other, they exchange guarantees and security. The philosopher acts as an intermediary between the possessor and the thing possessed, which must be protected from the risk that it vanishes in loss. The dual aspect of the dialectical mechanism allows the philosopher to seal the two sides of this relationship. Without recourse to the words that establish a delimitation of recovery and without the dialectic of reversal, would Abbagnano's speech still have maintained its positive foundation? It is not easy to answer. Maybe not. Perhaps his hypotheses of risk would have remained open or, in any case, would have remained hypotheses of the possibility of appearance, clear denunciations of incompleteness, analysis of the disastrous effects of the factual coercion. But Abbagnano considered his essential task to anchor positive existentialism in safety, developing, erasing a broad iconography of risk reabsorbed in the parallel iconography of safety.

As I said, Abbagnano wanted to characterize his existentialism in a positive sense, but what did he really mean by all this? Has it perhaps unwittingly referred to a scientific

foundation? Certainly not. To a saving or religious tradition? Not even this. These references are familiar to us, but the discussion on "faith" leaves several questions open to bring it closer to a Marcel. It stays away from you. To the "positive" specification he assigns a different title that characterizes the object in question in its own way. The reference links his philosophy to his way of conceiving life, to his existence. The first could remain incomprehensible if that signature did not stamp it in a particular way. It is not a positive philosophy, it is a philosophy that describes how to make existence positive, in other words, how to keep it out of harm's way. The spaces of coexistence do not cancel but underline the danger that this existence, thus saved from loss, falls into the anonymity of a false authenticity. In the same way, the technical means by which this safeguard is achieved are nothing more than further objects accumulated to create a further object, positivity. But this accumulation, in the perspective of danger, has the air of a network that is based only on the authority of the person who weaves it, the philosopher, not on a claimed objectivity that does not exist.

From time to time, the recovery of a single proposal of danger - not of a true danger of loss, which is never seriously delineated - curls up on itself in the dialectical claim of quieting by sealing. But we are dealing only with words arranged according to a known pattern that cover non-existent nudity like a modest veil. Therefore, as Abbagnano implies, there is no semiotic relationship between the proposal of danger and the recovery system, there is the fact that by insisting on this relationship, without actually ever coming to light, it is shifted into a context production and an object is manufactured which is then inserted into an object network of other objects pragmatically endowed with the meaning provided to them by the overall mechanism of forced action. The positivity is therefore not in the use of dialectical means of recovery and, least of all, in the sometimes ambiguous way in which the dangers from which to escape are proposed, but is moved elsewhere, in a sphere that indicates to the user how to use the positive existentialism and how to consider its author in this context of reassuring participation.

The positivity with which Abbagnano wants to gratify his existentialism is therefore not a characteristic of the latter but a juxtaposition that expresses the behavior of the philosopher in recovering the dangers presupposed but not proven as truly pertinent to the problematic nature of the authentic choice. The choice is assigned to existence, but it is not specified that it is essentially inaccessible as a choice that could upset the structure of doing. The only choice of this kind would be that between quantity and quality, but Abbagnano never mentions it. It uses an incredible term that should replace quality, "authenticity", a notarial term that refers to the administrative procedures of doing, where by taking root we obtain some certainty about the future, a guarantee for our possessions. Ultimately, positivity is only a remedy not a characteristic of Abbagnano's existence and reflection on existence, and this remedy works thanks to the metaphysical techniques we have talked about.

Removing this remedy, Abbagnano's existentialism would work the same, but as an open proposal, where one could insert critical development hypotheses regarding any type of rootedness. But the various openings made in this way should be concrete choices that are not apparent, they should individually indicate the possibility of an overcoming, exactly the opposite of a rooting. The dead points of fidelity would thus be brought back into doubt or deprived of meaning, they would remain mute and without reason to indicate a logical direction. Knowledge would now contribute to determining these real choices, no longer apparent, each comprising an indication marked in fire of the real risk that one runs, of the risk that in order to be taken must

be faced with courage. There could be many hypotheses to be made in this eventuality, possible but absent in Abbagnano, and none attributable to a recovery. With this signature on the choices existentialism could lead to other conclusions, not necessarily nullist, depriving itself of course of the dialectical leaps of which Abbagnano is so generous.

The process of recovery, at whose service Abbagnano puts himself, has its point of reference in the dialectical mechanism that we have mentioned so many times. It is not unimportant to keep in mind now that the movement of affirmation and denial is in itself inert and mute, so that in order to achieve recovery it must be animated by a program of danger flashed but not fully realized. The danger sign is affirmation and is generally placed in an objectified tension, that is, presented as an object. The sign of recovery is negation, which is also an object but not tension, indeed here the tension is reduced to a minimum, precisely in the rooting. These unreal figures, perfectly at ease in metaphysics and factual appearances, lend each other reality, as happens to shadows that trample each other without hurting themselves. In themselves these dialectical procedures have had their day but they could have some credibility if they really served to recover in the face of real danger. After all, for a conservative, recovery is his daily bread, but here there is nothing to recover because the danger is only imaginary, so the mechanism does its job but screeches empty. He continuously rolls up an object that has very different consequences - first of all the incompleteness and then the partiality perched in itself - certainly not the danger or risk indicated by Abbagnano.

There is no doubt that Abbagnano has realized that he is using a misplaced recovery, as can be seen from certain losses of cohesion regarding science and coexistence in the world, not to mention the claims about technology. Evidently his purpose was unreal, he had no concrete dangers in mind, for him as silent as his workroom, but philosophical dangers, theoretical failures and losses, just as the choices were not choices of life but of an interpretation of life of which philosophy is so cared for. This is why he artificially prepares, and without caring too much about the details, a dialectical recovery that is now out of philosophy, precisely because he knows that that was enough to stop an imaginary avalanche and turn - with a happy heart and a task done - to the mechanism of doing, soliciting a counter-proof that would confirm that everything has returned to its place in the cave of massacres.

Positive existentialism does not coincide with the sign that Abbagnano has chosen for him, let's say with the label. This is common, not even nullist existentialism uses an adequate label, but positive intelligibility is more risky as it involves in a backward process, emptying the object of meaning, not only the hypothesis of relationship with being, but also the justifications for recovery. The knowledge of this unreliable mechanism in turn gives the user the idea that only the empty sound of the term has a pacifying function, and that this emptiness works well since the contenders have reconciled themselves well in time. Choice is risk-free in life because it is truly lacking in quality. In its proposition as a reality of quantity, and only of this, it cannot but have the limited and harmless risk of a greater or lesser quantification.

Wandering around the active maze needs these reference markings, ghosts placed to indicate fictitious turns in a path of ghosts, and the philosophers, in their dogmatic sleep, are there to supply these papier-mâché puppets. The whole world of making is an appearance that emerges and remains visible, without completely disappearing, thanks to continuous maintenance that passes from production to explanation and vice versa. Within the object there is no being, there is no hypothetical spiritual world, there is nothing but the panic of lack, the restlessness of incompleteness. The

natural language of the object is the addition, and life made up of additions and preservations is not a very beautiful object. But the foundation of this object, lost in the continuous repetitiveness of coercion, lies elsewhere, in the quality, that is, in its being which has been stolen from it by greed and fear that breathes on the world.

The words, which the philosopher feeds on, are unable to express the quality. Not even as a reminder, although in this case they can enrich the object almost to complete it and speak to destiny, snatching it from its banality of future. I am only able to attend to the maintenance of the forced mechanism within which the object struggles in its incompleteness. The word is therefore an effective tool and a model of quantity, not quality. I can speak of danger but saying it does not give rise to real danger; I can speak of courage, but there is no courage in the word. The action is beyond words, even those that are eventually called to remember it. Yet a sign the word engraves in the object and, by insisting, can cause a sort of cognitive upheaval, that is, the preparation and selection of tools suitable for overcoming. The working of the action is different from the oppressive and controlled doing, therefore it cannot allow the word to cover it and justify it in the same way as the latter. If this were to happen, the power of active involvement would be conferred on the word, which is the work of a different conscience, it would be a sort of sadly objective initiation, an exorcism. I do not need words to act but only to remember my action, and these words, in this case, have a particular charge and upset the compulsory structure of the object - within certain limits - but they did not participate in the unleashing of the action. .

In the same way I thought half a century ago, even today I think that philosophy, knowledge among knowledge, can not only be used to feed the massacres, as it happens in its current use, but also to make it possible to overcome . There is in the word that looks at the great questions of life a mystery not yet solved, not even by the many hermeneutical analyzes, and this mystery is linked to the implementation of action. Is there a relationship between action and knowledge? There is but it is not easy to say. You can encircle the doing and force it to retreat into the simple stronghold of the object, but in the end you have to put aside the word and throw yourself into the fray. If this does not happen, the sign of the word is not only wasted but also functional to recovery. There is no guarantee with words, and the philosophy that uses them knows it well, only that it often twists them according to its own ends, which are always those of murder. Returning to Abbagnano's positive existentialism and the use of this word, I have always wondered what would be the result of a more consequent use of the term "factual". The support given to the word "positive" was of a metaphysical nature, opening the field to the corrective intervention of the hypothetical risks, as I said nonexistent. The word "positive" would not have provided any metaphysical support, but would have openly grafted his philosophical reflection into making forced, in the production of objects, a preliminary declaration of modesty that certainly would not have hurt his philosophical credibility, wanting to distinguish himself from the rampant existentialism nullist.

Yet the use of the word "positive" has a rationale that cannot be ignored. Abbagnano never specified it fully, but this is normal as philosophers are often the least suited to understand their own philosophy. This word means at the outset, before the prospect of risk, the limiting planning of recovery, in itself does not give anything concrete to the choices of which existentialism in general is the bearer, but the concept of recovery is highlighted and therefore , due to the commutative property of dialectics, also the concept of danger and loss. This word establishes a favorable condition for moving two ghosts engaged in a completely apparent clash, loss and recovery.

Limited to doing, reign of ghosts, I must recognize a certain efficacy to the word I discuss here, how effective a well-articulated figure of speech or a well-executed piece of writing is compared to a slovenly and unpleasant to read. I cannot say that these are unimportant issues, only that they relate distantly, or not at all, to Abbagnano's philosophy and his claim to save man and his existence from the dangers of being lost and lost in nothingness. I think Abbagnano made a reasoning quite close to the following. The word "positive" does not directly produce recovering effects but prepares, thanks to the dialectical mechanism, the recovery process and therefore, in this way, has its own effectiveness. In other words, "positive" is a sign that labels and prepares at the same time, obviously remaining in the appearance of forced action. However, the preparation can remain hidden if the process of dialectical overturning and therefore the concrete operation of recovery is not set in motion.

All of Abbagnano's work tends towards conservation. In it, existence remains a sort of habitus not to be tested except in the abstract, that is, in the choice that is not chosen. This conservative attitude produces and accumulates in existence a power that keeps away from danger simply because it has a positive character, that is, it is ordered to be rooted in transcendental tension. The positive character of existence is in being, and the more it is rooted in this, the more the sign of this positivity is deeply imprinted in existence. Here there is a double misunderstanding, the first places being in the appearance of doing, the second brings the character of positivity back to conservation. A paradoxical conclusion that is concerned with establishing precisely correlations that are perhaps non-existent in Abbagnano. In the end, following the thread of the sign, we are following what exists only in the world we have imagined, not in Abbagnano. Just punishment for those who persist in meeting metaphysicians.

Having therefore nothing to counterbalance with his rootedness, no danger to avert, Abbagnano creates in his philosophy a completely imaginary dialectical overcoming - not an overcoming -. Like all supporters of something abstract, he is in principle even more radical than would have been necessary in the face of concrete dangers. His recovery intentions are even more conservative. In carrying out the defense there is more deputation to the danger than there is in the indication of the danger itself. Since it is a movement of ghosts that act within the sphere of appearance, the thing has its effect. The danger is glimpsed by the user not in the indication of the choice but in the defense roots. What sense would it be to prepare defenses without a precise direction from which the danger is perceived? And Abbagnano always puts this danger before the conservative measure. From the narrow metaphysical realm, the inverted reversal relationship has considerable demonstrative power and it is this that brings out the nonexistent danger as if it were truly in front of the reader. The choice remains impossible, the scope of doing remains sealed in the usual way, but conservation is activated and produces its effects. As if to say that danger is not a real movement of existence, it does not bring it into play, but the conservation designated in the dialectical procedure makes it come to light as a signature imprinted on the object itself which in this way is dangerously harmless. Through the philosopher, the user experiences a dangerous condition as in a dream, is put at risk - fictitiously - and is taken out and rooted in conservation.

What we are emphasizing in Abbagnano is valid for any philosopher. Exactly, in the theory developed by the philosopher - in Abbagnano the thing is only more evident because of his extreme conservatism - a relationship of opposite sign with respect to reality is established, for which the simple fact of saying this reality is assimilated to the theory . This is the way philosophy produces objects, and this production is always directed towards the cave of massacres. Unhooked from any correspondence

commitment with the productive organization, philosophy has its roots in unpredictable consequences, in its past as well as in its future. With all his lofty feelings he always works to fuel murder, but it is not just any productive mechanism, or at least it does not work like all the other mechanisms of forced doing. This is why it can give life to objects that while remaining such - such as dialectical mechanisms - enter the market in another way and are used in a different way. They do not create a different consciousness, this they cannot do, they do not create a different consciousness, but they fascinate with a network of correlations that the rigid foundation of control finds it difficult to maintain within the limits set by the logical consciousness based on little by little. The figures that emerge feed a vast imaginary world that extends with wide borders, spreading parallel to doing and respecting the rules of the latter but in its own way. There is always in the philosophical object the intangible presence of a secret companion, only imagined by the user but fed by the philosopher's ability, and this hidden figure often takes the place of an always apparent imagination of being, and consoles and helps, covers and shrewdly moves accomplice to ensure the underground supply of the massacres.

The justifications of the philosophers are therefore enigmatic, and this even when they seem direct and clear, animated by iron deductive logic. They do not have as their foundation the objects of making as they are in forced production, but as they appear in the philosopher's imagination, in this very close to what happens in poetry or literature and even closer to what happens in music or in literature. figurative arts. Philosophical images do not reflect reality and are not duplicates of objects, even though they are also objects, but they are imaginary operations collected and concentrated on a problem that is indeed a non-philosophical object. It is this problem, for example existence for Abbagnano, which marks a philosophy and which constitutes that which provides the content or meaning or, if you prefer, the root of the philosophical imagination. The influence of philosophical reflection and of its consequent image on the object of forced production constitutes the trace that philosophy, thanks to its own meaning, imprints on the object in such a way as to make it an appearance more adequate to the function for which it is intended. This bond, or impression or mark, is the way in which philosophy marks the reality and the forced world that imprisons us all, covering it with a blanket of verisimilitude that keeps away any ambition to go beyond. Abbagnano's positive position, with its conservative concerns, is very representative of this way of working of the philosopher. In this impression we read more than what the philosopher wrote, and which we have followed step by step here, and indicates an area of undecidability, a place full of unmanifest surprises for those who have the desire and the courage to lift the veil of Maya.

Among the many hidden paths in the forest that suddenly turn towards quality, without having any privilege with this, there is this one of the philosophical imagination. By itself, enclosed in the logic of little by little, this imaginative force ends up covering the forced object and leading it towards the cave of massacres. Yet, in an unusual way, it can turn away from its institutional task and find itself projected elsewhere, towards involvement in quality. Unfortunately this is not the case with Abbagnano and I regret it for me not for him.

I cannot say that at the time I was able to fully grasp this intention, that is, of how the philosophical image could take an unthinkable different path. Over time, however, and now, in these very hard days of the late evening of my life, I realize that a real suggestion came to me from that same conservative dullness that was in front of me. Perhaps for a virtue of contrast, as it belongs to my character, when I find myself in

front of the absolutely obtuse I feel in me the best intuitions, the breath become wider and the hopes rise in flight. Like a flower of the driest and most hostile earth, frail at first and then more and more robust and self-confident, this is exactly where the idea of crossing over was born. The experience of quality was still to come, for the moment I was just entering the forest.

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